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Introduction
We have always lived in the shadows like obscure cockroaches, 
powerless before the reading of a newspaper, babbling before the 
morose enemy who stole our crops, stripped our land, converted 
them from wheat into vineyards useless for our hunger. We 
receive the natural verdict with relief. It would nally break the 
monotony of servitude. And it is the native soil that will shake 
the rocks and that now opens, to bury us with our denouncers, 
these arrogant masters who know the pain that they inict.
— “Old Man,” in Henri Kréa, Le séisme: Tragédie
A lmost four years after the French Algerian city of Orléansville was devastated by an earthquake in September 1954, the Franco-Alge-rian playwright Henri Kréa published a play that presented the seismic 
disaster as a harbinger of a painful but necessary decolonization. Kréa, a.k.a. 
Henri Cochin, son of a French father and Algerian mother, was an advocate 
of Algerian independence, and the struggle for decolonization was still under-
way when Kréa wrote Le séisme: Tragédie.1 The Algerian Revolution, which had 
begun just weeks a	er the earthquake, would not achieve the independence of 
Algeria from French rule until 1962. In the intervening years, North Africa and 
France would be wracked by a series of disasters: seismic a	ershocks and years 
of brutal warfare in Algeria, a dam collapse in France, a mass poisoning, and 
another catastrophic earthquake in Morocco.
Kréa’s play, begun in 1956 and published in 1958 in both Paris and Tunis, was 
explicitly anti-imperialist. The play builds on the synchronicity of the Orléans-
ville earthquake and the nationalist revolution that began a few weeks later. Yet 
Kréa’s play purports to render chronology irrelevant: Le séisme opens with a rec-
itation of major earthquakes of the 1900s, from Calabria in 1905 to Orléansville 
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in 1954, and then juxtaposes these disasters, particularly the Orléansville earth-
quake, with an ancient narrative of anti-colonial resistance in North Africa: the 
second-century BC rebellion of the Numidian king Jugartha against Roman 
occupation.2 The geoenvironmental disaster of 1954 was linked to colonial vi-
olence through the category of malheur (misfortune, woe); the revolution of 
1954 was linked to antiquity through the theme of oppression and anti-colonial 
rebellion.
At the outset, the play’s portrayal of natural disasters is intertwined with its 
portrayal of Roman/French colonialism in North Africa. The prologue begins 
with a voiceover explaining geological theories of earthquake production and 
then turns to antiquity, with the Romans invading North Africa like “locusts 
that periodically swoop down to bring famine to fertile Numidia.”3 After the 
prologue, however, the ancient setting abruptly dissolves, and the focus of the 
first act of the play (“Episode 1”) shifts to the 1954 earthquake as the play turns 
to the relationship between the seismic and political events in modern Algeria. 
Revising a trope that geographer El Djamhouria Slimani Aït Saada has traced 
back to the colonial discourses of the nineteenth century, Kréa portrayed a coun-
try battered by misfortune. Earthquakes, war, floods, locusts, and the tragedy 
of death in childbirth all converge in the suffering of the Algerian people. The 
choir chants in the final passage of the play:
This country, crucible of men of all origins of all poetic destinations  
Collides
With clatterings of fire
With the deaf rhythm of blood
Flowing in streams
Like a flooding river
Breaking the dikes of the narrow valleys. . . .
The eternal wave of generations . . .
Crushed by the cosmic pestle
Of misfortune.4
However, this grim finale, as well as the play’s subtitle—Tragédie—contradicts 
the dominant narrative of the play, which portrays the earthquake as a vehicle 
of salvation.5
At first, the earthquake seems to sweep away the injustices of colonialism, 
offering death as the only liberation. However, the pessimism of the Old Man’s 
interpretation of the disaster is superseded by a vision of hope through cathar-
sis, communicated at the end of “Episode 1” in a voiceover that reinforces the 
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relationship between the seismic and political upheavals in Algeria: “Under-
stand that the earth shook at the same time that the people arose from their tor-
por.”6 Thus the moral righteousness of the struggle for liberation gives meaning 
to all other forms of suffering. In Kréa’s play, the earthquake is not just a portent 
of the coming revolution, it is also retribution:
All the dead howl and stir in concert, these fields and these villages that 
were stolen from them. The trees open to battle the convoy of sacrilege. 
Nothing different, the insects, stones, man. Their planes like sharks are 
drowned by the welcome invasion of locusts. Their arms are of no use.7
One disaster avenges another, and if the colonized suffer, the colonizer is also 
weakened. The earthquake is a disaster not only for the long-suffering Algerians 
but also for the French; as such, it is the first strike against empire. The varieties 
of catastrophe that afflict humanity blur into one another: sharks and aerial 
bombardments; childbirth and epidemics; earthquakes and locusts. Yet there is 
order and meaning in this litany of suffering:
The great day has arrived
With its procession of misfortunes
But misfortunes are good for something
For example the general suppression of misery
The resurrection of grand sentiments
Certainly
One must die of hunger . . . to be human8
The earthquake, and the war, serve a purpose: the liberation and redemption of 
the Algerian people.
Kréa’s association of French colonialism with natural scourges like sharks or 
locusts portrays individual human actors as overwhelmed by a situation they 
neither understand nor control. The French occupiers are confused, struggling 
to follow an imperial ideology but bewildered by the realities of colonial North 
Africa. Believing in the good works brought about by colonialism but pelted 
by children throwing potatoes “larded with razor blades,” the soldiers ask why 
their beneficence is welcomed with such hostility, even from the earth itself: 
“the stones themselves ruminate with menace.”9 Ultimately, the colonial situ-
ation leads the occupiers to extremes of evil. A soldier who was a surgeon in 
France, saving lives, becomes a torturer in Algeria, disemboweling prisoners. An-
other soldier speaks with regret of two children he slaughtered “like partridges”; 
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another gleefully recounts the story of a humanist professor who spoke of ethics 
until he came under fire, at which point he became “as savage as a cannibal,” 
getting drunk and “thinking only of raping little girls.” This brutality, the play 
suggests, stems from colonial occupation; French intentions and the idea of a 
civilizing mission are irrelevant: they cannot mitigate the brutal nature of colo-
nialism any more than they can alter the movement of tectonic plates.10
The dramatic turning point in the play is the radicalization of the older gen-
eration of Muslim Algerians. This occurs in the last section of the play, when 
the Old Man and the Old Woman break free from their tragic flaw, their re-
signed accommodation to colonialism, which Kréa portrays as characteristic of 
the older generation. Awakened from their “hypnosis”11 by the earthquake, the 
old couple becomes politicized, and the Old Man leaves to take up arms for 
the nationalist cause. The sound of the rumbling earth fills the theater, and an 
image of a mask of Jugartha, symbol of anti-colonial rebellion, is projected onto a 
screen. Rather than representing the earthquake as an inexplicable, meaningless 
bringer of suffering, Kréa’s characters interpret it as a clarion call to revolution 
and as a sacrifice for the cause. In Kréa’s play, the earthquake-inflicted suffering 
of the people, like the violence of rebellion, is the price of salvation. In this vision 
of human politics and the physical environment, the two become one: the earth-
quake and the Algerian Revolution form an inseparable cataclysm.12
Decolonization and Disaster
Historians have increasingly recognized the role of environmental disasters in 
the expansion of colonial empires and the development of colonial states.13 In 
the historiography of decolonization in North Africa, however, environmental 
events, no matter how catastrophic in scale or transformative for those involved, 
are often relegated to the background.14 For the average historian, “Algeria 1954” 
is shorthand for one thing: the beginning of the Algerian Revolution, a war 
which finally led to Algerian independence over seven years later. For the sur-
vivors of Orléansville, however, “Algeria 1954” invokes not only the revolution 
but also the earthquake. For those who experienced environmental disasters in 
Morocco, Algeria, and France between 1954 and 1960, the consequent horrors 
were major events, not mere footnotes to the military and political upheavals 
of those years. However, the experience of empire and decolonization did not 
cease when environmental disasters erupted into the social and political lives 
of humans. The inseparability of the human and the environmental, of disaster 
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and decolonization, was inscribed across a range of historical texts that can be 
examined by the historian: in archival documents, in architecture, in fiction, 
and in memoir. The interpenetrations of disaster and decolonization in these 
texts have often been obscured by the tendency of popular and academic histo-
riography to separate narratives of political and military events and narratives of 
human culture and society from the history of the inanimate environment. Yet 
the evidence examined here reveals ways in which the environmental is lived and 
understood by humans through the experience of the political and the social.
The earthquake portrayed by Kréa was one of several environmental catastro-
phes that were bound up in the history, literature, and memory of decoloni-
zation in the French empire. This book focuses on four major environmental 
disasters that afflicted France, Algeria, and Morocco. These disasters occurred in 
the period of French Africa’s transition to independence, which came, formally, 
to Morocco (and Tunisia) in 1956; to much of sub-Saharan Africa in 1960; and, 
finally, to Algeria in 1962. Two of the disasters examined here are earthquakes: 
the September 9, 1954 earthquake and its seismic aftershocks in Algeria’s Chélif 
Valley, and the February 28, 1960 earthquake in Agadir, Morocco. The other 
two are of overtly anthropogenic origins: the flooding of Fréjus, France, due to 
the collapse of the Malpasset Dam in 1959, and a mass outbreak of paralysis in 
1959 Morocco, caused by the contamination of the food supply with jet engine 
lubricant from an American airbase.
These four disasters were interrelated in multiple ways. Refugees from the 
Orléansville earthquake found themselves in Fréjus when the Malpasset Dam 
collapsed, and Orléansville became a model for state responses to disaster in 
both Fréjus and Agadir. The experience of the 1959 poisoning altered the politi-
cal calculus of both the US State Department and the Moroccan political oppo-
sition following the 1960 earthquake. The Fréjus flood was invoked by French, 
American, and Moroccan actors in the diplomatic wrangling, domestic politics, 
and great-power machinations that followed both the 1959 poisoning and 1960 
earthquake. Due to these interconnections, these four events constitute a single 
object of study, impacting Algerian struggles for independence, French reckon-
ing with the loss of empire, and Moroccans’ endeavors to extricate themselves, 
even after formal independence, from the continuing military and cultural leg-
acy of French occupation.
These four disasters were not the only four horsemen of the French empire’s 
apocalypse in North Africa. Indeed, drought, famine, disease, torture, and mas-
sacres are all mentioned in the chapters that follow. Elinor Accampo and Jeffrey 
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Jackson have defined “disasters” as “extraordinary circumstances that force in-
dividuals, governments, and organizations to operate in unusual and stressful 
ways.”15 There were many such circumstances amidst the tumult of imperialism 
and decolonization. Nevertheless, these four catastrophes were distinct from the 
other calamities of the era in their interconnectedness and in that they were 
large-scale transformative events produced by “rapid-onset hazards,” the onsets 
of which were not intentionally initiated, thus fitting a narrower scholarly defi-
nition separating disasters from other infelicitous events.16
No great importance is placed here on the distinction between “nature- 
induced” and anthropogenic disasters.17 Rousseau said of the 1755 earthquake 
that devastated Lisbon and Meknes that, if people did not build homes made of 
heavy materials, earthquakes would cause little damage.18 Rousseau’s argument 
becomes particularly relevant to the present study when one learns of the injuries 
to earthquake-stricken rural Algerians caused by collapsing tile roofs, an innova-
tion that had replaced the mud-and-thatch used in decades past. More than two 
centuries after Rousseau, scholars now widely accept that the effects of so-called 
“natural disasters” are determined by historical processes and human actions. 
As Jonathan Bergman has put it, natural disasters constitute “a meeting ground 
or ‘human ecology’ between human and non-human worlds.”19 This is also true 
of unintentionally produced disasters such as the Malpasset Dam collapse in 
France and the mass chemical poisoning in Morocco, which were triggered by 
anthropogenically manufactured hazards.
Ted Steinberg has argued that the modern idea of a “natural” disaster is a 
technology of power, allowing elites to obscure the processes that produce dis-
proportionate suffering among the disempowered.20 In all four of the disasters 
addressed here, the colonized suffered more than did the colonizers, and the 
poor more than the rich, due to the unequal distribution of resources both be-
fore and after the disaster. In the case of the two earthquakes, the idea of “nat-
ural disasters” helped elites’ efforts to obscure the social determinants of this 
suffering. But all four of these disasters revealed the inequities and injustices of 
colonialism.
However, while recognizing the revelatory aspect of disasters, we must also 
recognize that disasters can also be transformative, creating abrupt changes in 
political, social, and cultural landscapes as well as physical ones. The present 
volume takes up the challenge posed by environmental historians to consider 
seriously the impact of the environment on human history.21 Arguing against 
the notion of “natural” (or “accidental”) disasters in favor of the idea that the 
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results of disasters are determined by human decisions and social arrangements, 
one runs the risk of denying the importance of the environment in history, re-
peating the notion of modern history as a story of humans shaping their own 
destinies using ingredients provided by nature.22
In the mythology of modernity, the environment begins as a problem but be-
comes a tool. This myth is shadowed by its inverse: the Frankenstein narrative of 
human hubris that places (inadequate) human rationality in opposition to (un-
controllable) nature. However, sources close to these events reveal a multivalent 
relation between the human history of decolonization and the environmental 
history of floods, chemical compounds, and earthquakes. As Timothy Mitchell 
has argued, the opposition between inanimate nature and active human ratio-
nality is problematic, a discursive tradition which itself ought to be an object 
of study, imposed upon a messy web of causality involving both human and 
non-human actors. In contrast to this hegemonic discourse, survivors’ memoirs 
and literary representations such as Kréa’s represent counter-hegemonic visions 
of what Mitchell calls “the ambivalent relation between the nonhuman and the 
human.”23 Archival documents reveal how disasters disrupted colonial projects 
and undermined the propaganda of imperialist “civilization” that promised 
material and moral benefits for the colonized; disasters likewise undercut tri-
umphalist nationalist narratives promising that political independence would 
bring salvation to the poor and oppressed. In other instances, however, the new 
circumstances created by disasters were mastered by the powerful, who forged 
new tools of colonial oppression, international diplomacy, anti-colonial propa-
ganda, or authoritarian nation-building.
In Kréa’s creative vision, humans are not the only actors, and the distinc-
tion between the human and inanimate fades. Kréa’s narrator informs us that 
“earthquakes are subject to the same causes whether they be human or telluric.”24 
Henri Kréa’s portrayal of the 1954 earthquake’s relation to the struggle for in-
dependence might be dismissed as “mere” metaphor, a literary device, if it were 
not for other types of documentary evidence revealing the effects of these disas-
ters, as “both ecological facts and representational spaces,”25 on the experience 
of decolonization, while also revealing the impact of decolonization on the ex-
perience of these disasters. This evidence includes French, Algerian, Moroccan, 
and American sources ranging from diplomatic cables and political polemics to 
memoirs and architectural reviews. These sources demonstrate that the intersec-
tions of disaster and decolonization affected not only memoirs and imaginative 
writing but also Cold War diplomacy, humanitarian medical missions, and the 
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architecture and urbanism of post-disaster reconstruction. This archival record 
is replete with evidence that the processes of decolonization and disaster were 
not just related by a coincidental similarity in their eects on human bodies and 
built environments but that disaster and decolonization impacted each other 
in multiple ways, as the legacy of colonialism and the politics of decolonization 
shaped the distribution of harm and the distribution of aid, while the destruc-
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Map 1. The western Maghreb and southwestern Europe. (Erin Greb Cartography.)
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Calamity, Empire, and Locality
The events described here all took place within a particular trans-Mediterranean 
region of the waning French empire, encompassing the western Maghreb and 
the Côte d’Azur. This book situates environmental disasters in the context of 
the processes of decolonization through which France, Algeria, and Morocco 
negotiated new relationships as separate entities rather than as components of 
an empire. However, the focus here is on localities rather than nation-states. 
To be more precise, the book centers on the study of disaster-afflicted provin-
cial cities and the areas around them: Orléansville and the Chélif Valley, Fréjus 
and the Reyran Valley, Agadir and the Sous Valley, and, to a lesser degree, Me-
knes, the initial epicenter of the 1959 poisoning that afflicted much of Morocco. 
Scholars Gregory Mann and Emmanuelle Saada, among others, have urged their 
colleagues to integrate the study of particular localities into our understanding 
of imperialism in both metropole and colony and to explore the relation of lo-
calities to each other and to global and imperial institutions and networks.26 
In an article focusing on Fréjus, Mann seeks to push colonial studies to see be-
yond the colonial cultures and discourses of the imperial administrative centers 
(Paris, Dakar) to the varied and specific places that constituted the empire. This 
book follows Mann by working to “disaggregate”27 the waning French empire 
by focusing on specific provincial localities—but it also explores what might be 
illuminated by re-aggregating these localities through the trans-local category 
of “disaster” (sinistre, cataclysme, catastrophe, karitha), a category neglected in 
academic historiography but dynamic in the popular press of the time, the ar-
chival record, and the remembered experience of those involved. Mann writes: 
“The town [Fréjus] and places like it offer immense potential for understand-
ing the cultivation and evolution of historically grounded social and political 
formations, as well as the emergence of new ones.”28 If we read “places like it” 
to mean other locales both transformed by decolonization and afflicted by di-
saster—i.e. Orléansville, Meknes, Agadir—we can then examine how disasters 
catalyzed the “emergence” of new “social and political formations” and how im-
perialism and decolonization shaped how people in these locales interpreted and 
responded to disaster.
The historiographic turn toward locality parallels efforts by Algerian scholars 
and memoirists to explore and remember local pasts, a trend which has produced 
complex treatments of the colonial era. Mostefa Lacheraf, in his 1999 preface to 
Dr. Belgacem Aït Ouyahia’s memoir Pierres et lumières, describes the attempt 
by Algerian writers to liberate Algerian history from the dominance of “abstract 
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ideologies, ahistorical and without relation to reality past or present” through 
the writing of local histories of village life and of cities. Writing during the civil 
war of the 1990s, Lacheraf argued that this localist turn could serve to counter 
not only “stereotyped ethnography” of Algerians (a legacy of colonialism) but 
also visions of Algeria promoted by Islamist radicals.29 This historiography of 
the local also offers an alternative to nationalist narratives of heroic resistance 
to a uniformly destructive colonizer.30 As Chapter 7 of the present volume will 
discuss, Aït Ouyahia’s memoir explicitly seeks to provide such an alternative 
through his self-deprecatory representations of his own tentative relation to the 
struggle for independence, and, less explicitly, through his ambiguous portrayals 
of French colonial education and medicine.
The turn toward local history in Algeria has also brought to light the relation-
ships between local disasters and experiences of colonialism and decolonization. 
El Djamhouria Slimani Aït Saada has made the region of the Chélif Valley, in-
cluding Orléansville (later known as El Asnam and today as Chlef), the focus of 
a study which “seeks to unravel the ties between physical and human geography 
and space, and economic, social, and cultural life” through an examination of 
memoirs, geographical works, and literature written from the time of French 
conquest to the late twentieth century.31 Aït Saada’s examination of the Ché-
lif Valley details an enduring discourse about the violence of the environment 
in Algeria that has persisted from the time of French conquest through half a 
century of Algerian independence. French sources from the nineteenth century 
reveal that the Orléansville region was defined, in the minds of many French 
writers, by the environmental hardships inflicted on its inhabitants, as “the heat, 
the floods, and the earthquakes contributed to the construction of a strongly 
deprecatory imagination of the region.”32 Since independence, Algerian writers 
have continued to reflect on the brutality of this environment. This discourse 
of the violent environment resembles the persistent narrative of human violence 
as the defining feature of Algerian history recently deconstructed by James Mc-
Dougall in both its racist imperialist form (“imagined native ‘savagery’” requir-
ing repressive violence from the colonizer) and its nationalist reincarnation (“in-
flexible, unreformable, total oppression” requiring revolutionary violence from 
the colonized).33 But these discourses about political and environmental violence 
are not separate, parallel strands. Aït Saada’s work reveals, with local specificity, 
a double helix of connections between discourses about calamity, colonial rule, 
and decolonization in the Chélif region.
Aït Saada explains that the association of natural disaster with the uprising of 
the Algerian people appeared not only in the work of Henri Kréa but also in that 
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of other Algerian writers such as Habib Tengour and Belgacem Aït Ouyahia 
(both discussed at length in this book), as well as Jean Millecam and Mohamed 
Magani.34 Aït Saada could also have included the leftist dissidents Boualem 
Khalfa, Henri Alleg, and Abdelhamid Benzin, who echoed Kréa in their mem-
oir of the dissident newspaper Alger Républicain: “The autumn of 1954 opened 
with a cataclysm. As if nature wanted to be the herald of the hurricane that, for 
more than seven years, would tear apart and convulse the country.”35 For these 
writers, as Aït Saada argues, the “political and telluric tremors” of the period 
could not be separated.36
The intersections of colonialism and decolonization with environmental 
calamity are equally evident in writings about the disasters in Fréjus, Agadir, 
and Meknes. In Morocco, there has been much interest in distinct histories of 
localities long neglected in nationalist historiographies—particularly in the 
Tashelhit-speaking south, where Agadir is located. This interest is due both to 
the widespread perception, discussed in Chapter 6, that the 1960 earthquake 
had a deleterious and disorienting effect on Agadir’s relation to Moroccan her-
itage and identity and to the countervailing narrative of the Berber cultural 
movement that posits Agadir as the “capital” of Morocco’s Berber culture.37 
In Fréjus, meanwhile, local notions of a particular identity have undergirded 
resistance to more inclusive notions of Frenchness from the time of the 1959 
Malpasset Dam collapse to the present. The chapters that follow make the argu-
ment that, in these localities, the experience of catastrophe was inseparable from 
the upheavals of decolonization, and the shape of decolonization was crafted by 
catastrophe.
The Long and the Short of It
Decolonization and disasters were often tied together in survivors’ and observ-
ers’ interpretations and memories of events—that is to say, in the lived expe-
rience of events, for we live in realms of memory and interpretation. Was this 
merely an ahistorical psychological or linguistic phenomenon—a tendency to as-
sociate suffering with suffering, sometimes including other, more personal trau-
mas? Does Kréa’s metaphor of disaster and decolonization have dramatic force 
only by means of a trick of the mind or linguistic sleight of hand through which 
the reader accepts the equation of one sort of woe with another? In Kréa’s play, 
the casualties of war and earthquake are intermingled with childbirth, death, 
and the suffering of famine.38 In other accounts of disaster discussed in this 
book, an automobile accident, a geriatric medical crisis and a childhood sexual 
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assault mingle with the violence of decolonization and of disasters. Meanwhile, 
the equation of environmental disaster with war had become commonplace in 
the twentieth century, as new technologies and methods of warfare—bomber 
planes and basket bombs— now leveled buildings and created carnage in a way 
that resembled the effects of earthquakes and floods.
This book argues that the survivors, novelists, and memoirists who associated 
the disasters of the period with decolonization were not merely suffering from 
a painful mental illusion or capitalizing on a coincidental resemblance or use-
ful metaphor. They were invoking a literary trope, to be sure, but the power of 
that literary trope was based, as good literature is, on astute observation. These 
individuals recognized that distinctions between the natural and the social, the 
seismic and the political, are illusory. No environmental event is experienced 
outside of sociopolitical contexts, and no human story takes place in an envi-
ronmental vacuum. The archival record reveals that the upheavals in Algeria, 
Morocco, and France that were triggered by the disasters of 1954–1960 were in-
separable from the upheavals produced by the violence of colonialism and decol-
onization. The human relation to the environment is not separate from political 
history, and one cannot write the history of these disasters without writing the 
history of decolonization.
Unlike Mitchell’s Rule of Experts and Gregory Clancey’s Earthquake Nation, 
works which have deftly treated intersections of environment and Western im-
perialism, this book does not focus primarily on “experts,” although experts are 
certainly included here. Much of this book examines the disruption caused by 
disasters and the efforts to conceptualize and instrumentalize disasters among 
those whose claims of expertise lay elsewhere: mayors, legislators, bureaucrats, 
diplomats, journalists, novelists, dissidents, a fisherman, an obstetrician, a film-
maker. Some of the sources used here conform to the traditional definition of 
“hard” primary sources: written close to the time of the event, for purposes 
seemingly other than the representation of events to posterity, but collected 
by archivists for later use in the construction of historiography. However, the 
present volume also examines, as source evidence, texts written months, years, 
or decades later. These texts include not only imaginative writing and personal 
memoirs but also local histories. However, while written long after the onset of 
the disasters discussed here, such sources are no less “primary” to an examina-
tion of the long-term effects of these disasters and the meanings that humans 
ascribed to them.
This book examines disasters and decolonization as temporally extensive 
phenomena that do not occur in a “catastrophic instant” but that unfold over 
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the course of time—not only weeks and years but also decades.39 Cities, once 
destroyed, remain transformed evermore, even if rebuilt. Bodies that become 
paralyzed remain impaired for decades, even if some recovery occurs. And the 
dead remain dead, even if they do not all remain in their original graves. There-
fore, sources that would usually be considered “secondary”—produced long after 
the initiating “event”—become “primary” in this analysis, revealing the disaster 
and decolonization in their temporally extended forms. Conversely, the “pri-
mary” sources produced soon after the onset of catastrophic events are no less 
representational than texts produced decades later, but they can represent only 
a temporally truncated version of the event; other sources must be consulted to 
understand catastrophic events as they unfold over a longer duration and are 
inscribed into built environments, histories, and memorializations.40
Decolonizations, like disasters, are also extended affairs. The term decol-
onization includes the formal recognition of national political independence 
through a treaty or accord (e.g. Morocco and France in 1956; Algeria and France 
in 1962); it can also refer to the mass exodus of colonists and descendants of 
colonists from a particular locality (e.g. Agadir in 1960; Orléansville in 1962). 
Decolonization also includes the long chronology of revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary violence that helped to bring about formal independence and con-
tinued thereafter. Sometimes, decolonization involves the departure not only of 
the living but also of the dead. Sometimes, the end of military occupation comes 
long after formal independence and after the outmigration of colonists and their 
corpses. In certain contexts, decolonization can mean the displacement of Eu-
ropean imperialism by Cold War geopolitics and American (or in other cases, 
Soviet) neo-imperialism. Decolonization can also mean the end of the hegemony 
of Western imperialist cultural values, aesthetics, and epistemologies—a process 
that, if not unattainable, is far slower, more fraught, and much less complete 
than the others. Consequently, the synchronicity and interpenetration of the 
history of decolonization with the four disasters examined here does not consist 
solely in the fact that the onset of these disasters began during the years of the 
Algerian Revolution or within a few years of Morocco’s emergence as an inde-
pendent nation. The disasters that began in 1954-1960 were long, and so were the 
decolonizations, and their interconnectedness has spanned decades.
The enduring temporality of both disasters and decolonization has been ex-
plored within the field of trauma studies. Approached from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, traumatic events are identified as such because the individual can-
not comprehend them as they occur; consequently, they are experienced only 
later, through flashbacks, emotions and sensory experiences that disrupt the 
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normal experiencing of time.41 Scholars of colonialism and decolonization have 
applied the concept of trauma to describe the social and psychological effects of 
colonial oppression on both the colonized and the colonizer.42 Paralleling the 
ideas of Henri Kréa, scholars Kai Erikson and Andy Horowitz have problema-
tized the distinction between sudden traumas and the slow grind and quotidian 
violence of social injustice or political repression, while applying this expanded 
concept of trauma to the experience of putatively natural disasters. Erikson has 
argued that not only sudden events but also “chronic conditions” can produce 
the traumatic psychological and social reactions that, in his view, define disas-
ters.43 Horowitz has argued that the trauma of disaster develops within the con-
text of longstanding social injustice and political violence. In such contexts, the 
sudden “traumatizing agency” of the short-term event cannot be separated from 
the suffering caused by the long history and enduring legacies of oppression and 
conflict.44 Human experiences of the earthquakes of Orléansville and Agadir, 
the 1959 poisoning in Morocco, and the flooding of Fréjus were indeed insepa-
rable from the “chronic conditions” of injustice and violence brought about by 
colonialism and decolonization.
However, the enduring experience of environmental disasters, like that of 
decolonization, cannot be wholly subsumed within the category of trauma.45 
Disasters and decolonization involve not only traumatized sufferers but also 
resilient survivors—and triumphant opportunists. In the weeks, months, and 
years following the onset of the disasters studied here, the effects of colonialism, 
decolonization, and catastrophe manifested, for some, in the struggle to survive 
extraordinarily difficult times; for others, in the struggle for power. For many—
diplomats and political leaders, rulers and dissidents, antagonists and allies in 
the era of the Cold War and decolonization—disaster was not trauma but rather 
was war by other means: the attempt to make Algeria French; the attempt to 
make it clear that Algerians were not French; the attempt to maintain Morocco’s 
dependence on France; the attempt to extend American influence in Morocco; 
the attempt to demonstrate Morocco’s independence from France. The effects 
of disasters were tied to questions ranging from whether French military bases 
might remain after independence to what a modern, independent North African 
city ought to look like.
In their short and their long manifestations, the disasters discussed here 
shaped international relations, urban landscapes, and the attitudes of French, 
Moroccan, and Algerian individuals toward the colonial, pre-disaster past and 
toward the post-disaster, post-independence future. The breakup of the French 
empire shaped how these disasters were conceptualized, how historical actors 
 Introduction 15 
responded to them, and how the suffering was distributed. The ongoing lives 
of disasters and decolonizations extended through the decades in the physical 
environment of cities and ruins, buildings and cemeteries, and in the culture and 
politics surrounding memory and the built environment. Rebuilding the cities 
of Orléansville, Fréjus, and Agadir took years, and these urban environments 
were forever transformed by their destruction and reconstruction, and by the 
political and demographic upheavals of decolonization. Survivors would forever 
have to cope with the absence of what had been destroyed, and with the mean-
ing of living in, or in exile from, a city that had been transformed. However, 
post-disaster urban landscapes also provided an opportunity for new assertions 
about culture, identity, and power. For some, recovery from disaster offered op-
portunities to break from the past and impose visions of a glorious future; for 
others, disaster offered an opportunity to lament how much had already been 
lost. The documentary record produced after these catastrophes reveals com-
peting elites, dissidents, and disaster survivors jockeying to advance competing 
and protean visions for Algeria, France, and Morocco in spaces fundamentally 
altered by political and environmental events.
This book argues that the interconnections between these disasters and the 
decolonization of Morocco and Algeria are evident in both the long and the 
short term, as evinced by sources produced throughout this temporal scale, 
ranging from diplomatic dispatches and radio broadcasts to memoirs, novels, 
architectural plans and urban landscapes. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the Chélif 
Valley earthquake and the Malpasset Dam collapse in both their short and long 
manifestations, through the lenses of archival documents and through works of 
long-term memory and representation. Chapter 4 concentrates on the Morocco 
oil poisoning in the short term, examining the expanding impact of the United 
States and the Cold War on the political and diplomatic environment in the 
waning French Empire. Chapters 5 and 6 both examine the Agadir earthquake, 
providing an extended case study of the short and long temporality of a partic-
ular disaster. Chapter 5 treats the short term, investigating the manifestations 
of the political and diplomatic struggles of decolonization and the Cold War 
in controversies concerning the treatment of survivors, the burial of the dead, 
and the reconstruction of the city. Because the built environment of Agadir’s 
post-earthquake urban landscape and the legacy of disaster remained central 
to debates about the meaning of Moroccan identity in ways not paralleled in 
Fréjus or in Orléansville-Chlef, Chapter 6 extends the treatment of the urban 
reconstruction of Agadir into the longer term, examining the politics of decol-
onization in relation to architecture and urban planning. Chapter 7 returns to 
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the topic of memory and literary representation, examining the long process of 
making meaning of catastrophe among survivors and observers of disasters and 
decolonization in both Morocco and Algeria.
In these chapters, I have sought to demonstrate that the 1954 Algeria earth-
quake, the 1959 Malpasset Dam collapse, the 1959 Morocco oil poisoning, and 
the 1960 Morocco earthquake were not just momentary ruptures in human his-
tory, but were enduring phenomena intimately connected with a decolonization 
process that continued long after the 1962 Évian Accords brought formal inde-
pendence to the last of France’s North African holdings. It may not be precisely 
true that “earthquakes are subject to the same causes whether they be human or 
telluric.”46 But Henri Kréa was right to see human and environmental history, 
decolonization and disaster, as interwoven both in the immediate aftermath of 
catastrophic events and through the long “eternal wave of generations.”
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Ch a pter 2
Algeria, 1954
At 1:06 a.m. on September 9, 1954, Algeria’s Chélif Valley was struck with an earthquake measuring 6.7 on the Richter scale. Two hundred kilometers northeast of the epicenter, the news reached a 
young Muslim doctor, Belgacem Aït Ouyahia, sitting in his new Renault 203 in 
the town of Haussonvillers (today Naciria). Aït Ouyahia had just le	 the Chélif 
the week before a	er nishing his surgical internship in Orléansville; he was 
on his way to take up a position in the colonial health service as a “médecin de 
colonization de la région” in his native Kabylia, while he nished his thesis. It 
was eight in the morning, and he had just stopped for gas, coee, and a beignet. 
Aït Ouyahia recounted that moment in his 1999 memoir:
I got back behind the wheel and turned on the radio:
“. . . [sic] has shaken the region of Orléansville. Numerous buildings have 
collapsed. Already there are known to be many victims, and the hospital 
is inundated with the injured. This is the largest earthquake ever known 
in Algeria…”
—My God! My God!
And I surprised myself; I, who was not too observant—even not ob-
servant at all—I surprised myself by reciting the shahada in a loud voice:
“There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his prophet.”1
Aït Ouyahia immediately turned the car around and returned to Orléansville to 
rejoin the medical team at the hospital there. Aït Ouyahia was fortunate to have 
been far from the center of the earthquake when it struck, but upon his return 
to Orléansville, a city of thirty thousand people just thirty kilometers from the 
epicenter, he would soon be confronted with the horrors that this sudden move-
ment of the inanimate had inicted on human bodies.
In his 1955 memoir, a French ocial, René Debia, described the experience of 
the city’s inhabitants:
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Those who were not crushed immediately were thrown to the ground “like 
the fruits of a fig tree bent by a storm,” like sailors in the midst of a storm, 
of which the same din arose around them; it was a deafening noise, formed 
of an extraordinary rumbling that rose from the subsoil of the earth, of the 
crashing of walls, and their cracking, like that of a ship rocked by waves, 
of the dull thud of buildings that crashed on their neighbors like water on 
a bridge. And the fathers, the mothers who gathered together their chil-
dren that night, in the darkness, did so instinctively with the idea of await-
ing together a death which seemed to them inevitable; but the shaking of 
the ground abated, little by little; without realizing it, they tried to grope 
their way to an exit or a stairwell, they climbed over the piles of rubble 
and twisted iron; surprised to be still alive, they reached a courtyard, a 
garden, or a street; and there, breathing, breathed finally an odor of sulfur 
that came, they didn’t know from where, and this opaque dust cloud that 
enveloped the city, adding to the thickness of the dark.2
When the sun rose, wrote Debia, Orléansville resembled a bombed out city, 
a “landscape of death. 3” Debia stated that four thousand homes had been de-
stroyed in the city; in the entire affected region, he counted eighteen thousand 
ruined “houses,” plus the destruction of thirty-five thousand gourbis—small, 
windowless structures made of earthen bricks, packed earth (pisé), or sticks or 
stones cemented with mud, that were home to the vast majority of the rural Mus-
lim population. In Debia’s words, the gourbis were obliterated “as if by an explo-
sion. Often the roof was intact but had collapsed in one piece on top of the rest 
of the structure; from this debris one pulled out the cadavers and the injured.”4
Scientists would later attribute the disaster’s onset to the slow collision of 
tectonic plates in the Dahra mountains near the Mediterranean coast.5 An af-
tershock measuring 6.2 on the Richter scale struck farther north near the coastal 
city of Ténès the next day, bringing down more buildings. Countless more af-
tershocks followed, including significant tremors on September 16 and October 
19 and 21. The earthquake and its aftershocks killed at least twelve hundred 
people throughout the region, injured about fourteen thousand, and left as many 
as two hundred thousand homeless. The vast majority of the dead—over 90 
percent—were Muslim Algerians, reflecting the overall population of the af-
fected area as well as the quality of housing.6 As in most earthquakes, it was 
human construction that did most of the actual killing. The deadly pancak-
ing of gourbis described by René Debia was most likely due to the adoption of 
tile roofing material weighed down and held in place by large rocks. In urban 
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areas, the widespread use of masonry in building construction proved similarly 
lethal.7 Neither metropolitan nor Algerian France had building codes specifi-
cally developed for areas of seismic risk, and the general French building code 
was only applied to larger buildings constructed after 1946 from steel-reinforced 
concrete.8 On the other hand, reinforced concrete was insufficient to save an 
almost-completed nine-story, low-income apartment building (habitation à loyer 
modéré or HLM) in Orléansville, which “collapsed like a house of cards, crush-
ing the workers who were living on one its floors.”9
Those who died there left no memoirs, of course. If disaster victims are a 
particular subcategory of subaltern, then only the survivors speak.10 However, 
the voices of the most disempowered survivors are also muted: the destitute, the 
illiterate, those too traumatized by disaster or terrorized by war, or too occupied 
by the struggle to survive to provide testimony for posterity. René Debia and 
Belgacem Aït Ouyahia were in many ways typical of those who were able to 
provide such testimony. As the French subprefect for the region of Orléansville 
and an educated surgeon and future professor of obstetrics at the Algiers School 
of Medicine, respectively, these men were sufficiently privileged to get their own 
representations of the disaster published, even if this event, so enormous in scale 
and transformative in their own lives, would be pushed to the margins of the 
dominant historical narratives of the era.11 Both Debia and Aït Ouyahia saw the 
disaster as intimately related to the question of decolonization in Algeria, but 
the two men held sharply contrasting views of this relationship. For Debia, the 
earthquake both revealed and augmented the commonality of interests between 
the French and the Muslim Algerians of the Chélif Valley, demonstrating the 
necessity of continued French rule; for Aït Ouyahia, the disaster was a turning 
point that decisively demonstrated the oppressive nature of French colonialism. 
Their writings demonstrate the fractured experience of these events as well as 
the inseparability of the environmental catastrophe from the experience of po-
litical turmoil.
Like the memoirs of Debia and Aït Ouyahia, sources written in the days and 
weeks following the 1954 earthquake also reveal divergent understandings of 
these events as well as the linkages between the earthquake and the possibility 
of decolonization. Archival sources demonstrate that the catastrophe became 
a tool for the French colonial state to use disaster response to counter nation-
alist narratives and to defend a vision of benevolent colonialism. Yet, because 
the earthquake wreaked enormous destruction on the built environment, espe-
cially on the humble edifices housing most of the region’s Muslim population, it 
dramatically increased the financial cost, technical difficulty, and bureaucratic 
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complexity of the colonial state’s efforts to make plausible its narratives of civ-
ilization, development, and solidarity. Consequently, the disaster provided an 
opportunity for dissidents to offer counter-narratives decrying the hypocrisy and 
futility of the colonial project. The earthquake thus became an important part 
of the struggle for and against Algerian independence, and the political struggle 
in Algeria shaped human responses to the seismic shocks that rocked the Chélif 
Valley in 1954.
A Department of France, A Valley in North Africa
French histories of Algeria’s Chélif Valley typically begin with the founding of 
Orléansville in 1843 as a military camp by General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud. 
Bugeaud’s occupation of Orléansville, and of the Mediterranean town of Ténès, 
forty kilometers to the north, was intended to create a bulwark against the re-
turn of the forces of Amir Abd al-Qadir, the Algerian resistance leader whom 
French forces had driven out of the Chélif Valley.12 The new French outpost was 
near the site of an ancient Roman colony of Castellum Tingitanum, a fact that 
proved useful to the narratives of French imperialists seeking to link the French 
conquest of Algeria to the heritage of Rome. The local name for the site (which 
may have been the location of a weekly souk) was Lasnab or in classical Arabic, 
al-Asnam, meaning “idols,” a name possibly derived from the memory of the 
Roman presence or of their ruins. El Asnam became the official name of the 
city after independence until it was renamed “Chlef ” after another earthquake 
devastated the city in 1980.13 In 1848, the northern part of what is today Algeria, 
including the Chélif Valley, was declared part of France by the Second Republic.
Orléansville’s location, isolated by the Dahra Mountains to the north and 
the Ouarsenis to the south, was perceived as inhospitable by the French due 
to its climate and due to the ongoing resistance of the inhabitants of the two 
mountain ranges.14 Nevertheless, the European settlement at Orléansville grew 
into a thriving town and became the seat of a subprefecture administering a 
district, or arrondissement, extending north to Ténès, within the larger French 
department of Algiers, département 91 among the departments of France.15 (The 
départements are roughly akin to a North American state or province.)
To begin the history of this valley in North Africa with the arrival of Euro-
peans reinforces an obviously Eurocentric historical metanarrative. If the scope 
of the narrative is narrowly confined to the city of Orléansville, this approach 
might seem, at first, to be satisfactory. Geographer Valentin Pelosse points out 
that, unlike Algerian cities such as Algiers, Constantine, and Tlemcen, the 
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French post at Orléansville was not grafted onto an Algerian Muslim town, and 
there was only a limited presence of Muslim Algerians in Orléansville during the 
early years of the settlement’s growth.16 For René Debia, the subprefect and ad-
ministrative head of the arrondissement in 1954, Orléansville, though inhabited 
by migrants “from all shores of the Mediterranean,” grew into a typical “small 
bourgeois city” of the Third Republic.17
A transformation was underway, however: the city started to become what 
Debia called “a great indigenous city, one of the most significant Arab cities in 
all of Algeria.”18 By 1900, the city of Orléansville was already home to approxi-
mately three thousand Muslim Algerians, half the total population.19 These 
Muslims did not materialize out of thin air. Even if Orléansville was a creation of 
the French, the Chélif Valley was not—there was an earlier history of the region. 
The Chélif Valley was inhabited, prior to the French arrival, by the Awlad Qasir, 
among others. By 1863 the French had driven the Awlad Qasir out of twelve 
thousand hectares of the best agricultural land.20 For the next several decades, 
Muslims often sought to escape the rural poverty caused by French conquest 
of the Chélif by emigrating to Tunisia or other Muslim countries rather than 
to European-dominated Algerian cities. Around the turn of the century, how-
ever, migratory flows shifted toward the city, and the history of the rural Chélif 
merged with the history of French-built Orléansville.21
This growing city, like all of Algeria, was dominated by its European inhabi-
tants, who enjoyed the full rights of French citizenship, while the Muslims were 
French subjects ruled according to the indigénat, or native-status, laws.22 Never-
theless, certain leading Muslim families were able to maintain their prominence 
by switching their allegiance to the colonial state, which needed collaborators 
who could facilitate control of the Muslim population as French-appointed 
rural notables, or caïds. The most significant of these families in the Chélif was 
the Saïah family.23 The Saïahs became a focus of controversy and criticism after 
the Orléansville earthquake: as a propertied elite with close ties to the French 
regime, they represented a symbolic fulcrum in the struggle for post-disaster 
justice in the region: though members of the Saïah family positioned themselves 
as advocates for the Muslim population, they were portrayed by critics as oppres-
sors, criminally implicated in an unjust system.
The Saïahs’ relationship with the French was shaped, over the years, by 
French reform measures intended to justify, mitigate, or occlude the arbitrary 
and oppressive character of colonial rule. While the most dramatic of these re-
forms were enacted after the Second World War, historians have argued that 
this process stretched back into the nineteenth century and included the 1898 
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establishment of the Délégations Financières, an assembly that included a lim-
ited number of seats for privileged Muslim Algerians. Reform accelerated after 
the First World War, when almost half of adult Algerian men were exempted 
from the indigénat and given voting rights in local elections. After World War 
II, the French regime affirmed the citizenship of Muslim Algerians and, in 1947, 
replaced the Délégations Financières with a 120-seat Algerian Assembly, elected 
by voters who were divided into two “colleges,” one composed of Europeans and 
a small number of select Muslim Algerians, and one composed solely of Muslim 
Algerians.24
These postwar reforms maintained a system of governance firmly under the 
control of the French of European origin and their chosen Muslim allies. Al-
though the indigénat was eliminated, and adult male Muslim voters could now 
elect some representatives to the French National Assembly and the Algerian 
Assembly, in Algeria the influence of the sixty Algerian Assembly delegates cho-
sen by the Muslim “second college” voters was checked by the power of the sixty 
chosen by the overwhelmingly European voters of the “first college.” Conse-
quently, as has often been pointed out, delegates representing a European popu-
lation of less than a million and less than sixty thousand of the most privileged 
Muslims (those who had been given “first college” voting status) could block the 
will of the delegates who represented a population of almost eight million. The 
ability of the settler population to prevent the Muslim majority from expanding 
their power was reinforced by the requirement of a two-thirds supermajority for 
certain proposed reforms. When an upswell of Muslim political activity led to 
nationalist successes in municipal elections in 1947, the authorities further sub-
verted the limited democratic potential of this assembly through intimidation 
and election-tampering in favor of approved Muslim candidates.25
This “reformed” political system prevented real democratization in Alge-
ria, but it provided opportunities for a well-positioned few. Closely tied to the 
French colonial system, the Saïah rose to top of the reformed political struc-
ture. At the time of the earthquake, members of the family held important posi-
tions in French Algeria: Saïah Abdelkader was a member and former president 
of the Algerian Assembly; Bouali Saïah was a member of the Assembly, and 
Saïah Menouar was a representative to the French National Assembly in Paris. 
Locally, several members of the family still held posts of caïd in the Chélif re-
gion.26 The vast majority of Muslim Algerians were less fortunate, and it was 
the poor Muslim population that would suffer the most after their homes were 
destroyed by the earthquake, in the growing shantytowns around Orléansville 
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housing migrants from the countryside and in the vast rural areas housing an 
impoverished and scattered population. The relation of the Saïahs to this popu-
lation—as oppressors or advocates—would be a matter of controversy when the 
earthquake struck.
City and Country on the Eve of Destruction
In sharp contrast to Agadir, destroyed by an earthquake less than six years later, 
controversy and political struggle following the 1954 earthquake in the Ché-
lif would center as much on rural as on urban areas, while the destruction of 
Orléansville’s architectural legacy, such as it was, would provoke little comment. 
Orléansville’s twentieth-century landscape still bore the imprint of its military 
origin. A grid of streets was surrounded by a wall and a belt of military land, 
with military buildings dominating the western part of the city. Outside of the 
walls, the metropolitan area (agglomération) of Orléansville included two sub-
urbs ( faubourgs), La Ferme in the north and La Bocca Sahnoune in the south. 
These suburbs became increasingly Muslim as they absorbed migrants from the 
countryside. Europeans engaged in “white flight” from the faubourgs into city 
proper, while many Muslim Algerians lived in improvised mudbrick and bidon-
ville (shanty) housing without piped water or sanitation infrastructure.27
As Benjamin Stora explains, many Muslims across Algeria had been driven to 
cities by French expropriation of land and water, the disruption of pre-colonial 
social and economic networks, and population growth. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, communal tribal lands, properties of religious brotherhoods, and lands of 
the defeated Ottoman governor had been partitioned into private plots, leaving 
the average Muslim Algerian farmer with only seven acres, barely enough for sub-
sistence. Meanwhile, traditional systems of water management were disrupted, 
along with communal landholding and charitable religious foundations. By 1919, 
colons, farmers of European descent with French citizenship, possessed a million 
acres of land in the département of Algiers alone, although, it should be noted, 
there was enormous inequality of wealth within the European population, and 
agricultural consolidation in the twentieth century also led to the urbanization 
the European population.28 In the Chélif Valley, rural poverty and further eco-
nomic disruption in the period of the world wars prompted an acceleration of 
rural-to-urban migration, and by 1948 the official census in Orléansville counted 
13,693 Muslim Algerians, out of a population of 17,223.29 The rate of migration 
was such that, by 1954, the majority of the city’s population had been born in the 
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countryside. By 1960, when the European population of Orléansville reached its 
apex, the Muslim population had grown to almost thirty-eight thousand, and 
people classified as “European” constituted only 16 percent of the population.30
These transformations of the city created some unease among the French 
elite. A report by the département’s Service of Urbanism described the popula-
tion growth of the suburbs as “disordered.”31 For Sub-Prefect Debia, an advocate 
of colonialism through economic development, the growth of the city’s Muslim 
population was, in part, a positive development, insofar as it included Muslim 
merchants and functionaries and later some doctors and lawyers, of Kabyle and 
Arab backgrounds, who “adopted our way of life, if not in terms of dress then at 
least in the realm of habitat,” moving into villas and apartments formerly occu-
pied by Europeans. “Less encouraging,” lamented Debia, “because it was a sign of 
poverty and because it often resulted in social uprootedness,” was the much more 
numerous settling of Muslims in the faubourgs “where they often lived as if they 
were in the douars [rural villages]”32 Debia described the exponential growth of 
unregulated housing in these suburbs as a demographic battle that threatened to 
overwhelm the legacy of the planned French city, protected by the “solid corset” 
of its ramparts.33 Debia’s modernist, imperialist fear of unregulated Muslims was 
echoed by another French official who described the faubourgs as “two popular 
quartiers constructed in an anarchic fashion, in violation of the most elementary 
rules of hygiene and urbanism.”34
Reinforcing this vision of a city divided between realms of European progress 
and Muslim disorder, the European sections of Orléansville had by 1954 become 
home to dazzling monuments to Europeans’ belief in their own modernity. 
Debia described the architectural innovations: “Here, an ultra-modern build-
ing; there, a gigantic school, the largest in France [sic]; an administrative hôtel; 
a ten-story building under construction; a magnificent subprefecture in the his-
pano-mauresque style.” It was a city “glittering with light at night,” and a city 
of motorcars.35 The city walls were undergoing demolition, and the glittering 
modernity of the city extended westward beyond the old city limits, exemplified 
by the construction of a “sumptuous” new building to house the administrative 
offices of the subprefecture.36
All this was far removed from the lives of most inhabitants of the region, 
however. Beyond the immediate environs of the city, the arrondissement admin-
istered by the subprefecture of Orléansville, which included most of the zone 
affected by the earthquake, was overwhelmingly rural. This area included eight 
sizable communities, with a total population of about eighty-five thousand, that 
were classified as communes de plein-exercice, endowed with elected municipal 
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governments due to their significant European populations. In addition to the 
city of Orléansville, these included Ténès, on the coast (population ten thou-
sand); and Oued-Fodda (population twelve thousand), east of Orléansville, and 
five smaller towns. Nevertheless, most of the arrondissement’s three hundred 
thousand inhabitants lived in rural districts classified as communes mixtes, where 
the almost entirely Muslim residents were administered by appointed officials.37 
In these rural areas, “extreme dispersion characterized the distribution of the 
rural population,” who survived through a combination of pastoralism and ag-
riculture.38 This “extreme dispersion,” over an area of four hundred fifty thou-
sand hectares (more than seventeen hundred square miles), would make disaster 
response slow and difficult.
Disaster Response
The effectiveness, earnestness, and equity—or lack thereof—of the French di-
saster response effort became a central focus of public contestation in Algeria in 
the autumn of 1954, as competing voices struggled to frame the shortcomings of 
the disaster response as either the fruit of an intrinsically unjust system, or as the 
inevitable result of the sheer magnitude of the “natural” disaster amid the pu-
tatively primordial backwardness of the Algerian people, or simply as the result 
of organizational failures that could be corrected for future disasters through 
technocratic adjustments.
Those involved in the disaster response in its early stages testified to the 
magnitude of the challenges they faced. On the night of the first earthquake, 
“total confusion, in darkness” reigned in Orléansville until sunrise; one early 
report described an “atmosphere of war (presence of numerous soldiers) and of 
post-bombardment.”39 The seismic shock had destroyed the city’s means of tele-
communication with the outside world and had interrupted its electrical sup-
ply. A gendarme was dispatched to the town of Oued Fodda, twenty kilometers 
away, where he was able to reach Algiers by telephone, forty minutes after the 
disaster. 40 The radio transmitter of the French military subdivision in Orléans-
ville had been damaged but was repaired within two hours, enabling Subprefect 
Debia to send three messages requesting tents and food as well as civil engineers, 
trucks, and bulldozers. As the hours passed, news of destruction in Ténès and 
in several towns in the Chélif Valley trickled into Orléansville, and Débia re-
quested helicopters.41
The city was home to a volunteer crew of thirty or so firefighters (sa-
peurs-pompiers). They were reportedly unable to organize as a team in the early 
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hours of the disaster, but were instead drawn individually or in small groups into 
rescue efforts in their immediate vicinities; the fire chief and several pompiers 
became engaged in efforts to extricate victims buried in the ruins of the Hotel 
Baudoin.42 The 200 legionnaires housed at the military garrison, and the 30 or 
so police d’État were able to respond in more organized fashion within hours. 
By the afternoon, their numbers were augmented by the arrival of an additional 
500 troops, with trucks and bulldozers, and several sapeur-pompier units from 
Relizane, to the southwest, and Algiers, to the northeast.43
The medical staff at the hospital constituted another indispensable group of 
first responders, reinforced by health professionals arriving from other areas. 
In a chapter titled “Orléansville 54,” Dr. Aït Ouyahia described the scene in 
the hospital just after his arrival the next day, when additional tremors struck. 
Patients sustained additional injuries as they were thrown from their beds by the 
aftershocks. Beds were moved to the garden as new patients were brought in with 
fresh injuries. Amid the fear and chaos that ensued, the medical staff, led by Aït 
Ouyahia’s mentor Dr. Kamoun, kept working.44
As crucial to the disaster response as the functioning of the hospital was the 
fact that the city possessed not only a railway depot but an airport; both were 
damaged but still usable. The morning after the first earthquake, the first relief 
shipment, containing medical supplies, arrived by air. 45 The Cold War presence 
of the US Air Force in Europe and in neighboring Morocco proved valuable, 
as six American C-119s joined ten French army planes in the airlift of goods 
from France to Algiers and Algiers to Orléansville.46 By afternoon, flights were 
arriving in Orléansville every twenty minutes, bringing supplies and evacuating 
the seriously injured: 117 were evacuated the first day. Hunger and thirst were 
rampant, but in the afternoon, the arriving army trucks brought bread and two 
cisterns of water. 47 Shipments of tents also began to arrive immediately, but 
the supply was grossly inadequate. People had no choice but sleep in the open, 
although some found refuge in train cars still on the tracks of the train station, 
slowing the arrival of shipments by rail.48
On September 11, a national disaster relief committee, the Comité National 
de Secours aux Victimes du Séisme de la région d’Orléansville, was created by 
the Ministry of the Interior in Paris, and the Government-General of Algeria 
established a parallel committee.49 A large role in the post-disaster relief effort 
was played by the metropolitan Service National de Protection Civile (SNPC), 
which dispatched a team to Orléansville, including seventeen members of the 
Paris Sapeurs-Pompiers to supplement the firefighters from Orléansville and 
from Algiers. The SNPC team leader, Lieutenant Colonel Curie, arrived in 
 Algeria, 1954 27 
Algiers on September 11 at what is today the Houari Boumediènne airport, 
along with a shipment of 16 large tents and 245 beds. That night, Curie flew to 
Orléansville, where he met with Subprefect Debia and Mr. Freychet, director of 
the departmental relief service (Service de Secours). The rest of the metropolitan 
SNPC team arrived within the next forty-eight hours, accompanied by an engi-
neer named Marius Hautberg, who had been appointed to serve as an assistant 
(adjoint) to Colonel Curie, with a mission to conduct a study of structural dam-
age, methods of clearing debris, and the organization of the disaster response.50
Those engaged in disaster response were not immune to the stress created by 
the carnage and destruction that surrounded them. Once assembled in Orléans-
ville, the sapeurs-pompiers slept in tents at the military garrison, where food 
supplies were inadequate, while Curie and Hautberg joined Subprefect Debia, 
his staff, and his family in tents near the slightly damaged subprefecture build-
ing. 51 Hautberg recounted that, within the SNPC team, “overwork, fatigue, 
and a kind of necro-psychosis caused an ambiance of nervousness,” and tempers 
flared.52 Aït Ouyahia, too, referred to his own shock and emotional distress upon 
viewing the carnage.53 As the days passed, response workers undertook the grisly 
task of excavating the ruins to recover bodies. Soon, “in the stifling heat of Sep-
tember, the atmosphere was permeated with the odor of decay.”54 In the blazing 
heat, workers began to use the stench to help them locate the bodies, which had 
to be painstakingly extricated from the rubble and then coated with quicklime 
in an attempt to prevent outbreaks of disease.55 DDT was sprayed liberally over 
the city by helicopter and from trucks.56 A school was converted into a makeshift 
morgue, where the bodies were placed in coffins, which were being shipped in 
from throughout the region.57 After another major aftershock on September 16 
brought still more damage to the city, eighty four more firefighters arrived from 
Paris, bringing the total size of the SNPC team to about one hundred.58 How-
ever, the dispatch of these reinforcements from the metropole was rushed after 
the new tremor struck. Consequently, they arrived without adequate advance 
planning or materials—they lacked sufficient food supplies for themselves and 
were not accompanied by the fifty tons of tents they had been expected to bring. 
As a result, the SNPC team was, an according to Curie, ill-equipped to respond 
to the new wave of disaster.59
Beni Rached
In the weeks and months following the earthquake, much controversy sur-
rounded the dire conditions and scarcity of relief aid in rural areas, where the 
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population was overwhelmingly Muslim. For the first few days, however, officials 
had initially assumed that the epicenter of the earthquake was in Orléansville60 
where initial counts of the dead ranged from 153 (including 23 “Europeans” and 
130 “français musulmans”) to 168.61 There were also reports from other towns 
describing death and damage throughout an area extending from the Chélif Val-
ley towns of Oued Fodda (163 dead) and Pontéba (“total destruction – numerous 
dead”), to Ténès on the coast.62 However, officials were slow to recognize the ex-
tent of the disaster in rural areas, and no effort was made in the first 48 hours to 
extend disaster aid into the smaller villages, or douars, in hard-to-reach areas not 
served by roads, where most of the thousands of casualties had in fact occurred.63
It was not until September 11 that aid workers in Orléansville became aware 
of the enormity of the devastation of the village of Beni Rached, 40 kilometers 
to the east at the true epicenter of the earthquake, where 300 residents had been 
killed.64 Sources provide conflicting accounts of the discovery of the tragedy 
there. Official reports neglected the role of Algerian Muslim agency in uncover-
ing and treating the suffering in Beni Rached, emphasizing instead the vigorous 
state response that followed. Colonel Curie’s report from September 27, 1954, 
stated that the discovery of Beni Rached on September 11 was made “by chance” 
by a gendarme.65 According to Colonel Curie’s concise report, the morning after 
the discovery of Beni Rached, a US Air Force helicopter then flew reconnais-
sance missions in the area, returning with one of the injured. More helicopter 
evacuations followed, and a systematic effort was undertaken to identify affected 
rural communities, with ten medical teams sent out to canvass the region.66 Col-
onel Curie’s report on the SNPC mission to Orléansville was followed, in De-
cember 1954, by a report on the organization of the disaster response written 
by Philippe Kessler, a recent graduate of the elite École nationale d’administra-
tion who had been conducting an administrative traineeship near the Chélif 
Valley in September, and by Marius Hautberg’s report addressing both disaster 
response and the structural effects of the earthquake on buildings.
Kessler’s report credited the medical service’s staff as being the first to address 
the full extent of the rural disaster. Like Curie and Hautberg, Kessler empha-
sized the importance of helicopters.67 Kessler was impressed by the heroic drama 
of the aerovac: “It is thus that in certain places where, in the memory of man, 
no ‘European’ had ever passed, families affected by the disaster could see one of 
these providential machines descend from heaven, land at their door, from which 
would disembark ‘toubib’ [doctor] or nurse. This medical penetration, provoked 
by the event, brought a royal and marvelous path to the unhappy people who 
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benefitted from it.”68 This story of miraculous, technological “penetration” (a 
term of colonial conquest) by European saviors is redolent of the mythology 
of colonialism—the “providential” machines a modern version of Columbus’s 
ships, appearing as gods, as Europeans liked to claim, to the inhabitants of a New 
World. Frantz Fanon informs us that Algerian Muslims often saw the colonial 
doctor as threatening and humiliating rather than “marvelous.”69 While there 
is no doubt that the helicopter evacuations saved lives, Kessler’s version of the 
narrative emphasizes the importance of the colonizer’s military technology, and 
erases the agency of Muslims—both outsiders and residents of Beni Rached—
who responded to the disaster.
Dr. Aït Ouyahia tells a very different story. According to Aït Ouyahia, the 
medical staff at the Orléansville hospital, finally taking a dinner break on the 
evening of September 10, were joined by local notable Saïah Menouar, a deputy 
(representative) from Orléansville to the National Assembly in Paris. According 
to Aït Ouyahia, the young doctor turned to his supervisor, Dr. Kamoun, and 
said, “I have noticed, sir, that all the injured who have come to us come from the 
farms and villages that are along the roads. I wonder, in what condition are the 
isolated douars and mechtas [villages and hamlets]?”70 Saïah Menouar offered the 
use of his jeep, and, after a few hours of sleep, Menouar and Aït Ouyahia left, 
still in the dark of night.
Aït Ouyahia may have downplayed Menouar’s role in initiating the expedi-
tion. French records indicate that Saïah Menouar was born in Beni Rached and 
that six members of the Saïah family died there during the earthquake. This 
suggests that Saïah Menouar played a more active role in initiating the expedi-
tion and determining its destination than Aït Ouyahia indicated: Saïah Me-
nouar was very likely the driving force of the expedition, if not the actual driver, 
as in the doctor’s memoir.71 Aït Ouyahia’s account, published in 1999, reflects 
some ambivalence about Saïah Menouar, mentioning that Menouar had been 
“elected” by the Muslim population only after being handpicked “by the admin-
istration and colons of the Chélif,” in consultation with the head of the Saïah 
family, Saïah Abdelkader.72 Aït Ouyahia’s depiction of Saïah Menouar’s role in 
this story may have been influenced by nationalist condemnations of those who, 
like the Saïah, collaborated with French rule. Nevertheless, the doctor’s memoirs 
granted Saïah Menouar a role, unlike the reports of Curie and Kessler.
According to Aït Ouyahia’s memoir, he and Menouar drove about thirty ki-
lometers on the road, through the town of Oued Fodda. (There, the ten-year-old 
Ali Bouzar, who would later write his own memoir of the earthquakes of 1954 
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and 1980, had just survived the disaster and was fearing for the life of his father, 
a medical worker in Orléansville—likely one of Aït Ouyahia’s colleagues.73) Past 
Oued Fodda, they left the road and turned north, following a trail along a dry 
riverbed. At dawn, they reached a pair of collapsed dwellings. Under a fig tree 
lay, still alive, a woman, seven months pregnant, the skin on her bloody abdomen 
torn back as if “scalped,” along with a man and a small child. Around them lay 
corpses: their three sons, and the man’s parents. Aït Ouyahia applied sulfa and 
bandages to the woman’s wounds and promised the man they would soon return 
to take the woman and child with them to the hospital. They then pressed on 
for another dozen kilometers to the village of Beni Rached. There, they found 
that “not a single house had resisted the earthquake; Beni Rached was nothing 
more than a gigantic cluster of earth and stone, planted here and there with torn 
up walls.”74 The survivors recognized “Si Menouar” and kissed his hand. They 
reported that there were several dead in every household; the mosque had been 
converted into a morgue; survivors were still trying to dig out the dead from 
the ruins. Dr. Aït Ouyahia worked for several hours treating the injured, until 
he ran out of supplies. Aït Ouyahia and Saïah Menouar were forced to return 
to Orléansville, to summon more assistance. On the way, they came to the first 
family they had encountered by the fig tree. The woman and child were still 
there. The man was on his way to bury the dead. His donkey and mule were 
laden with corpses; his parents and two of his sons were stuffed into the saddle 
bags, his third son lay across the back of the mule.75
The contrast between Aït Ouyahia’s account and those of the French reports 
raises certain questions about sources. Aït-Ouyahia’s book’s 1999 publication 
date makes it different from Debia’s 1955 memoir and from other sources used 
in this chapter such as contemporaneous press reports and archival documents 
such as cablegrams and official government reports: it is inflected by a greater 
passage of time and by the knowledge that the turmoil of the Algerian rebellion 
would lead to independence in 1962 (and then to an imperfect polity in indepen-
dent Algeria). Can Aït Ouyahia’s memoir of his life and family history published 
many decades later, in 1999, be useful in understanding events following the 
disaster in 1954? Or can it only be used as evidence of the long-term, retrospec-
tive intermingling of understandings of decolonization and the 1954 disaster 
in imagination and memory (a purpose to which it will be put in Chapter 7)? 
Certainly, Aït Ouyahia’s memoir cannot be considered entirely reliable. Yet the 
early genesis of the reports available in French archives does not necessarily make 
them more reliable than the memories of Aït Ouyahia or those of writers such 
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as Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine, Habib Tengour, and Ali Bouzar, whose work will 
be discussed in Chapter 7. Historians of colonialism are accustomed to reading 
primary archival sources “against the grain” and with an awareness that authors’ 
depictions of events may be shaped by the cultures of colonialism; we are equally 
aware, in dealing with post-independence memoirs, that depictions of events 
may be shaped by cultures of anti-colonial nationalism, by the preoccupations 
of later decades, and by the desire to tailor memorialization to the needs of a 
specific audience.
However, exclusively privileging early archival documents when examining 
the events of 1954 would privilege the French who were in a position to write 
official accounts, skewing our historical understanding in ways that would re-
flect the distribution of power in 1950s Algeria. Though Aït Ouyahia’s account 
of “Orléansville, 1954” is separated from events by the passage of more time than 
are Curie’s, Hautberg’s, and Kessler’s, it must be recognized that the French ac-
counts, even those written just days after the events, are also works of memory 
and representation for a specific audience. The historian must also approach 
those accounts skeptically, in recognition of their neglect (both ideologically 
conditioned and individually self-serving) of Muslim agency, and in recogni-
tion of their echoes of imperialist narratives. Hitherto unexploited archives in 
Algeria may eventually reveal additional perspectives on these events, but in any 
case, our understanding of history will remain an ongoing work of construction 
out of the “disparate and multiple” memories (both long-and short-term) and 
representations by those involved.76
The Second Phase
French archival documents provide much detail about the disaster response as 
the French state’s efforts shifted from the initial phase of rescuing victims, treat-
ing the injured, and retrieving the dead, to “interventions of secondary urgency”: 
housing the displaced and beginning the process of reconstruction. However, 
contemporaneous descriptions of events by leftist and nationalist journalists 
called into question official representations of this second phase of disaster re-
sponse. Central to the public debate and political struggle in the Chélif Valley in 
late 1954 were divisions over not only whether the French state was acting with 
equity to assist both the Muslim and the European survivors but also whether the 
remoteness and inaccessibility of rural villages such as Beni Rached was part of a 
status quo ante that French colonialism had to confront and overcome or if the 
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vulnerability of rural Algerians was a product of colonial neglect or exploitative 
harm—in other words, whether the French colonial state, as it then existed, was 
the solution to the disaster that afflicted Muslim Algerians, or its deepest cause.
The second phase of relief efforts included both direct state intervention 
through the work of the SNPC and services such as Ponts et chaussées (Bridges 
and Roads), and donations from private individuals and from organizations such 
as the Red Cross and Sécours Catholique (Catholic Relief). The Interior Minis-
try’s Comité National de Secours organized a “solidarity campaign” to solicit do-
nations, beginning with a “National Day of Solidarity” on September 26. These 
funds were to be applied toward the purchase and transport of tents, blankets, 
and other goods to meet the immediate needs of survivors. Throughout metro-
politan and overseas France, as well as Morocco and Tunisia, tens of thousands 
of fundraising posters and hundreds of thousands of solidarity badges were dis-
tributed. The total amount collected throughout France and its empire eventu-
ally rose to more than 1.5 billion francs (over four million dollars).77 However, 
raising the money was one thing; getting aid to the people in need was another.
Monetary donations from throughout France and the overseas French depart-
ments were turned over to the treasury office (Trésorier Payeur Géneral) of each 
department and then consolidated in Paris by the Trésorier Payeur Géneral de la 
Seine.78 Donations in kind, however, were sent directly to the Governor-General 
of Algeria by each department, resulting in a diverse plethora of goods that had 
to be counted and sorted prior to distribution in the affected areas.79 Cultural 
and religious differences produced some glitches in the trans-Mediterranean 
solidarity effort, most notably an excess of food donations containing pork, and 
a shortage of clothing for Muslim women,80 although fifty million francs from 
the September fundraising were earmarked for the purchase of cloth for such 
clothing.81
It was housing, however, that presented the greatest problem, a fact agreed 
upon by all sources. If a major rationale for French rule in Algeria in the twen-
tieth century was the ability of the French to improve the material well-being 
of Muslim Algerians, the earthquake had just made this vastly more difficult.82 
Sources within the National Service of Civil Protection (SNCP) presented the 
difficulties as largely logistical. By September 13, the Ministry of the Interior in 
Paris had arranged shipments, with the help of the SNPC, the French Army 
of the Air, and the US Air Force, of 316 large tents capable of housing over six 
thousand people.83 Radio broadcasts in France urged citizens to donate their 
old camping tents, declaring that “the tent that you have been keeping in the 
attic and that the grandchildren never use would constitute an undreamed-of 
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solution for an affected family.”84 As more tents arrived, the SNPC team led by 
Curie and Hautberg took charge of sorting and distribution. However, the tents 
were of a variety of sizes and types, and most were ill-suited to housing families. 
It became a nightmare to sort and count the component parts to assure that 
each recipient obtained a complete kit. Hautberg’s log also indicated that there 
were some enormous American military tents, “worthy of a circus,” that neither 
the SNPC nor the legionnaires could figure out how to assemble.85 Meanwhile, 
displaced residents resisted the efforts of aid workers to move them into large 
tent cities, preferring to camp in front of their damaged homes and keep watch 
over their goods.86
By September 22, Hautberg reported that 2,371 tents had been received and 
2,066 of them distributed, leaving 305 still in reserve, with the arrival of another 
930 anxiously anticipated.87 The leaders of the disaster response were well aware 
that this was insufficient and requested more. A daily report of the Algerian 
emergency committee estimated that only approximately half of the need had 
been met.88 Given the enormity of the disaster, with over forty thousand homes 
destroyed,89 this was a gross underestimation of need, reflecting the assumption 
that the rural gourbi dwellers would not receive tents.
In the long term, more than tents would be needed to rebuild Orléansville 
and to save French Algeria from the political and environmental disasters that 
threatened. In late September, Hautberg, seeing tents as an unsatisfactory rem-
edy to the housing crisis, traveled to Paris, and communicated “to diverse indi-
viduals interested in the events in Orléansville” the urgent need to construct 
temporary housing, referred to as “barracks.” Hautberg pointed out that “the 
more quickly these are installed, the less need there is for tents.” Hautberg also 
warned, ominously and accurately, that “the rains in the Chélif Valley are said 
to be torrential.”90 The first step beyond tents was the requisitioning of fourteen 
thousand square meters of asbestos-reinforced, fiber-cement sheets—roofing 
material for temporary housing.91
With the winter rains coming, temporary housing was an urgent need. How-
ever, barracks, like tents, were mainly destined for the cities and towns. Those 
who lived in gourbis were expected to quickly rebuild their homes themselves, 
supported by grants of materials and cash payments of ten thousand francs (about 
thirty US dollars in 1954) to each household, to be followed by an additional 
ten thousand later.92 The proponents of this response argued that an illiterate 
population in desperate need, many living in areas not served by roads, required 
a process that would be simple and, it was hoped, quick—quick enough to obviate 
the need for tents or barracks. In practice, however, rebuilding gourbis was not as 
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simple as officials had initially hoped. On September 22, Saïah Abdelkader and 
the mayor of Orléansville, Ange Bisgambiglia, met with the Governor-General 
of Algeria, Roger Léonard, during Léonard’s visit to Orléansville, and both local 
officials complained of inadequate efforts to help the inhabitants of gourbis. They 
denounced the slow pace of distribution of building supplies (specifically, poles 
to provide a lattice for the roofs) and complained of delays in the distribution of 
the promised first installment of ten thousand francs for these families without 
shelter.93 When the Algerian Assembly convened several days later to address the 
crisis, one representative (M. Francis) pointed out that the “gourbi” policy ig-
nored the many rural poor who lived in houses made of stone that could not be 
rebuilt with some wooden poles and twenty thousand francs. Similarly, represen-
tative Bentaieb objected to the use of the term “traditional” in the budget line for 
“improvements for traditional rural habitats,” essentially agreeing with Francis 
that aid should not be based on an arbitrary distinction between what was mod-
ern and what was traditional in the dwellings of the rural poor. The term “tradi-
tional” was duly deleted from the legislation, but the Assembly maintained the 
policy that rural populations would be expected to rebuild their own homes with 
the assistance of some materials and the fixed payment of twenty thousand francs. 
Future long-term improvements were promised, but the advocates of the plan 
claimed that the inhabitants of gourbis preferred to rebuild their own homes.94
Solidarity and Division
For the French state, Algeria was France, and the message was one of national 
solidarity; flags were flown at half-mast on public buildings throughout France.95 
Hautberg believed that this sentiment was sincere and widely shared, referring 
to “this Algeria, so dear to all the French.”96 Governor-General Léonard pro-
claimed, “I say above all that the French government considers the Orléans-
ville catastrophe a national catastrophe, which France takes charge of because 
it affects a French department, French citizens.” This statement was meant to 
be inclusive of Muslim Algerians, who were technically French citizens, albeit 
unequal ones. Léonard declared, “There has never been, and never will be, dis-
crimination of any kind regarding the victims.”97 Given the obvious divisions in 
colonial Algerian society amid intermittent nationalist insurgency since 1945, 
such assurances were aspirational, and had to be made explicit, if only in hopes of 
minimizing political discord. Léonard’s declaration prefigured a more deliberate 
policy promoting the idea of Muslim equality after 1958.98
As Valentin Pelosse has pointed out, official public declarations from the 
state—in Paris, Algiers, and Orléansville—presented an image of unity across 
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ethnic divisions, but this “phraséologie officielle” 99 was undermined both by 
the preexisting inequities of colonialism and by the official disaster response, 
which treated poor rural Muslims very differently from the rest of the popula-
tion. Nevertheless, it was frequently claimed that the earthquake had the effect 
of unifying the population across class and ethnic lines. Raymond LaQuière, 
president of the Algerian Assembly, declared that “All distinctions, all hierar-
chies, were leveled in single blow: there remained only brothers, animated by 
a single and identical desire to help their neighbor with sublime devotion”100 
Orléansville mayor Bisgambiglia echoed this sentiment, declaring to the As-
sembly that “The Chélif contains two ethnic elements: the Muslims, who are 
the more unfortunate, and the Europeans. One should not oppose one to other, 
because they have shown, after the earthquake, that they consider each other as 
brothers.”101 Several months later, René Debia explained the process by which 
he believed the earthquake had furthered this inter-ethnic solidarity. From the 
limited vantage point of the subprefecture, Débia described the first night after 
the disaster: “An empty lot, across from the subprefecture, was transformed into 
a city of canvas where, indistinctly, and taking into account only the situation 
of the family, were settled Europeans and Muslims . . . it never ceased to bring 
together the ethnic strata of the population so that everyone, rich and poor, 
and whatever their origins, knew the same hardship and started again together 
from zero.”102 In Debia’s account, it was as if the earthquake had resolved the 
fundamental contradiction of France’s “Impossible Republic,” reconciling in one 
cataclysmic moment the aspirations of French universalism with imperial rule 
in Algeria.103 But Debia’s optimistic vision, like the broader hope of reconciling 
imperialism with democracy, was a fantasy. The winds were shifting. By late Sep-
tember, diverse voices, both within the state disaster response effort and in the 
press, were pointing out the imminent arrival of the rainy season that portended 
fresh misery for the many thousands sleeping outdoors or in tents.104
Organized Protest
Sources contemporaneous with the earthquake response reveal that depictions 
of the disaster quickly became a field of struggle over the future of Algeria. Even 
as official French sources promoted a narrative of solidarity and promises of im-
provements, alternative narratives were being offered within the framework of 
Algerian nationalism, on the one hand, and leftist calls for class struggle, on 
the other. Within weeks of the first earthquake, organized opposition groups 
began to openly denounce the French colonial authorities in Orléansville, and 
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the provision of humanitarian aid became a field of political and ideological 
struggle in the Chélif Valley.105 Active post-disaster public relations campaigns 
and relief aid operations were carried out by various groups in Algeria: the Al-
gerian Communist Party, the Communist-linked Conféderation Général du 
Travail (CGT) labor union—and also by Ferhat Abbas’s moderate nationalist 
Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) and the less moderate 
Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), the na-
tionalist party originally founded by Messali Hadj. The earthquake created an 
opportunity for these groups to challenge the state’s narrative of the disaster 
response and to present their own alternatives.106
The UDMA’s newspaper, La République algérienne, denounced the author-
ities’ efforts at disaster response and the propaganda of “solidarity” that accom-
panied it. The authorities were accused of “criminal negligence and scandal-
ous discrimination” based on race. The paper also took note of the manner in 
which official sources and the mainstream press emphasized the destruction of 
the urban centers where most Europeans lived, and how they invariably reported 
the number of European dead separately from casualties among français musul-
mans. La République algérienne portrayed the paucity and tardiness of disaster 
aid in rural areas as a product of racial discrimination. The paper rejected official 
claims that the lack of roads was to blame for these shortcomings, and argued 
that transportation infrastructure never seemed to be a problem when the army 
wanted to send “trucks full of troops” to crush rural disturbances, as they had 
in the village of Sidi Ali Bounab three years before. Moreover, the paper argued, 
the flimsy construction of gourbis and the absence of roads and medical facilities 
only demonstrated the emptiness of the imperialist promises associated with the 
“civilizing mission.”107
The authorities were denounced in slightly different terms by dissident po-
litical groups of the far Left that included both Muslims and Europeans, most 
notably the CGT trade union (associated with the French Communist Party) 
and the Algerian Communist Party (PCA). Like the nationalist UDMA, these 
groups offered material and political support to the victims of the disaster while 
portraying the French state as callously indifferent to the needs of the people. 
Some of their criticisms seemed to echo the UDMA almost verbatim.108 How-
ever, as historian Yaël Fletcher has demonstrated, these non-nationalist groups 
promoted a class-based vision of colonial oppression that deemphasized ethnic 
divisions.109 A major vehicle for this vision was the daily newspaper Alger ré-
publicain, whose Muslim Algerian and European editors and writers, though 
predominantly affiliated with the PCA, sought to provide a platform for diverse 
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opposition groups and, as they put it, to “unite, as broadly as possible, all those 
who—regardless of their political orientations and their origins—want to end 
colonial oppression.”110 In their criticisms of the state response and their appeals 
for donations from their members, these groups offered their own vision of “sol-
idarity” between the European French and Muslim and non-Muslim Algeri-
ans, based on class identity.111 This alternative vision criticized the inequities 
of French colonialism and castigated the French authorities but also hoped to 
mitigate the “feudal” elements of Algerian nationalism by persuading nation-
alists to see the French working class as their comrades in the struggle against 
colonial tyranny.112
In early October, articles in Alger républicain denounced the empty promises 
and slow pace of the state’s response to the disaster, contrasting the generosity 
and goodwill of the people who had donated to the solidarity fund with the 
anemic official efforts to deliver help to the people. Particularly contemptible, 
in this view, was the state’s expectation that the rural population should rebuild 
their own dwellings, with no help from the state except the paltry payments of 
twenty thousand francs (less than sixty US dollars)—not even tents for tempo-
rary shelter. The earthquake had exposed the falseness of officials’ claims about 
the material benefits the French state had brought to Algeria. The suffering of 
rural people—rarely identified as Muslim or Arab—was the direct consequence 
of the failures of the state; villages like Beni Rached had been “abandoned” and 
left without access roads or medical facilities.113
Meanwhile, rural and urban people began to register their discontent, some-
times organized by the dissident political groups. On October 2, Alger répub-
licain reported that a hundred “paysans” (peasants or country folk) from the 
douar Bouarouys had marched in protest of a local official or caïd who had de-
manded bribes from families wishing their names to appear on a list of those to 
receive the aid allowance for rebuilding—a recurring complaint that the leftist 
press used to demonstrate the complicity of Muslim elites with the oppressive 
French state.114 A day or two later, women from the douar of Oued Larbi, who 
had organized a “Committee of Disaster Victims,” presented themselves at the 
subprefecture in Orléansville, accompanied by Baya Allaouchiche, secretary of 
the “Union of the Women of Algeria,” and demanded the distribution of tents.115 
The CGT’s disaster relief committee organized a delegation of 300 rural “fel-
lahs” who marched to the town hall in Orléansville, where some of them were 
able to gain an audience with Saïah Abdelkader’s personal secretary, to whom 
they complained of the lack of tents and the practice of providing only one re-
construction allowance in cases of multiple families living in a single dwelling.116
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OnOctober 9, the rain began to fall, and the need for shelter became urgent. 
The CGT responded with its own relief efforts and organized a march of 500 
“fellahs and rural workers” to the town of Oued Fodda, led by syndicate leaders 
Gessoum Dahmane, Mohammed Marouf, and Zaidi. On October 14, Dahmane 
led another march—of 700 people, according to Alger républicain—to the sub-
prefecture in Orléansville, where Debia’s reassurances that all would soon be 
housed were found unconvincing.117 Yet another march of over 700 women took 
place in Orléansville on October 28.118 In Alger républicain, André Ruiz appealed 
to international class solidarity: “Brothers and sisters, workers and peasants, of 
the regions of Orléansville, Ténès, Duperré, you can count on the support of 
the working class of Algeria and of France, and the support of the international 
working class. . . .It is incontestable that this catastrophe highlights the misery of 
our lands, due in the first place to the regime of colonial exploitation.”119 
Critiques of the state response also emerged in the metropole. On October 
8, the Catholic Resistance newspaper Témoinage chrétien (Christian Witness), 
which would later voice important critiques of French tactics in the Algerian 
War, published an article titled “Orléansville: Racism is not dead! Does the 
Mayor only want to feed the Europeans?” The paper quoted a September 15 
message, allegedly sent by Bisgambiglia, mayor of Orléansville, to the Red Cross: 
“Please do not feed Pontéba, the villages Menassis, Maizia, El-Douabed, Gulaf-
tia, Kafafsa, Cheklil and Chouiat, where the men and children did not come to 
work this morning.”120 This piece of damning evidence was later reprinted in 
Algeria in the CGT’s La Vie ouvrière (The Worker’s Life) and in its local monthly 
newsletter, La voix des sinistrés du Chéliff (The Voice of the Disaster Survivors of 
the Chélif ).121
Whereas Témoinage chrétien had focused on Bisgambiglia, Alger républicain 
and the CGT paired Bisgambiglia’s villainy with that of privileged Muslims. 
Alger républicain pointed out that the first cement building to be constructed, 
in October 1954, was a shed to house Bisgambiglia’s horses, but it also addressed 
continuing demands for bribes from rural Muslim caïds.122 The CGT’s La voix 
des sinistrés du Chéliff paired Bisgambiglia with Saïah Abdelkader, describing 
the two as “The Profiteers of Misery.” Both Saïah and Bigambiglia, it was im-
plied, were guilty of skimming from donations intended for disaster victims; 
Saïah would later be accused of profiting from the disaster through his family’s 
stake in a cement company which was contracted as a supplier in the construc-
tion of HLM housing.123
The archival record suggests that this demonization of Bisgambiglia and Saïah 
Abdelkader was not fully justified; in September 1954 the pair had pressed the 
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Algerian government to speed the distribution of materials for the reconstruc-
tion of gourbis, and in 1955 Saïah would lobby the government in Paris to expand 
construction of permanent HLM apartment housing in Orléansville for homeless 
Muslims who had migrated to the city after the earthquake.124 However, in the 
Algerian Assembly, it would be the PCA representative René Justrabo who would 
speak out for the needs of the rural poor. Bisgambiglia and Saïah Abdelkader, in 
contrast, would focus on maximizing indemnifications for property owners.125 For 
the CGT, this dastardly duo constituted a perfect foil to demonstrate that ethnic-
ity and religion were irrelevant to the class struggle against capitalist oppression. 
The oppressors, it was made clear, had no ethnic identity.
This message was reinforced by a complementary message of worker soli-
darity across ethnic lines. Parisian syndicalists visited Beni Rached in October 
1954,126 and Alger républicain contrasted the empty words of Saïah Abdelkader 
and the inaction of the Algerian Assembly with the successful effort of council-
man Rachid Dali Bey, a communist, to persuade the Algiers Conseil Général to 
allocate one hundred million francs for disaster relief.127 Meanwhile, Ruiz was 
organizing local Muslim Algerian elected officials, who formed a “Comité Na-
tional algérien d’aide aux sinistrés,” which addressed complaints to the Minister 
of the Interior about the lack of tents and barracks, and about the extortion of 
bribes from disaster survivors by rural caïds.128
The situation seemed to be explosive. Faced with signs of popular agitation, 
the authorities assigned gendarmes to Beni Rached and other villages.129 As the 
rains intensified, so did the protests. In late October, Alger républicain reported 
crowds as large as two thousand.130
Shortcomings and Deep Causes
The force of seismic waves had produced a dramatic intervention in human 
history, transforming another environmental factor, the seasonal rains, from a 
routine and predictable event into a catastrophe: a humanitarian catastrophe 
for the people of the Chélif Valley and a political disaster for the French state. 
These catastrophes were also products of late colonialism: a century of impover-
ishment and neglect left the rural Algerian population exposed to the elements 
in the autumn of 1954, while the growing vitality of the anti-colonial opposition 
made the suffering of poor Muslim Algerians an urgent political concern for the 
colonial regime.
The French state’s response was seen as inadequate not only by the regime’s 
opponents but also by those responsible for the disaster response. By early 1955, 
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the solidarity campaign had collected over 1.5 billion francs, with donations ar-
riving from across Europe, the Middle East, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union. This did not, however, translate into robust action in the Chélif Valley.131 
Within the SNPC, the shortcomings of the immediate disaster response were 
acknowledged, and the event became a case study in unpreparedness and sub-
optimal organization. Although the immediate response of the military units, 
sapeurs-pompiers, and especially the medical staff seem to have been universally 
applauded, the response from the local government and from Algiers and Paris 
was inefficient.132 As Colonel Curie’s report on the disaster response effort would 
explain, the local staff of the Service de Santé had performed admirably, but the 
local authorities, including Debia, Bisgambiglia, and the mayors of the other 
affected towns lacked the “means of communication” to organize an effective 
local governmental disaster response operation. Only the military troops in the 
area had been able to respond immediately. The subprefecture building had it-
self been damaged, as had the gendarmie, and the local officials had themselves 
been traumatized by the disaster. The Service de Protection Civile d’Algerie had 
been slow to respond to the disaster; the “designated director of disaster relief ” 
arrived in Orléansville on Friday September 11, only to return to Algiers that day, 
and when he returned on the 12th, he possessed no more means of communica-
tion or response than did the subprefect or the mayor.133
As Kessler noted in his report on the disaster response, the SNPC team that 
set up operations on September 20 in the subprefecture fell short of the orga-
nization and infrastructure called for in the Plan ORSEC (Organisation de la 
réponse de sécurité civile),134 the guidelines for disaster response promulgated by 
the French state in 1952. The Plan ORSEC specified that a team of “specialized 
functionaries and technicians” needed to be sent to the disaster site with the au-
thority to respond to the variety of urgent problems that might arise. This team 
would have both the skills and the “psychological distance” necessary to con-
front the disaster, but it was to work closely with the local authorities in order 
to benefit from local knowledge. The Orléansville response, however, suffered 
from poor coordination. Although the Civil Protection workers from outside 
of Orléansville shared space in available buildings with the local authorities, 
this resulted in the “dispersion of services” of the SNPC staff while producing 
confusion, rather than coordination, between the hierarchy of the SNPC and 
that of the subprefecture. 135 Marius Hautberg complained that the municipal 
government issued vouchers to Orléansville residents for tents and blankets 
without regard for the ability of the SNPC to fulfill such commitments, and 
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uncoordinated requests were made to the engineering corps by various authori-
ties, including Debia, at the subprefecture; Freychet, representing the prefecture; 
and even the medical service, resulting in wasted time and resources. Meanwhile, 
although buildings containing corpses were excavated, no official possessed the 
legal authority to order the demolition of the countless other buildings that 
stood unusable, damaged by the earthquake.136 These critiques were analogous 
to concerns emanating from within the Algerian government. In an October 
7 encrypted telegram marked “secret,” Governor-General Roger Léonard ex-
pressed alarm that “latent conflicts” between the municipal authorities and the 
prefecture prevented effective action, as did the lack of a legal structure per-
mitting the Algerian administration to address the need for repairs to existing 
buildings and for permits for new construction. These problems rendered the 
administration “paralyzed,” according to Leonard, “on the eve of winter.”137
Kessler argued that the impact of the earthquake was much like that of an ae-
rial bombing campaign, and therefore planners of national defense had much to 
learn from Orléansville. Kessler noted that there was one important difference 
between the earthquake in Orléansville and the experience of cities destroyed 
in war: the Orléansville disaster had occurred when France was otherwise at 
peace and had affected only a single region. 138 Given the peacetime abundance 
of means in September, the inefficiency of the response was worrisome. For Kes-
sler, the “appalling mediocrity” of the service’s own resources and the grossly 
“insufficient training” of the local French population would be a wake-up call, 
he hoped, for French disaster response. 139 A similar view was made public in 
the pages of the newspaper L’est républican, where an editorial titled “Warn-
ing” pointed out the growing danger of nuclear destruction of French cities and 
cited the inadequacy of the response to the earthquake.140 Hautberg, too, hoped 
that improvements in the organization of disaster response would better prepare 
the administration to respond in times of war.141 Finishing their reports in De-
cember 1954, it was not yet evident to Kessler and Hautberg that history would 
record the period of relative peace in North Africa as ending within weeks of 
the disaster.
Neither Hautberg, the engineer, Kessler, the administrator-in-training, nor 
Debia, the subprefect, made any mention of the political agitation of the sur-
vivors. Hautberg and Debia, however, addressed the question of deeper causes 
of the suffering occasioned by the disaster, and recognized that the problems 
revealed by the earthquake went beyond organizational inefficiency. They rec-
ognized that the disaster produced disproportionate suffering among Muslim 
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Algerians living in rural poverty even if they did not accept that this poverty was 
rooted in the injustices of colonialism, insisting instead that French rule was a 
force for positive change.
In subprefect Debia’s view, the earthquake provoked a “revelation” for outsid-
ers, including “visitors, metropolitan or Algerian [i.e. colons], journalists, func-
tionaries—and even very high functionaries.” This revelation, for Debia, was not 
of the iniquities of colonialism but of the harshness of the land, invoking the dis-
course described by Aït-Saada. For the first time, these outsiders saw beyond the 
façade of beautiful beaches, impressive dams, and public works usually shown 
to important visitors and tourists. The disaster brought to the fore “the Alge-
rian reality” of an “ungrateful land” where people toiled in an inhospitable cli-
mate, as they had for millennia, but where population growth now exacerbated 
their poverty. Debia was confident in the French colonizing mission, however: 
the solution lay in the “mise en valeur” (improvement) of Algeria through eco-
nomic development.142 Prior to the earthquake, Debia had dreamed of the Ché-
lif Valley becoming “a new California,” and he remained optimistic, although 
he had recognized, even before the outbreak of war, that the poverty of rural 
Algerians was “the gravest problem, which risks endangering France’s work of 
civilization.”143
For Hautberg, too, the alterity of “this land of Africa . . . brutal and savage” 
was the root cause of Algerian underdevelopment. 144 Like Debia, Hautberg be-
lieved that the future of French Algeria depended on economic development. 
Unlike Debia, however, Hautberg acknowledged the fragility of the ties between 
Muslim Algerians and France, pointing out that French “penetration” in North 
Africa was a relatively recent phenomenon. Hautberg argued that poverty was 
the root cause of unrest in Algeria, inclining Muslim Algerians “to react vio-
lently in order to loosen the grip of their misery.”145 For Hautberg, this poverty 
exacerbated the suffering brought by the disaster, and was the primary cause of 
social disorder. Ignoring the role that the French had played in destroying the 
rural livelihoods of Muslim Algerians since the nineteenth century, Hautberg 
assumed that the current underdevelopment reflected the historical status quo 
ante, perpetuated by a lack of modern agricultural methods and by insufficient 
French schooling. Echoing a frequent postwar theme in French colonial theory, 
Hautberg argued that the solution lay in a Keynesian program of state invest-
ment in Algerian economic development.146
The suffering that followed the earthquake had drawn attention to the ineq-
uities of life in Algeria and the need for improvements in the standard of living 
of the Muslim population. For Debia, French rule was the cure for Algeria’s 
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underdevelopment, not its cause, but “two thousand years of backwardness can-
not be regained in a century.”147 Algeria’s situation, he argued, was not unlike 
that of America’s rural South, where state-led economic initiatives—the Tennes-
see Valley Authority—had been initiated in response. In contrast, Alger répub-
lican asserted that the root cause of Algerian poverty was the state itself, which 
imposed on poor Algerians “a burdened life, with taxes, caïds, informants, and 
gendarmes.”148 Nevertheless, there was significant point of agreement between 
the views of dissidents like the editors of Alger républican and imperialist ana-
lysts like Debia, Kessler, and Hautberg. They recognized that disaster response 
was not enough: reconstruction would be insufficient if it merely returned the 
Chélif Valley to its pre-earthquake condition. As Alger républican put it,
The problem posed goes beyond reconstruction, or aid, or even solidarity 
with the victims of the catastrophe. Because these fundamental problems 
will not be resolved when everything is put back “in order.” When we re-
sume “as before” the neck irons of misery and hunger. A “normal” misery 
and hunger. A life without school, without doctors, without warmth and 
without liberty.149
Yet even restoring the Chélif to its pre-earthquake condition seemed initially 
to be beyond the competence of the French authorities; the seismic event had 
dramatically exacerbated the contradiction between imperialism’s promises and 
the reality of life in Algeria.
Revolution and Reconstruction
On the night of October 31, 1954, a series of attacks were carried out by the FLN 
(Front de Libération Nationale), across Algeria, mainly in Algiers, Kabylia, and 
the Aures mountains. On November 1, the FLN issued a proclamation that the 
“final phase” of the struggle for an independent Algerian state was beginning, a 
“true revolutionary struggle” that would use “every means” to force the French 
to negotiate.150 This was not, however, the sudden start of a conflagration. The 
insurrection of 1954 started small, with fewer than a thousand armed militants 
and was part of a history of postwar resistance that included the mass uprisings 
of 1945 followed by the militant activities of the FLN’s predecessor, the MTLD’s 
Organisation Spéciale.151 In 1954, the new insurrection brought no immediate 
transformation of the situation in the Chélif.
Soon, however, the “events” of the incipient revolution started to compete 
with the disaster response for headlines in the Algerian press, and voices in the 
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Chélif Valley began to ask how the earthquake was related to the insurrection. 
The earthquake, it was assumed, was simply too momentous an event to be irrel-
evant to the political question. Descriptions of the calm in the Chélif and plan-
ning for the reconstruction of Orléansville became elements of the discursive 
contest to imagine the future of Algeria.
For seventeen months after the FLN declaration, Orléansville remained un-
touched, as the FLN struggled to gain traction beyond its strongholds in the 
Aurès and Kabylia, in eastern Algeria. The calm in the Chélif, however, was only 
relative: peace for the colonizer went hand in hand with oppression and violence 
for the colonized. The nationalists’ declaration of war had made all forms of dis-
sidence more dangerous. Survivors’ organizations, by operating in the open, gave 
the administration prime targets for repression: the activist, the disgruntled, the 
engaged. In November 1954, fourteen people were arrested in Beni Rached, as 
well as five CGT members organizing in the village of Chouchoua.152 In January 
1955, the CGT’s La voix des sinistrés reported that homes of its disaster commit-
tee organizers were raided by French troops or gendarmes, claiming to search 
for arms. One local organizer, Ahmed Sameti, was imprisoned on charges that 
he had stolen the caïd’s cow. Two others were imprisoned on charges related to 
demonstrations. The villages of Yaabouch and Ouled Bendou were also raided. 
No arms were found, but nineteen people were arrested.153 The following year, 
there were more arrests in Beni Rached, and twelve in the village of Taighaout. 
In August 1955, Kaddhar, the secretary of the Fédération des Comités de Défense 
des sinistrés was arrested, as was, a few months later, the secretary for the Comité 
Intersyndical de solidarité, Dahmane Guessous. In May 1956, the remaining 
leadership of these committees were rounded up and sent to detention camps.154
Yäel Fletcher has argued that the earthquakes of September and the rains of 
October had given the leftist dissidents writing for Alger républicain and orga-
nizing the CGT’s disaster victims’ committees a grand opportunity to promote 
their narrative of a class-based divide between the workers and the wealthy. The 
FLN insurrection did not trigger a sudden conversion of these activists to the na-
tionalist cause—at least not overtly.155 In 1954, however, voices from the Left de-
nounced the repressive measures taken in response to the outbreak of hostilities, 
and argued that the root causes of the insurrection lay in the oppressive nature 
of French rule in Algeria. Alger républicain declared “the necessity of seeking 
and finding, QUICKLY, democratic solutions to the Algerian problem.”156 The 
Fédération des Comités de defense des Sinistrés (Federation of Committees for 
the Defense of the Victims) declared that “the deep causes of these events [the 
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FLN insurrection] reside in the accumulation of the methods of exploitation 
and oppression, in all domains, of misery and arbitrariness, by a colonial regime 
which is largely condemned by all humanity.”157 Alger républicain also pointed 
out the contradiction between the French state’s inability to supply twenty-five 
thousand tents in the aftermath of the earthquake and its ability to use aircraft 
to deploy paratroopers across Algeria in response to the FLN.158 The Chélif 
earthquake was once again portrayed as revelatory of the follies and hypocrisy 
of the colonial regime.
Meanwhile, supporters of French colonialism depicted Orléansville and the 
French response to the earthquake as a model for Algeria. In September 1955, an 
article in the Journal d’Alger asked, “Do we owe to the [seismic] cataclysm the 
total absence of political troubles in the region of Orléanville?”159 Subprefect 
Debia began his book-length history and memoir of Orléansville, published that 
year, with a foreword titled “Warning.” In the months between his completion of 
the manuscript’s chapters and the publication of the book, Debia acknowledged 
that “the situation” in Algeria had become more perilous. But Debia remained 
hopeful, as his book’s title indicated: Orléansville: Naissance et destruction d’une 
ville: Sa résurrection (Birth and Destruction of a City: Its Resurrection).160 Debia 
portrayed the region as a harbor of political tranquility amidst an Algeria in cri-
sis, and he attributed this to the leveling effect of the earthquake. His memoir is 
notably silent about the discord of October 1954, when, as the rains intensified, 
people slept in the open and marched in the streets. Debia elided the entire pe-
riod of the survivors’ protests and their repression in three words: “the months 
passed.” 161 Ignoring these events, Debia focused on the urban housing of Euro-
peans and Muslims of all social classes, first in an improvised “city of wood” and 
then in barracks constructed, for temporary housing, beginning in December 
and largely completed by March. There, Europeans and Muslims experienced 
together the hardships of life after the earthquake. 162 The result was a new sol-
idarity. The final page of Debia’s book was blank, except for a photograph of a 
smiling Muslim Algerian boy.
Given the anger and misery expressed in the Chélif Valley in the fall and 
winter of 1954, Debia’s optimism was Panglossian. In the Chélif the rains contin-
ued, as did the survivors’ demonstrations, culminating in a demonstration of as 
many as five thousand people on November 25.163 Their complaints, as conveyed 
by Algèr republicain and La voix des sinistrés du Chéliff, continued to focus on 
the difficulty of obtaining the twenty thousand francs allotted to rural families 
rendered homeless, and above all, the lack of housing. The weather had made 
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the need for housing urgent, and, weeks after the disaster, neither the admin-
istration nor the survivors saw tents as an adequate solution. On October 11, 
the administration had promised temporary housing in barracks constructed 
of prefabricated materials. However, the volume of material ordered was grossly 
insufficient, having been intended only for the residents of towns and cities. 
Meanwhile, there was no sign of progress on plans for permanent reconstruc-
tion of Orléansville.164
Nevertheless, the pace of disaster relief did improve in November 1954. This 
was partly in response to the political agitation in the Chélif, and to negative 
press coverage about the disaster response in Algeria and metropolitan France. 
In part it was simply because initiatives begun in late September and October 
were finally bearing fruit. In October, a meeting of the Algerian Assembly had 
established a legal basis for funding reconstruction; meanwhile, the mess of het-
erogeneous tents and poles and canvas piling up in the Orléansville train station 
was sorted out. By late November, according to official figures, over 6,000 tents 
had been distributed, including 500 from the Italian Red Cross, 1,474 from 
the SNPC, and 1,030 from the army. Thirty thousand blankets were handed 
out: the Red Cross had provided twenty thousand and Sécours Catholique, ten 
thousand.165 (No mention was made in official counts of the efforts made by the 
CGT, UDMA, or MTLD.) From Kessler’s point of view, the distribution of 
tents “represented the vastest French housing effort ever achieved in a time of 
peace.”166 Meanwhile, “Operation Gourbi” was declared, to speed the distribu-
tion of funds and supplies to permit rural families to rebuild their homes. Debia 
claimed that the reconstruction of thirty-eight thousand gourbis was completed 
by winter (Interior Minister Mitterrand claimed that it was thirty-five thou-
sand), enabled by the aid payments of twenty thousand francs each.167 Official 
claims of successes in the distribution of tents and aid for the construction of 
gourbis are corroborated by a shift in the nature of the critiques leveled by the 
colonial regime’s critics, including not only the CGT and Alger républican but 
also the metropolitan Comité Chrètien d’entente France-Islam, who now in-
creasingly called for the construction of barracks or more permanent “modern” 
housing for the rural population.168
The question of housing in the Chélif was not just a matter of overcoming 
logistical, financial, or bureaucratic obstacles, however. In the context of the 
FLN rebellion, reconstruction took on new urgency. It is important to note that 
this urgency predated the 1958 Constantine Plan, which is often portrayed as a 
turning point in the French response to anti-colonial revolt. A massive program 
of state investment in Algeria intended to undercut the appeal of the FLN by 
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fulfilling some of the promises of colonialism, the Constantine Plan aimed to 
improve standards of living through investment in infrastructure, industry, edu-
cation, and particularly the construction of decent housing for swelling urban 
populations. However, this 1958 initiative was part of an ongoing shift in post-
war colonial thinking emphasizing social reconfiguration and economic devel-
opment through Keynesian investment. French intentions for reconstruction 
in the Chélif Valley prefigured the Constantine Plan as a response to the threat 
of nationalism.169
Scholars have demonstrated that violent coercion played a central role in this 
attempt to remake Algeria through an imposed economic transformation.170 For 
Debia, the earthquake’s violent disruption of traditional patterns of Muslims’ 
lives already represented a helpful “forced step toward assimilation, of which we 
today see the happy effects.”171 Debia argued that these “happy effects” meant 
that there was hope that France might “remake the moral, social, economic and 
administrative conquest of the country.”172 Debia argued that the regime’s critics 
were wrong to focus merely on housing the rural poor without envisioning a 
wholesale transformation of Algerian life. He saw the inadequacy of the gourbis 
as a mere symptom of the underdevelopment of rural Algeria; replacing collapsed 
gourbis with modern housing would not treat the cause of the problem. Roads, 
he argued, were the key: “It is by road that civilization penetrates and implants 
itself.”173 Debia’s view that the inaccessibility and isolation of remote villages was 
a major obstacle to the success of the French project was widely shared; and in 
the context of the war this problem would eventually be addressed through the 
mass relocation of rural Algerians into dismal centers of régroupement.174 In the 
Chélif, however, mass relocation had already begun. The population had swelled 
on the outskirts of Orléansville, as desperate earthquake survivors in rural areas 
moved closer to the center of aid distribution, many resorting to picking through 
garbage dumps to survive.175 The Muslim Algerian population of the city grew 
to over twenty thousand by 1955.176
Reconstruction was slow to manifest, however, and its political purpose was 
undermined by the inequities of colonial power. In 1955, the Commissariat of 
Reconstruction rebuilt low-income (HLM) apartment housing in Orléansville 
destroyed by the earthquake and constructed additional HLM housing, but in 
some cases European families moved into these buildings. Muslims in the sub-
urbs of Le Ferme and Bocca Sahnoune, including many who had migrated from 
the countryside after the disaster, continued to live in tents.177 
Owners of European-style buildings in cities and towns were better provided 
for. Not only were they provided with temporary “barrack” housing, but they 
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had the opportunity to receive substantial compensation for their losses from 
the state. In October 1954, the Algerian Assembly had authorized assistance 
from state funds for private property owners (excluding the gourbi dwellers) 
equal to the value of any property damage valued at more than five thousand 
francs. This aid included grants of up to one hundred thousand francs per prop-
erty owner for repairs, and up to the depreciated value of the building for build-
ings deemed irreparable. Government-backed low-interest loans were offered to 
cover the remainder of repair or reconstruction costs. This assistance, however, 
was issued in the form of vouchers, redeemable only when reconstruction was 
underway, which required obtaining demolition and building permits from 
the newly created Commissaire de la Reconstruction. The process was slow, 
and consequently little permanent reconstruction occurred before 1956. When 
buildings were reconstructed, provisions intended to ensure that renters would 
be able to return to reconstructed buildings proved ineffective, and many ten-
ants remained displaced.178
As one might expect, the well-to-do and the well-connected fared best of all. 
As the months passed, critics on the Left pointed out that Bisgambiglia and 
Saïah Abdelkader received state funds to reconstruct their own villas, reportedly 
costing ten million and sixteen million francs, respectively, while their business 
enterprises and those of their family members benefitted from state reconstruc-
tion contracts.179 The wealthy also benefitted from the real estate market created 
by the process of reconstruction. The rich bought the property and the vouch-
ers of owners left destitute by the earthquake, who could not afford to wait for 
the Commissariat of Reconstruction to approve reconstruction plans and issue 
payment for their vouchers. This created a profitable market for those with the 
means to speculate in a real-estate market propped up by government funds. 
Meanwhile, in 1955, the municipal council blocked the urban planners’ efforts to 
“construct affordable housing in well-situated locations” such as on the central 
thoroughfare, the rue d’Isly, and near the train station. In a move paralleling seg-
regationist strategy in the United States, plans for a public swimming pool were 
thwarted in favor of a privately owned swim club exclusively for Europeans.180 
In March 1956, 1.3 of the 1.5 billion francs from the national solidarity fund 
remained unspent. The CGT’s Committee for the Defense of Disaster Victims 
(Comité pour la defense des Sinistrés) argued that these funds should go di-
rectly to the survivors of the earthquake.181 However, a member of the Saïah 
family had organized a survivors’ group to act as an alternative voice to the 
CGT, and this group supported the transfer of money from the solidarity fund 
to the reconstruction budget.182 The CGT’s approach would have ensured that 
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equal benefits would go, not only to urban property owners, but to urban rent-
ers and the rural population in the gourbis, who constituted the majority of 
those affected by the disaster. Instead, the funds were transferred to the Alge-
rian Government-General for use by the Commissariat of Reconstruction, in 
keeping with the regime’s desire to impose centrally directed transformation.183
Plans laid out in October of 1954 that had languished for many months were 
now put into motion. These included provisions to address the needs of the 
Muslim poor. Two hundred fifty thousand francs were allocated for “social im-
provements in the douars.” One hundred nine million francs were allocated for 
roads, water supply, and sanitation in Orléansville’s Muslim suburbs of La Ferme 
and Bocca Sahnoune. In Ténès, apartment housing was to be constructed for 328 
families, along with a school, mosque, and bathhouse (a hammam or “Moor-
ish bath”). Trade schools for construction were to be built in Orléansville and 
Ténès, at a cost of thirty-two million francs; eighty million was allocated for a 
cultural center in Orléansville; while only forty million was set aside for a rural 
vocational training center in El Attaf.184 A small portion of these funds were 
used to respond to complaints of discrimination against Muslim Algerians. For 
example, a supplemental distribution for war veterans of ten thousand francs 
from the solidarity fund, originally only distributed in the city of Orléansville, 
was extended to veterans in the outlying areas when Muslim veterans outside of 
the city complained that geography was being used as a proxy for race in grant-
ing preferential treatment to European veterans.185 Such measures, however, did 
little to counteract the rural catastrophe inflicted, first by more than a century of 
settler colonialism and then by the new violence of the earthquake and the war.
The FLN’s major operations were largely limited to eastern Algeria in the 
first phase of the war, and therefore no clear conclusion can be reached about 
the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort as an imperialist countermeasure to 
nationalist recruitment. Keynesian effects may have made a contribution to the 
relative calm in Orléansville. Certainly, Keynesian stimulus is a more plausible 
explanation than Debia’s imagined social leveling and post-disaster assimilation 
in the tent cities of Orléansville. Alger républicain had criticized the state for 
earmarking funds for reconstruction and compensation of damages that could 
have been directed toward the most urgent material needs of the survivors.186 
However, after 1954, both the reconstruction of the city and the presence of the 
army stimulated the local economy, creating jobs and a demand for goods from 
local businesses.187 Before the earthquake, in an economy long dependent on day 
laborers, underemployment had been a major problem. Hundreds of the under-
employed and unemployed had demonstrated in Orléansville in October 1953, 
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and the administration in 1954 counted 1,026 unemployed workers. The direct, 
short-term effect of the earthquake was striking: even critics of the colonial state 
recognized that, in November 1954, more than two and a half times that number 
were employed in the task of clearing the debris; seven months later, 800 were 
still working in this capacity. 188 However, this was not a sufficient remedy in the 
long term for Algerian economic suffering or political discontent.
In 1956, the war came to the Chélif. The Army of National Liberation (ALN) 
gained a foothold in the mountains north and south of the valley (the Dahra 
and the Ouarsenis); the Government-General considered the villages in these 
areas 20 to 50 percent “contaminated.”189 Although the French maintained con-
trol of Orléansville, the city experienced attacks and assassinations; meanwhile, 
the ALN expanded their control of the mountains.190 In 1957, the Chélif Valley 
itself was the site of significant fighting, not only between the nationalists and 
the French and their Muslim allies, but between rival nationalist groups.191 In 
some areas affected by the earthquake, disaster reconstruction came to a halt.192 
The army began implementing the massive forced “regrouping” of populations, 
along with whatever portion of their herds and belongings they could manage to 
bring with them, out of the mountains and into regroupement village centers. By 
October 1958, in the newly created département of Orléansville, which extended 
north to the coast at Ténès and south beyond the Ouarsenis, over 100 thou-
sand people had been forcibly displaced; two years later, over 260 thousand were 
housed in 311 regroupement centers, approximately 40 percent of the region’s 
Muslim Algerian population. Many thousands more fled to cities to escape this 
“regrouping.”193 Although the French organizations Secours Catholique and 
the Protestant CIMADE (Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des évacués) 
provided aid in these camps and distributed donations of food and clothing 
shipped from the United States, press reports of unhygienic living conditions 
and malnutrition in the camps scandalized the metropolitan public.194 Across 
Algeria, the French state’s belated attempts to provide these refugees with food 
and housing, first in tents and then in barracks, paralleled the belated scramble 
to provide shelter to earthquake survivors in 1954.
In the Chélif, funds originating in the 1954 fundraising campaign and ear-
marked for “social improvements in the douars” were now directed toward these 
“regroupment” centers. As the Commissariat of Reconstruction put it, disaster 
relief in the countryside was now “tightly associated with the work of pacifica-
tion.”195 Disaster response in Algeria, in other words, had become a tool used by 
the colonial state in its efforts to counter the effects of nationalism. Reconstruc-
tion efforts were then augmented, beginning in 1958, by the Constantine Plan. 
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Valentin Pelosse points out that the total sum paid in salaries to Muslim Algeri-
ans by the Commissariat of Reconstruction (750 million old francs between 1955 
and 1961) amounted to as much as 40 percent of the annual agricultural payroll 
for Algerian workers in the Chélif area.196 In addition to providing employment 
directly, reconstruction had a broader effect on the economy. The Muslim mid-
dle class in Orléansville, including business owners, teachers, professionals, and 
functionaries, grew to perhaps 10 percent of the Muslim population by 1962.197 
However, the fact that Muslims in Orléansville benefitted from post-earthquake 
reconstruction and the Constantine Plan does not mean that the position of 
Muslims improved relative to Europeans or that economic power was redis-
tributed. Europeans, already economically and politically better off, tended to 
benefit the most from the economic stimulus. The Constantine Plan aimed to 
counteract this by stipulating that contracts for goods and services engage not 
only the largest firms but also “diverse small and medium-sized local entrepre-
neurs.” However, these small businesses, to a greater degree in Orléansville than 
in some cities, were often owned by Europeans.198 Moreover, as Pelosse points 
out, the combined effects of regroupement and public spending on earthquake 
reconstruction exacerbated the long-standing tendency of the French coloniz-
ers to privilege urban areas while carrying out the “devastation” of the rural 
economy.199 Construction and reconstruction could do little to address the gross 
and pervasive inequities of colonialism. Yet it is clear that the response to the 
earthquake was part and parcel of the French state’s response to the political 
insurrection.
Conclusion
The inseparability of the natural disaster and the war was captured in the in-
terpretation of events presented by the playwright Henri Kréa and in the mem-
oir of Dr. Aït Ouyahia, who each portrayed the earthquake as a harbinger of a 
nationalist awakening. In Dr. Aït Ouyahia’s recollections of his own personal 
experience, the façade of solidarity in Algeria crumbled within days of the first 
earthquake. Aït Ouyahia recalled press reports describing how, “during those 
days, the entire world manifested its compassion and generosity.”200 Yet this talk 
of universal solidarity did not ring true for him. As a Kabyle-speaking Mus-
lim from a small rural village, Aït Ouyahia had a deep-rooted sympathy for the 
predicament of the rural Algerians he found suffering in Beni Rached. How-
ever, as a French-educated doctor and the son of a French-educated “indigenous 
schoolteacher,” Aït Ouyahia was part of a tiny elite of Muslim professionals who 
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had benefitted from French power and from colonial education.201 Frantz Fanon 
wrote that, before the war of liberation, “the doctor always appears as a link in 
the colonialist network, as a spokesman for the occupying power.”202 Yet, in his 
memoirs, Aït Ouyahia dated his passage from the realm of the colonizer to the 
realm of the colonized not to the outbreak of war but rather to the aftermath of 
the earthquake.
Soon after the disaster, the young doctor observed as crowds of mostly Mus-
lim Algerians gathered to receive aid, and a commotion occurred outside one 
of the tents where humanitarian aid was being distributed. Soldiers dragged a 
young Algerian man away from the tent, and a French officer ordered the crowd 
to disperse, declaring: “All thieves, these Arabs!” This event is not implausible: 
Hautberg also described incidents of friction between earthquake survivors and 
French aid workers leading to the intervention of gendarmes during the distri-
bution of aid.203 For Aït Ouyahia, the angry words of the French officer were an 
outrage, and a transformative moment for the newly minted, French-trained ob-
stetric surgeon. According to his account, he confronted the French officer and, 
in front of the crowd, denounced the man’s racism. Aït Ouyahia remembered 
the moment as an epiphany:
It was as if this insult was addressed to me alone. I decided then to take on, 
alone, the burden for all the Arabs, and in their name, to respond, alone, 
to he who had just injured us. I had to do it, me who spoke French. . . . 
Forgotten was the Muslim intern, all proud of being called “Monsieur,” just 
like his European colleagues in the medical service! Forgotten the young 
indigene who had been told, more than once, that he was not “an ordinary 
Arab”. . . . To the Devil the privileged Muslim! I was no longer me; I was 
those, those poor wretches in rags and dirty feet. I felt suddenly strong, all 
grown up.204 
At this moment, Aït Ouyahia appears to have experienced a conversion. For 
this Kabyle-speaking, French-educated doctor, a new ideology of solidarity, that 
of Arab-Algerian nationalism, had replaced the claims of Franco-Algerian unity 
and universal brotherhood.205 Aït Ouyahia would later go on to provide active 
support to the Algerian revolution against France.
Although Henri Kréa in 1957 and Aït Ouyahia in 1999 portrayed the earth-
quake as a definitive trigger event in Algerians’ embrace of the FLN cause, this 
cannot be taken as evidence of a widespread phenomenon. Even regarding his 
own, personal experience, Aït Ouyahia’s story about the French officer seems to 
fit uneasily with other chapters in his disjointed memoir that treat his wartime 
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support for the FLN without any reference to the earthquake as a formative 
experience. Clearly, however, Aït Ouyahia’s memory of the earthquake itself was 
strongly tied to his commitment to the nationalist struggle for independence.
The archival record produced in the weeks and months following the earth-
quake supports the view that disaster and decolonization were linked, as colo-
nizer and colonized interpreted and responded to the seismic disaster in light 
of the problems of inequity in Algeria and of Algeria’s relation to France. By 
the time the earthquake struck, Algerian nationalism had already been growing 
for decades, and North Africa already being rent by nationalist violence from 
Morocco to Tunisia, but the Chélif disaster revealed and exacerbated the very 
injustices and miseries of colonialism that fueled the nationalist revolution. The 
bankruptcy of the social contract implied by French promises of “civilization” 
and economic development was already apparent in Algeria, but by destroying 
vast amounts of housing, the seismic shocks of 1954 exposed the poorest Al-
gerians to the winter rains and exponentially increased what it would cost the 
French state to follow through on its promises—at precisely the moment when 
anti-colonial opposition was gathering strength. Indisputably, when the earth-
quake struck, questions of decolonization were far from the minds of some—
the child Ali Bouzar waking from his bed in Oued Fodda, or those suocating 
workers, crushed in the ruins of a high rise in Orléansville. However, the earth-
quake and the war of independence are not separable objects of inquiry, at least 
not when the scope of inquiry includes the Chélif Valley. Every action of the 
French state and of its agents, critics, and rivals in the Chélif was conditioned 
by the question of whether Algeria was France, and whether and how it would 
remain so. In the Chélif, disaster relief became a eld of struggle over decoloni-
zation, as it would in Fréjus and in Morocco in the coming years.
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Ch a pter 3
Fréjus 1959, Under Water and at War
On the night of December 2, 1959, fourteen-year-old Christian Hughes and his father returned home in Fréjus, on the north shore of the Mediterranean, at the mouths of the Argens and Reyran Rivers, 
in the French département of the Var. They had set out by bicycle in the pouring 
rain to pull in their fishing nets, but Christian’s father had changed his mind, 
and they returned empty-handed to the house the Hughes family shared with 
Christian’s aunt and uncle. They immediately went to bed. All seemed normal 
until, as Hughes recalled: “Then, we heard noises, gunshots. My father, my sister 
came out of their rooms. We were in the midst of the Algerian War. My brother 
was in the djebels [mountains]. We heard rifle shots, the siren, the alarm; it scared 
us. My sister said, ‘It is the FLN attacking….’ Everyone shouted, ‘It is a revolu-
tion!’” There was a loud knock on the door: Christian’s father demanded that 
somebody get him a knife. Then his father and uncle opened the door, and his 
uncle, “a colossus, two meters tall,” fainted. It was not a revolution; the Algerian 
revolutionaries were not invading the quiet town in the dark of night. It was a 
flood: there was “water everywhere.” A neighbor was at the door to warn them. 
Christian’s uncle revived and shouted: “A tidal wave, we’re all going to die!”1
The Malpasset Dam north of Fréjus had burst at approximately 9:30 p.m., 
unleashing a wall of water. Waves, reportedly four-to-five meters high, swept 
through the Reyran Valley and into Fréjus. Over 400 people were drowned; 155 
buildings were destroyed, and almost 800 were damaged. Over thirteen square 
kilometers of agricultural land flooded; a thousand sheep drowned, and 471 
vehicles were destroyed.2 Christian Hughes remembered seeing the aftermath 
the next day: “cadavers, destroyed buildings, hectares of ruined crops, drowned 
animals.”3
Hughes’s short memoir of the event, published in 2003, illustrates how the 
environmental catastrophe his family experienced in 1959 was intertwined in his 
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memory with the political violence of the Algerian War. Hughes was not alone 
in connecting the experience of the ood to that of war and decolonization, and 
the imbrication of the Fréjus ood with imperialism and the Algerian War was 
not limited to an ex post facto reconstruction of events. The town of Fréjus had 
long had a particularly strong connection to France’s colonial endeavors, and 
this connection was evident in 1959. This chapter will make use of sources from 
1959 through the 1960s and beyond to demonstrate how the Malpasset disaster 
was shaped by events in North Africa (including both the Algerian Revolution 
and the Chélif earthquake), aecting who suered as a result, how the state 
responded, and how the disaster in the Var was remembered.
The War at Home
In the grim context of 1959, the Hughes family’s initial assumption that the vio-
lence outside their door was caused by Algerian revolutionaries was not entirely 
implausible. The “events” in Algeria, which had begun as a small uprising in No-
vember 1954, had metastasized into a major conict by the time of the Malpasset 
Dam collapse. The nationalist revolutionaries of the FLN (Front de libération 
nationale) recruited new supporters as their attacks prompted French reprisals 
against the Muslim population. By February 1955, the revolt had begun to spread 
beyond FLN strongholds in the Aurès Mountains and Kabylia; in response, the 
French sent more soldiers to Algeria, including conscripts as well as professional 
troops battle-hardened by the failed campaign for French Indochina.4 In 1957 Al-
giers had been engulfed in urban guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and reprisals, but in 
Algiers and across Algeria, French forces were able to reverse FLN gains through 
a brutal campaign that included the “widespread and systematic” use of torture.5
The “regrouping” of rural populations and then the 1958 Constantine Plan fur-
ther escalated this French campaign to transform and “reconquer” Algeria.6
The population of the metropole was keenly aware of these “events.” In the 
Var, the then-dominant Socialist party lamented “the sacrices imposed on 
young Frenchmen, who risk paying—and paying dearly—for the faults of co-
lonialism and the deciencies of rulers.”7 In Algiers, however, there was no sign 
of compromise: in 1958 the formation of a government in Paris under a prime 
minister who had advocated negotiation with the nationalists had precipitated 
a rebellion of hard-line settlers and French paratroopers in Algeria. This had 
brought down the Fourth Republic and prompted the return of Charles de 
Gaulle to power. The war continued.8
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In the sixteen months preceding the Malpasset Dam collapse, the FLN had 
taken the war to the hexagon, attacking oil reneries and military and police 
forces in metropolitan France.9 In 2011, the German historians Matthias Ritzi 
and Erich Schmidt-Eenboom uncovered a report by a West German spy, Richard 
Christmann, indicating that the FLN had been considering attacks on dams in 
France. Through his informants inside the FLN, Christmann had learned that 
the revolutionaries were exploring new options for sabotage. They were studying 
sewer tunnels and public water supply infrastructure in Paris and Algiers, with 
the idea of planting bombs underneath buildings, or using judiciously placed 
explosions to destroy the public water supply. In addition, the FLN was con-
templating the destruction of dams. A	er the Malpasset collapse, Christmann 
believed that the catastrophe had in fact resulted from such an attack. In a report 
for the West German intelligence service, Christmann stated that “A	er an at-
tack on a small dam in southern France had only a partial success, but took many 
lives, all other terrorist measures were stopped by order of the group around Ben 
Bella, then still imprisoned.” This was obviously a reference to the collapse of the 
Malpasset Dam. Ritzi and Schmidt-Eenboom have accepted Christmann’s view 
that the FLN were responsible for the Fréjus disaster.10 This idea has since been 
publicized by Schmidt-Eenbaum and by a 2013 Arte television documentary, 
reviving, in public discourse, the connection between the violence of decoloni-
zation and the ood.11
This interpretation of the evidence has signicant aws, however. It would be 
hard to imagine by what standard the destruction of Fréjus would be considered 
only a “partial success,” if the goal of the FLN attacks in France was to spread 
fear and force France to shi	 security forces away from Algeria. 12 It is possible 
that the indiscriminate killing of Algerian Muslims by the disaster caused FLN 
leaders to think twice about turning dams into weapons. However, it seems 
likely that Christmann was mistaken or misled about the cause of the disaster, 
or was speculating based on his knowledge of prior FLN intentions. He may also 
have misinterpreted later FLN discussion about what lessons the revolutionaries 
might learn from the Fréjus accident about dam sabotage as a political tactic.
As Benjamin Stora and others have argued, it seems very unlikely that the 
Malpasset Dam was in fact destroyed by an FLN attack, since no reference to 
such an attack has ever been made by party leaders or combatants (generally 
unapologetic about the necessary violence of the war), and no trace of such an 
attack has been found in the French or Algerian archives.13 Therefore, Christ-
mann’s claim and the Ritzi/Schmidt-Eeboom hypothesis are best interpreted as 
a parallel to Hughes’s recollection of the disaster. Across the decades, some have 
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found it dicult to believe that destruction on such a scale was not somehow 
connected to the events in Algeria—which it was, even if an FLN attack was 
not to blame.
No such thing as an Accidental Disaster
The ooding of Fréjus, the result of a dam failure, would not generally be con-
sidered a “natural” disaster. However, the same analytical questions that underlie 
environmental historians’ eorts to problematize the notion of a natural disaster 
can be applied to this “accidental” event: how did the unintended movements 
of the inanimate (earth, concrete, water) interact with historical processes and 
human power relations? How was the resulting damage and suering distrib-
uted as a result? How did authorities’ treatment of the event as an accident ob-
scure the deeper causes of this suering?
The Malpasset Dam’s construction in the 1950s had been a response to 
drought in the area—that is, to the discrepancy between the availability of fresh 
water and the demands of the human community that had developed in the 
region. While the Argens River ran from the west to its mouth at Fréjus, the 
lands to the north of the town were watered by the Reyran—but the Reyran 
“river” was a seasonal wadi, o	en dry except for in the winter months. The 
population of the coastal region including Fréjus, Saint-Raphaël, Saint-Tropez, 
and Sainte-Maxime, within the département of the Var, had been estimated to 
be about forty-ve thousand in 1945, and departmental ocials expected it to 
soon reach one hundred 	y thousand during the summer tourist season. The 
thirsty summer crowds would require 6.5 million cubic meters of drinking water 
annually; the agriculture of the area would use over 13 million cubic meters of 
water for irrigation. Planners concluded that meeting such needs necessitated a 
reservoir of 22 million cubic meters, to account for evaporative loss. Damming 
the Reyran produced the necessary accumulation of water for year-round use.14
From the start, the dam had served both a political and an economic pur-
pose. As Georges Menant wrote in 1960, “Our lands were thirsty for water like 
we were thirsty for progress, and progress, that was the dam.”15 Although there 
had been discussion of various solutions to the region’s shortage of water for 
irrigation, the project that became the Malpasset Dam was proposed in 1946 by 
a departmental councilman, communist schoolteacher Antoine Foucard. The 
project was then taken up by the Socialists, who had initially shared power with 
the Communists and then came to dominate postwar departmental and mu-
nicipal government for over a decade.16 The dam’s construction began in 1952 
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and was completed in 1954, although legal disputes with the owner of one of 
the local mines delayed the complete lling of the planned reservoir basin until 
1959.17 The dam project served not only as a source of water, but also as a symbol 
of hope a	er the Second World War, and as proof of the ability of the postwar 
local leadership, men of the Le	 and the Resistance, to provide a brighter future 
for the people of the region. By the time the basin was lled, however, the wars 
of decolonization had eroded the optimism of the post-World War II decade.
In the weeks immediately following the disaster, connections between French 
imperialism and the dam collapse were absent in the public discourse. It was 
quickly accepted that there was no sign of sabotage or saboteurs, and discussions 
regarding the cause focused on the design and placement of the dam. In the 
initial absence of details, a failure of state oversight seemed a likely culprit. On 
December 6, Nice-Matin published an article with the headline: “Unbelievable 
but True! No legislation requires prior geological testing for the construction 
of dams, which is indispensable.”18 Those who sought to impute blame for the 
disaster were more likely to point to the Socialists than to the FLN. In 1958, 
the “events” in Algeria had brought down the Fourth Republic, and the March 
1959 municipal elections had brought the French right into power in Fréjus, led 
by the new mayor André Léotard, a former Vichy ocial.19 On December 10, 
Louis Eugène Joly, a former colonial engineer and the Vichy-era mayor of Fréjus 
(1941–1944), wrote to Léotard and demanded that justice be brought to bear 
against those responsible for the dam’s creation. Joly was presumably no friend 
to the Socialist and Communist politicians who had initiated the construction 
of the dam. Invoking the authority of his experience as an engineer in the colo-
nies, and particularly as head of Public Works for Niger “where had created, in 
technical matters, the city of Niamey,” Joly now stated that he had always had 
his doubts about the Malpasset project. Joly suggested that those responsible for 
geographical studies may have been pressured to produce a favorable conclusion, 
and he claimed that there had been sucient concerns among engineers to have 
precluded the decision to construct a “thin” arch dam rather than a traditional 
“heavy” dam.” 20
Yet ocial inquiries concluded that no one was to blame for the disaster. In 
1960, a Commission of Inquiry instituted by the Ministry of Agriculture con-
sidered and ruled out sabotage, judging that some traces of saboteurs operating 
on such a large scale would have been noticeable before or a	er the ood. The 
commission also considered and eliminated as possible causes the use of dyna-
mite in the construction of the nearby highway, an earthquake, or a meteorite 
strike (the latter possibility suggested by eyewitness reports that lights in the sky 
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preceded the ood). The commission also ruled out human error, nding that 
the dam failure “must be exclusively attributed to the ground below the foun-
dations,” which contained hidden faults or underground weak spots that gave 
way in November 1959; there were no errors in the design or construction of the 
dam itself. The nal words of the “survey of possible causes” seem to have been 
directed against the idea that the project itself might have been hubris: “As the 
result of these investigations, the commission can arm that the catastrophe of 
Malpasset should not diminish the condence of engineers in dams of the arch 
type [i.e. a “thin” curved dam which bulges in the direction of the reservoir], the 
safety of which is ensured as long as the entire supporting structure is capable 
of permanently carrying the loads transmitted by such a structure.”21 In other 
words, there was nothing wrong with the dam; it was the earth that had failed.
Consequently, the French state acknowledged no responsibility for damages. 
Laurin, deputy from the Var, objected that the state’s response, based on past 
responses to natural disasters, was inappropriate. This was no natural disaster, 
argued Laurin: its origins, he argued, should have entitled victims to full resti-
tution from the state for damages which, he estimated, would total 236 million 
new francs.22 However, the Senate rejected all such proposals that would have 
made the state responsible for damages.23 The state authorized only 40 million 
new francs for disaster aid (equivalent to 4 billion old francs following a devalu-
ation in January 1960). Of the 40 million, 39.2 million was to be used to rebuild 
civilian and military infrastructure, including roads, rural engineering, and port 
repair. Only 800,000 was allocated for urgent, emergency aid to victims.24 The 
Department of the Var did provide reconstruction payments for businesses, and 
the municipal government of Fréjus successfully pursued legal action against 
the Department of the Var, as the party responsible for the dam, to eventually 
obtain state compensation for the cost of rebuilding public infrastructure, even 
in the absence of any nding of fault. However, indemnifying individual victims 
and their heirs would be le	 to private donors through a “solidarity” campaign 
modeled on the one for victims of the Orléansville earthquake.25 As in the case 
of Orléansville, an abundance of donations poured in from around metropolitan 
France, Algeria, and the world.26
The initial investigation’s nding that no one was to blame for the disaster 
was upheld by a separate, court-ordered inquiry in 1967, and nally by the Con-
seil d’État, (France’s highest court) in 1971.27 Some experts did testify that the 
civil engineers had been negligent in failing to conduct adequate testing of the 
rock bed, and that therefore ultimate culpability should be attributed to the 
chief of the Service of Rural Engineering of the Var, who had been in charge 
60 chapter 3
of the operation. However, the prevailing argument was that the faults in the 
rock were not detectible before the disaster by the means then available but be-
came visible only a	er the ood waters had swept away concealing layers.28 This 
conclusion has been upheld by recent scholarship on the topic. Pierre Duault 
describes how a lack of regulatory oversight and communication among experts, 
regulators, and workers meant that there was little awareness of risks and there-
fore no surveillance for early warning signs. Nevertheless, Duault argues that 
would be anachronistic to expect procedures to have been in place that became 
commonplace and required only as a response to studies conducted a	er the 
Malpasset incident.29
However, when viewed in a broader historical context, debates about whether 
the disaster was an unforeseeable accident or the result of human malfeasance or 
negligence present a false dichotomy. One need not believe that FLN sabotage 
was involved in order to view the Fréjus disaster as a product of empire. The tech-
nical ability to construct such public works, developed to a great extent in the 
colonies, served to demonstrate a putative European modernity that sought to 
maintain the distinction between the “modern” metropole and the “backwards” 
colonial subject. Moreover, the Malpasset Dam was intended to serve not only 
the basic needs of the Var’s population but also the agricultural export market, 
contributing to the postwar economic recovery that was necessary for France to 
maintain control over its colonial empire. The Malpasset was also designed to 
provide for the auence and leisure of the metropolitan French, who would be 
vacationing on the Côte d’Azur, and French military personnel preparing for, 
or recovering from, their imperial duties at the local army post and aero-naval 
base. These ambitions drove the politicians, engineers, and geographers of the 
Var to push beyond the contemporaneous limits of geotechnical foresight and 
bureaucratic oversight and beyond their ability to master the inanimate forces 
of water, earth, and rock.30
However, understanding this disaster is not just a matter of identifying the 
causes of the construction and dissolution of the Malpasset Dam. The dimen-
sions of the disaster—whom it aected, and how—unfolded over weeks and 
even years. The cultural and social dynamics of empire shaped how Fréjus’s in-
habitants of European and Algerian origin were impacted by the disaster: where 
they lived, where they died, and, for those who survived, how they were imag-
ined and treated a	erward by French commentators and French government 
ocials.
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Chélif-on-the-Reyran (Algerians in Fréjus)
The history of the city of Fréjus is intertwined with the history of the French 
empire in Africa, a fact which has been recognized by academics as well as by 
journalists, amateur historians, and popular writers. The academic historians 
Gregory Mann and M. Kathryn Edwards have analyzed the connection to em-
pire found in local representations of Fréjus’s history. As Mann has argued, Fré-
jus is not merely a generic French town: “Fréjus has a distinct past, one not shared 
by the country as a whole... for Fréjus we cannot read ‘France.’”31 Fréjus’s history 
and locally-constructed identity is imbued with what Mann refers to as “residues 
of empire.”32 Mann notes that the streets and places of Fréjus are named a	er the 
heroes of empire, like Gallieni and Lyautey, and that over ten thousand soldiers 
from the colonies are buried in the area, a byproduct of the Great War and the 
presence of (segregated) military hospitals that treated the wounded.33 Later, as 
local historians and journalists have frequently noted, Fréjus also became the 
point of departure for many metropolitan troops leaving for the colonies, and 
the town’s population grew by 1959 to include not only over 13,000 civilians but 
also 6,331 uniformed soldiers.34 As Edwards explains, Fréjus’s connections with 
the imperial project in Indochina made the town an apparently “natural choice” 
when, in the 1980s, French associations of veterans and formers settlers sought a 
site for a national memorial to the Indochina Wars.35
As Mann has argued, colonial relationships, networks, and ows connect par-
ticular localities in the empire, “and it is not always necessary to pass through 
Paris.”36 Although Mann has emphasized the movement of troops and Fréjus’s 
unique relation to France’s West African empire in the period of the World 
Wars, a	er World War II Fréjus also developed a strong connection to Algeria’s 
Chélif valley, and especially to the village of Ouled Fares, near Orléansville.37
Postwar Fréjus, like other parts of metropolitan France, needed laborers for its 
mines, factories, and road crews. Fréjus came to depend on immigrant work-
ers, including Spaniards and Italians as well as Algerians, many of whom were 
housed in barracks. A	er 1954, the Algerian proportion of the population in-
creased dramatically.
This demographic shi	 was not in itself unique to Fréjus or to the Chélif: 
between 1954 and 1962, the Algerian Muslim population in France increased 
from 211,000 to as many as 436,000, driven largely by migration from rural 
areas.38 In the Chélif, however, the geoenvironmental violence of the earthquake 
was a unique factor exacerbating the suering of a rural population already 
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impoverished by a century of colonial rule, prompting an additional wave of mi-
gration. According to ocial counts, Fréjus in 1954 was home to “between 300 
and 350 souls” from the Chélif; a	er the earthquake, some immigrant workers 
in Fréjus brought over additional family members.39 By 1959, Fréjus was said to 
be home to as many as 1,100 Muslim Algerians. According to a 1960 account by 
journalist Gaston Bonheur, earthquake refugees constituted the majority of the 
North African community there.40 Some of the Chélif refugees arrived desti-
tute, and were assisted by the Red Cross, using funds from the earthquake sol-
idarity fundraising drive, inciting resentment among the European residents.41
In Bonheur’s telling, one set of twins, Zorah and Nadine Mekki, had been born 
when their mother went into labor during the terror of the Orléansville disaster; 
they drowned in the Fréjus ood.42
In addition to the earthquake and the economic devastation of wartime rural 
Algeria, another driver of the migration of Muslim Algerians to France was 
the eort of the French state to assist Muslims targeted as collaborators by the 
FLN. These political refugees sought safety in metropolitan France. Archival 
documents reveal that in 1956 the French government authorized the use of nine 
million francs remaining in the budget for the reconstruction of Ténès (near 
Orléansville) for the purpose of resettling “North Africans needing residence in 
the metropole, with rst priority being given, where appropriate, to those from 
the disaster region of the Chélif.”43 This decision had been urged both in order 
to resettle Orléansville earthquake survivors with relatives already working in 
agriculture in several departments, including the Var, and in order to resettle 
political refugees. The Var was listed among the regions needing immigrant 
labor. Because of the large proportion of families in Fréjus from the Chélif re-
gion and the directive given to prioritize the political refugees who came from 
the earthquake-stricken zone (a nod to the original authorization of these funds 
for use in reconstruction), it is reasonable to conclude that the Algerian popu-
lation of Fréjus in 1959 included these sorts of political refugees as well as other 
war refugees and earthquake refugees.
When the economic inequalities of empire and the violence of decolonization 
drove Muslims to migrate from the Chélif Valley to the Reyran Valley, these an-
thropogenic factors combined with drought in Algeria and “diluvian rainfalls” 
in France to set the stage for the Malpasset disaster in December 1959. When the 
water level behind the dam rose to unprecedented levels,44 the earth beneath the 
dam gave way, and the residents of the valley below paid the price. The Algerian 
residents of Fréjus paid a particularly high price.
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Ocial Policies and Local Ocials
As Todd Shepard and Amelia Lyons have shown, the French state’s ocial re-
sponse in the late 1950s to the FLN’s nationalist narrative was to proclaim that 
Muslim Algerians were fully French, while taking ethnic origins into account 
for the purposes of ghting discrimination and providing social welfare assis-
tance. These policies aimed to improve the economic status of Algerians within 
France while simultaneously pursuing the goals of the colonial “civilizing mis-
sion” among the migrants. Ocially, Muslim Algerians were already French cit-
izens, and since the late 1940s the “Muslim French from Algeria” were to possess 
political equality while in metropolitan France, even if they lacked such equality 
in Algeria. In 1958, in a belated attempt to undermine support for the FLN, the 
Constitution of the Fi	h Republic had extended this more equal citizenship to 
Muslims in Algeria as well. Furthermore, the promotion of equality was now ex-
tended beyond political and legal equality. The social advancement of Muslims 
became an ocial goal of the Republic, and provision of welfare benets to the 
“Muslim French” in the metropole became a crucial element of the French eort 
to mitigate Muslim grievances against French rule.45 
Nevertheless, as Amelia Lyons has pointed out, resistance to this policy existed 
both among “well placed government ocials” and among the European-born 
neighbors of migrants, who continued to believe that “Algerians did not t into 
France.”46 French responses to the Fréjus disaster demonstrate that the ocial 
ideology of integration and equality was not hegemonic in the Var of 1959, as 
evinced by French accounts of the disaster and by the actions of the local govern-
ment revealed by the archival record. The municipal government, conditioned 
by the ingrained colonial habits of discrimination, made use of ethnic catego-
rization to block, rather than assist, the social advancement and well-being of 
Muslim Algerians in the wake of the Fréjus disaster.
Archival sources reveal the gap between local government actions and the 
ocial, legal position of Muslim Algerians within France. A	er the Malpasset 
disaster, Algerians in Fréjus, citizenship notwithstanding, were subjected to a 
discriminatory regime based on suspicion and scrutiny. Payments to “North 
Africans” or Algerian “français musulmans” (used as interchangeable terms) 
were set at lower levels than those available to French of European origin, and 
procedures were put in place to make it dicult for Muslims to obtain disaster 
relief at all. On December 5, 1959, the municipal council of Fréjus instituted a 
special service to review the claims made by North Africans who sought aid 
as victims of the ood. This service would be staed by the Service of Muslim 
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Aairs on the rst oor of the town hall (Mairie) and would authorize North 
Africans to receive “white cards” entitling disaster survivors to food, clothing, 
and aid payments—but only if they could provide a signed attestation to their 
residency from an employer, and another from a “metropolitan Frenchman” or 
an Algerian accepted as a long-term resident of Fréjus who was also “known to 
be honorable.” This had to be accompanied by an ocial certicate from the 
Fréjus police commissariat.47
Even for disaster survivors who managed to assemble these documents, the 
initial approval of disaster survivor status for “les français origins des départe-
ments de l’Afrique du Nord,” (“the French originating in the departments of 
North Africa,” i.e. Muslim Algerians) was merely provisional, entitling them 
only to an initial emergency payment of 5,000 francs and a second, “comple-
mentary” payment of 10,000 francs per person. Algerians became eligible for the 
larger amounts received by “metropolitan Frenchmen” (eventually set at 50,000 
per household, plus 20,000 per additional person in the family) only “when the 
state of disaster victim is determined in an [unspecied] formal manner, and 
unequivocally.”48 The imposition of this special process for Muslim Algerians 
belied their ocial status as equal citizens of France.
The distribution of donations from the Fréjus solidarity fund reveals gross 
discrepancies between the aid for Muslim citizens and for citizens of European 
descent, despite the ocial doctrine of the Frenchness of Algeria and the goal 
of equality of Algerians as French citizens. According to an unpublished report 
from the Mairie, 170 “Muslim” families suered damages from the disaster, 
and 1,680 “autochthones” families. The ocial number of deaths was given as 
396, including 27 unidentied dead and 50 missing persons. The report’s sec-
tion on “Categorization by Origin” identied 338 of the dead as “nationals”; 10 
were “foreign”; 39 were “Muslim” and 9 were “Africans (soldiers).”49 Fatalities in 
the Muslim community may in fact have been more numerous: Oliver Donat 
has pointed out that the number of dead remained controversial. The ocial 
gure of the total dead eventually rose to 423, but some claimed that the real 
number was over 500.50 According to the unpublished Mairie report, “North 
Africans” in Fréjus received 360,212 new francs in aid payments, compared with 
over 88 million distributed to survivors and victims’ heirs not identied as of 
North African origin. This meant that Muslims in Fréjus constituted at least 
9.2 percent of the aected families and at least 9.8 percent of the dead (based on 
39 out of 396) but received 0.4 percent of the aid.51
The archives oer several clues indicating why Algerian Muslims in Fréjus 
received relatively little aid in the a	ermath of the disaster. The mayor’s oce’s 
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unpublished report listed payments to “North Africans” separately from pay-
ments to other residents of Fréjus. These payments were included only a	er a 
section listing donations from the city of Fréjus to victims of later disasters else-
where, including victims of oods in 1960 and a donation of clothing (includ-
ing transport) to post-earthquake Agadir. The content and organization of this 
unpublished report is telling: Muslim deaths were not like other deaths, and aid 
to Fréjus residents of Algerian origin was seen by the Mairie not as a duty of the 
state to its citizens but as an act of humanitarian generosity to outsiders, who 
did not merit the same treatment as “autochthon” French in Fréjus. Moreover, 
resistance to the notion of Algerian French citizenship was not limited to o-
cials at the local level: a December 7 telegram from the Interior Ministry’s Ser-
vice of National Civil Protection to all metropolitan and Algerian departmental 
prefects included Algerians in an enumeration of “foreign nationals” who had 
perished in the ood.52
This othering of Algeria was also present in Mayor Léotard’s 1959 Christmas 
message to survivors: “We have not been abandoned. From all parts of the world 
have come evidence of sympathy and solace. A mutilated Algeria has responded 
with an admirable élan.”53 Léotard’s phrasing, placing donations from “muti-
lated” Algeria a	er those “from all parts of the world,” paralleled the structure 
of the unpublished report on aid distribution. Algeria was not France, and Al-
gerians were not French, even if French rule over its Algerian subjects and lands 
was to be defended and maintained.
This, however, was not ocial policy, of course. When the city government 
published a brochure on the occasion of the rst anniversary of the disaster, the 
brochure included much of the information from the unpublished report. How-
ever, it did not specify payments to North Africans as opposed to other residents 
and did not divide the aected families into “autochthon families” and “Muslim 
families.” Moreover, the published brochure no longer divided the dead into the 
categories of “nationals,” “foreigners,” and “Muslims” (in that order); instead, it 
recognized Algerian Muslims as a subset of French citizens, listing fatalities as:




The dierence between the published and unpublished reports illustrates 
the tension between the status of Algerian Muslims as a category of French cit-
izens and the colonial culture that designated them as “Other,” as indigènes. 
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The published brochure served to eace the colonialist thinking, which was still 
pervasive, in favor of the ocial doctrines of equality. The unpublished report, 
however, reveals the colonial culture that was driving decision-making at the 
local level in Fréjus. Even the published brochure, however, found it necessary 
to distinguish between the two categories of French.
Being ocially French did not help Algerian Muslims in Fréjus: unlike the 
Italians living there, for example, these “North Africans” had no foreign con-
sulate to advocate for their interests or to raise funds abroad specically on their 
behalf.55 Of course, much of the discrepancy in relief payments was due to the 
fact that aid distribution was in large part based on property damage, a common 
post-disaster practice that privileges the owning classes and prevents disasters 
from having leveling eects. However, the lack of wealth among Fréjus’s Muslim 
inhabitants of Algerian origin was no accident; it was the result of a long story of 
colonialism dating back to the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 as well as the 
more recent history of Fréjus and Algeria in the twentieth century.
The relatively meager aid dispensed to North Africans in Fréjus came in the 
context of a general abundance of donated funds. In the words of Olivier Donat, 
a local historian of Fréjus:
The Malpasset disaster was a global tragedy. From all over the world, food, 
clothing, clothes, money and consolation made their way to Fréjus, a town 
ravaged by nature. All roads in France were crossed by cars with ags and 
the placards of “S.O.S. Fréjus” to collect donations for the victims.56
In the wake of such generosity, waste was almost inevitable, and there was 
little oversight of the mayor’s oce as it distributed the funds. In 1961, a gov-
ernment auditor concluded that “it is not possible to know whether the funds 
collected were regularly and equitably distributed” but noted that in many cases 
damage claims seemed to have been inated. There were, nevertheless, funds le	 
over for use in other catastrophes, and it was suggested that donations might be 
used for general improvements in the area, such as road construction, although 
such a diversion of funds, noted the author of the 1961 investigative report, would 
be a violation of the normal expectations of donors.57 In the nal accounting, 
in 1968, a total of 100,001,938 francs had been available, including state funds 
and donations. In the end, the books were balanced and excess funds dispersed 
by shi	ing funds to victims of subsequent disasters (over half a million francs) 
and to expenditures for “Works in the Public Interest” (almost 3.5 million), and 
“diverse” expenditures, mainly repair of roads and public buildings (almost 
5 million).58 It is notable that the amount diverted into “Works in the Public 
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Interest” and “diverse expenditures” would have been sucient to bring relief 
payments to Muslims in Fréjus in line with that received by the non-Muslim 
population.
The special surveillance of France’s Muslim Algerian citizens was by no means 
unique to Fréjus but was fundamental to the state’s eort to remake these citi-
zens’ relationship to the Republic on both sides of the Mediterranean. However, 
the 1959 ood provided local ocials in Fréjus with a particular opportunity, 
and a choice. They could implement and extend, on a local level, the national 
policy of promoting the social advancement of Algerians in France in hopes of 
undermining the case for Algerian independence and bolstering France’s image 
as a universal, democratic Republic. Or the local leadership could reassert the 
second-class status of Algerians as dangerous, untrustworthy subjects whose 
alterity made them less, not more, worthy of public benevolence than the “au-
tochthon” French. In 1959 and 1960, the town government chose the latter, even 
if national policy made them reluctant to advertise this choice.
Memoir and Memory
Far removed from these events, Christian Hughes, the sherman’s son, wrote 
his memoir of the Fréjus ood “forty years later” from a hospital bed. A new 
crisis, an unspecied medical crisis, had brought his mind back to 1959: “In this 
hospital where I have once more had a brush with death, the enormous wave of 
the Malpasset has torn my memory, leading me, frozen, to the mouth of the Ar-
gens.”59 Thus three painful events became intimately connected in his memoir: 
one that was his alone and two that were shared by many. In Hughes’s memoir, 
the agonies of decolonization, the ood, and the hospital all live on, together.
Hughes’s juxtaposition of his personal medical crisis with the paired mem-
ories of decolonization and environmental disaster resembles a parallel juxta-
position in the memoir of Belgacem Aït Ouyahia, the Kabyle Algerian doctor 
who treated the injured in the immediate a	ermath of the 1954 Orléansville 
earthquake (discussed in Chapter 2). Dr. Aït Ouyahia linked the disaster to the 
struggle for independence by describing his sudden shi	 of identity, days a	er 
the earthquake, from an assimilated “privileged Muslim” to a new identication 
with the downtrodden “Arab” poor, portrayed as a key moment in his conversion 
to the FLN cause.60 However, Aït Ouyahia, like Hughes, also associated the 
environmental and political upheavals that he lived through with his memory 
of a personal medical crisis. In Aït Ouyahia’s case, this was an automobile acci-
dent in which he had been injured prior to the earthquake. His account of the 
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scene at the hospital a	er the earthquake is interrupted by a ashback to this 
earlier trauma, inserting Aït Ouyahia’s own fear and hysteria a	er his automo-
bile crash into the middle of his account of the bloody scene at the hospital.61 
In Aït Ouyahia’s fractured narrative, this digression serves to convey empathy 
for the emotional suering experienced by the earthquake survivors. The link-
age of personal health crises to the experience of environmental disaster in the 
memoirs of Hughes and Aït Ouyahia support the idea that suering, while in-
separable from the social or political contexts of history, also functions as a cat-
egory unto itself; that traumas, however disconnected in origin, tend to become 
associated in lived experience, memory, and representation, and, therefore, in 
eects.62 However, the association of the Fréjus ood with the war in North 
Africa was not idiosyncratic, or purely psychological, and is repeatedly evinced 
in historical sources whose dates of origins range from the immediate a	ermath 
of the disaster into the new millennium.
Portrayals of Algerian Muslims in French writers’ dramatized accounts of 
the Fréjus disaster can illuminate the shi	ing discourses that shaped French 
attitudes and actions towards Algerians in the a	ermath of the ood. Journalist 
Gaston Bonheur, memorializing the ood just months a	er the event, saw the 
history of the Fréjus ood as inseparable from the town’s longstanding relation 
to the French empire. Bonheur—an editor of Paris-Match who would later be 
accused of sympathizing with the French settler terrorist group, the Organisa-
tion armée secrete (OAS)63—dated this connection to 1916, when general Gal-
lieni had established Fréjus as a military town in order to provide a winter base 
for “troops of color” from the empire. This event brought the empire to Fréjus 
in a way that, for Bonheur, seems to have evoked sentimental exoticism: “Sene-
galese, Malgaches, Pondicherryians, soldiers from the Pacic: they camped here 
in the antiquated décor of a colonial exposition that lacked neither Buddhist 
pagoda nor Sudanese mosque.”64 Bonheur’s comparison of Fréjus to a festive 
colonial exposition invoked positive images of the unity of the empire, a com-
parison that had been used to describe Fréjus during the interwar period.65 A 
similarly sunny portrayal of the town’s military multiculturalism—concealing 
the racism faced by African troops in France—was provided by an anonymous 
memoirist many years later, in a collection published for the 	ieth anniversary 
of the ood: “The Senegalese riemen based at Camp de Caïs descended into 
town, sometimes barefoot. . . . ‘There are pretty things!’ they said, looking at 
the shop windows. They called all the women ‘Mama,’ always smiling; we never 
failed to salute their passage to honor their bravery on the eld of battle.”66 These 
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accounts made it clear that when the Malpasset Dam burst, the ood swept 
through a crucial part of a benevolent French Empire.
In 1998, local historian Max Prado echoed this sense of Fréjus’s imperial role 
but extended his analysis into the more distant past and combined it with a 
sense of grief. For Prado, the south of France had for centuries been the site of a 
cycle of colonialism and rebellion that had begun with the colonization of the 
Mediterranean coast, rst by Cretans, then by Celts, then by Romans. Prado 
saw the war in Algeria as a tragic continuation of this long historical process. 
Modern Fréjus was a staging point for French conscripts, “young people in the 
ower of their life,” being deployed to Algeria for a doomed cause: “The barracks 
in Fréjus in the Robert and Lecocq districts, the aeronaval base and hospital in 
the military zone, would be the last steps of mobilization on the continent; the 
origin of many broken lives.” 67 Prado made clear that Fréjus, ooded or dry, was 
bound to the violence of empire.
For many writers, memories and metaphors of war permeated descriptions of 
the ood, and references to the Second World War accompanied references to 
the African empire. Martial associations were always close at hand in Fréjus, and 
the immediate disaster response was led by troops stationed in the area, joined 
by the gendarmerie and the Fréjus-Saint Raphaël re-rescue unit (pompiers). As-
sistance was also provided by United States navy ships in the Mediterranean.68
In 1968, Régina Wallet imagined the scene at dawn that day as a scene of war: 
“Jeeps and bulldozers and military trucks ready to attack. Alas, the battle of 
Fréjus was not won.”69
Undoubtedly, each person in Fréjus contextualized the disaster in terms of 
their own experience. Wallet imagined the multiplicity of individual reactions 
to the deafening roar of the ood wave:
An earthquake, thought the refugees from Orléansville, who, this time, 
would not escape their rendezvous with death.—the bombardment of 
Leipzig. And also of Dresden, specied a former prisoner in Silesia.—no, 
it was the Deluge, murmured a nun at prayer; God wearied of an evil world, 
and Fréjus did not repent like Nineva.70
In a dierent era, the religious explanation of Wallet’s nun would have been the 
dominant cultural reaction to a European disaster such as this. But this was the 
twentieth century, the century of anthropogenic, martial apocalypses, and every 
adult in Fréjus had experiences related to the wars France had been ghting since 
1939 in Europe, in Indochina, and in North Africa.
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French accounts of the ood o	en displayed grim irony in relating the sto-
ries of those who survived the horrors of war only to die in the ood. Writing 
in 1960, Bonheur described a Madame Legrand, who “during the war, already 
had known all the horrors, all the distress, during the terrible bombardments of 
Hammanlif (400 dead in a few minutes), as the British 8th Army pushed back 
the Afrika Korps in Cap Bon in 1943.” The death toll on that day in Tunisia 
was similar to that of Fréjus in 1959; in Fréjus, according to Bonheur, Mrs. Leg-
rand lost her seven-year-old daughter.71 Bonheur’s account of Mrs. Legrand’s 
tragedy is paralleled by Wallet’s 1968 portrayal of Sergeant Boul, an Algerian 
War veteran:
On that rst of December, Sergeant Boul had rejoined the garrison in 
Fréjus. Two years in Algeria, what an ordeal. Even for a soldier who had 
chosen war. But these guerrillas, these attacks on the sly, these tortures, this 
was not real war, in which one is confronted face to face. Sergeant Boule 
was weary. He aspired to rest, to calm, with his family. He would rejoin, 
that very day, his wife, who was arriving from Thionville with their three 
children. 72 
That night, Boul was awakened by a sudden noise, and leaped up. Wallet imag-
ined his thoughts in the last moments of his life. He was startled by the noise, 
“but he smiled. He was no longer at war. He was in the Côte d’Azur. Already the 
wave, like the enemy, pounced.”73 Boul and his children were killed. For both 
Bonheur and Wallet, the tragedy of the ood was amplied by the surprising 
irony that the apparently peaceful environment of the Reyran Valley could de-
stroy what the brutality of war had not.
Some representations of the Fréjus disaster reected the ocial discourse 
claiming the unity and solidarity of Algeria with France, in which the conict 
in Algeria was portrayed as an unnecessary and unfortunate political develop-
ment. Other accounts, however, embodied the habits of imperial contempt for 
a subjugated population. Maurice Croizard’s 1960 depiction of Fréjus presented 
an image of harmony among the town’s metropolitan and African residents. 
Croizard’s account reconstructs (or imagines), in intimate detail, a reunion be-
tween two former military comrades just before the collapse of the dam. Croiz-
ard portrays a conversation between a Sergeant Léveillé, just arrived from Alge-
ria, and his friend Mohammed Azzi. Léveillé speaks warmly about the North 
African territory: “A beautiful country, really, if it were not for this political 
ugliness,” and Mohammed Azzi tells his old friend that he has been thriving in 
his new home in Fréjus: “I am the happiest man in the North African colony [in 
Fréjus 1959, Under Water and at War 71 
Fréjus]. Now there are eleven hundred of us here, including families. Almost all 
of Orléansville. . . . And you know, there’s no politics here. Just family men. . . . 
We have social security, we are paid like the French.”74 Minutes later, the dam 
burst. Azzi survived but had to identify the bodies of many of his friends and 
their children, drowned when the oodwaters destroyed the Sabagh factory and 
the nearby homes of “North Africans.” Forty-three corpses were found in an 
area of a few hundred meters. Nearby, according to Croizard, “an Arab…beat his 
chest and repeated: ‘I was the one who brought them here a	er the Orléansville 
catastrophe. I told them, you will have work, you will be happy. I’m the one who 
led them to their deaths... it was me, it was me.’”75 Fréjus’s memoirists’ portrayals 
of Muslims in Fréjus took on a sympathetic tone as they conveyed the stories of 
Algerians surviving the earthquake only to die in Fréjus, stories which paralleled 
narratives about the European French who had lived through war but perished 
in the ood.
Some French accounts of North Africans in Fréjus mixed sympathy with the 
paternalism and contempt inherited from over a century of imperialist culture. 
Régina Wallet repeatedly invoked clichés of Arab fatalism in the a	ermath of 
the disaster: “It was written, declared the Arabs.”76 Wallet seemed to reserve 
her sympathy for North African children. She enumerated twenty-two chil-
dren who died in three North African families, identied by name, and ended 
a chapter with a grisly scene: “A great silence, disturbed by the cawing of crows. 
Dreadful silence, silence of death. Between two branches, like a bird with wings 
unfurled, rested a dismembered [écartelé] toddler. One of the little Arabs who, 
around the barracks, laughed and sang, like the children of the douars.”77 Later, 
Wallet’s book itself ends with the story of an ocial at the prefecture who re-
ceived a request from a young French couple from outside Fréjus who hoped to 
adopt a child orphaned in the disaster. “We would take the most pitiful, even a 
little Arab,” the couple oered, but, according to Wallet, “the little Arabs, they 
all disappeared in the ood,” including those saved from the “bombardment 
[sic!] of Orléansville.” The ocial wept, having also lost a child in the ood.78
Although the writing of history is always an interpretive act, Wallet’s “his-
tory” of these events, as well as the accounts of the disaster published in Bon-
heur’s 1960 anthology describing the disaster, must be considered, at least in 
part, to be imaginative rather than strictly historical works. Unlike, for example, 
the 2003 history of the Malpasset Dam and the Fréjus disaster published by the 
Société de l’histoire de Fréjus written by Vito Valenti and Alfred Bertini (the 
latter a participant in the municipal response to the disaster), or Max Prado’s 
self-published 1998 history, neither Wallet nor Bonheur explicitly grounded 
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their description of events in documentary evidence. Nor were Wallet and Bon-
heur witnesses to the events, as Christian Hughes was. In her preface, Wallet, 
a novelist by trade and habit, claimed that there was “neither imagination, nor 
invention on the part of the witness, in this atrocious and authentic story.” At 
the same time, however, she acknowledged that memories change over time, 
and that “a testimony is only sincere at the exact moment of the event.” Conse-
quently, Wallet asked her readers for “indulgence, not for myself, who is relating 
this just as it is told to me, but for the witness, who, time passing, translates 
his unhappy adventure with an innite sadness.”79 Nevertheless, Wallet did not 
limit her account to what could be veried or supported by written sources or 
oral testimony. Her narrative obviously goes beyond what could be supported by 
any evidence, documentary or otherwise, in depicting the interior soliloquies of 
individuals in the moments before their deaths.
Gaston Bonheur, in contrast, was a professional journalist and editor of news 
magazines (and also a poet in his younger years). His volume on Fréjus, cowrit-
ten with Maurice Croizard, Géorge Pernoud, and others, was part of the Map-
pemonde series, directed by Bonheur and Pernoud, which included titles such 
as The Nazis since Nuremburg and Anastasia, if it is True?. The back cover of 
Bonheur’s Fréjus volume claimed that “the authors published in this collection 
do not write. They transcribe. The real author is the march of time, creator 
of tragedies, comedies, catastrophes, which will draw out literature and which 
History will put in order.” Nevertheless, Bonheur’s and Wallet’s accounts might 
be classied as pseudo-histories, claiming creative license in works aimed at a 
mass audience.
As Claire Eldridge has argued, memories are “socially-framed, present- 
orientated, relational, and driven by specic agents.”80 Like the memoirs written 
by survivors of disasters, these pseudo-historical works demonstrate how the 
constructed narratives of the event intertwined the memory of environmental 
disaster with memories of war and empire. These sources also reect and reveal 
how decolonization impacted representations of disasters.
Unlike the accounts by Bonheur and Croizard, Wallet’s 1968 work was 
penned a	er Algerian independence. As Todd Shepard has demonstrated, 
a	er 1962 the Frenchness of Muslim Algerians was erased from French law and 
from public memory, consecrated through a mass genuection to “the tide of 
history.”81 Before 1962, there had been a political incentive for French writers 
to deny belief in the otherness of Muslim Algerians in hopes of undermining 
the nationalists’ narrative and advancing the notion that Algeria was France. 
Decolonization brought an end to this incentive. It also brought thousands 
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of “repatriated” Europeans from Algeria to the Var, a demographic event that 
would arguably play a role in making the area a stronghold of the nationalist, 
anti-immigrant Front National, culminating in the FN’s 2014 victory in the 
Fréjus municipal elections. Wallet’s portrayal of sympathy for “little Arabs” and 
solidarity among the bereaved drew on notions of childhood as a universal cat-
egory. However, it also reected post-1962 fears that France would be “overrun” 
by the children of an alarmingly fertile Algerian migrant population, an attitude 
which contrasted sharply with the natalism of French policy in the 1950s, when 
women and children were seen as a moderating (or “civilizing”) element among 
Algerian migrants in France.82
The sympathy Wallet expressed toward children was less evident in Wallet’s 
portrayals of North African adults. Wallet conveyed the suspicion and con-
tempt, replete with the cultural legacy of imperialism and orientalism, that some 
European French held toward the North Africans in Fréjus:
Eleven Arab families were lodged at the Sabac [sic] factory. All were swept 
away by the wave. But one could never count the victims, and the Arab 
mystery was never resolved. How many Algerians or Moroccans worked at 
the factory, or on the nearby farms? Many were employed as casual hires 
and their foremen had never declared them. Some, in transit, had no xed 
domicile. They lodged with a comrade, in a ruined shed, or even under 
the light of the moon, under an olive tree. At the whim of friends and 
acquaintances, they took turns with the employers, who never recognized 
them. An Arab greatly resembles another Arab. The same bronzed face, the 
same look, evasive or timid, the same childish language. An Ali is always 
an Ali. . . . None of them possessed a work permit. Thus, how can they be 
counted? Especially those who were lost. Impossible to identify disgured 
faces. And how, in Algeria, to nd their families? All their wives were il-
literate and incapable of making a claim. . . . At the same time, some cra	y 
Arabs, who were working very tranquilly outside of Fréjus, attempted to 
get indemnities as victims. In the chaos, all regulation became impossible 
and there are always some vultures who prot from tragic circumstances.83
Eldridge has shown, in her scholarly examination of the construction of mem-
ory and historical self-understandings among the communities of Europeans 
who le	 Algeria for France ca. 1962, that the pieds noirs’ communal construction 
of memory denied that racial injustice was the basis of colonial Algerian society 
and that these constructions described positive interactions with Muslims in 
Algeria (mainly those in servile positions). However, as Eldridge argues, these 
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positive portrayals were also accompanied by “a category of unknown or threat-
ening ‘Arabs’ or ‘Muslims,’ who, although mentioned much less frequently, un-
derlined the continuing need for a ‘civilizing’ French presence and the challenges 
associated with that endeavor.”84 This pattern is evident in Wallet’s account of 
“cra	y” and dishonest Arabs in Fréjus.
Wallet’s 1968 portrayal of Arabs exploiting French generosity also resembles 
a 2008 description of Orléansville by Jacques Torres, a “repatriated” pied noir. 
Torres describes a joke that circulated a	er the 1954 earthquake: “When you 
asked an Arab what his profession was, he responded, laughing: ‘Me? Sinistri ou 
labbèss (a disaster victim, and all is well—that is enough)’….The status of ‘sinistré’ 
[disaster victim] gave the right to signicant aid, which was enough for certain 
people to live on.”85 When Wallet and Torres wrote their stories of disaster, Al-
geria was independent, and it was no longer necessary or plausible to arm the 
solidarity of Algerians with France, or vice versa.
However, Wallet’s portrayal of Arabs as “cra	y” or “vultures,” unrecognizable 
and transient, defying French attempts to name and regulate them, were not 
merely a product of decolonization, but was also shaped by old habits of racist, 
orientalist colonial discourse. Hostility to Muslim North Africans in Fréjus did 
not begin in 1962. Ingrained colonialist habits of thought were evident in Fréjus 
in 1959, and such thinking had demonstrable consequences for Muslim Alge-
rians, both immediately a	er the 1959 disaster and for many decades to come.
Fréjus and Le Pen’s Front National
In 1987, local historian and Var schoolteacher Louis Robion described anx-
iety over “cultural identity” in Fréjus which prompted people to ask, “Is Fréjus 
still Fréjus?” Robion attributed this “millenarian disquiet” to rapid population 
growth and urbanization, as well as the transformations brought about by the 
expansion of tourism, globalization, and the cultural inuences brought by new 
migrants. As the tourism industry grew, some residents feared that Fréjus might 
be on the verge of becoming a generic beach town: as Robion put it, residents 
were “haunted by the image of the American ‘sun-belt [sic, in English].’” Mean-
while, cultural change meant that Provençal was disappearing, and “anchovies 
have given way to pizza and méchoui [North African roasted lamb].”86 The cul-
tural anxieties described by Robion resemble those that might be found among 
longtime residents of many a European (or American) small town, reecting 
the rapid changes of the twentieth century. Yet, despite the commonalities that 
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cultural anxiety in Fréjus shared with the angst of globalization elsewhere, the 
anxieties in Fréjus were shaped by the particularities of its history.
Robion argued that the changes Fréjus was experiencing were not to be 
condemned because the only “tradition” in Fréjus was one of cultural transfor-
mation and successive new inuences, from the Romans to the tenth-century 
Bourguinons, seventeenth-century Moriscos, and eighteenth-century Germans, 
to the “Portuguese and Maghrebians of today.”87 It was no shame and no nov-
elty, argued Robion, that Fréjus had in the twentieth century become home to 
a pagoda and a mosque as well as a cathedral. But Robion’s analysis ignored the 
particularly strong historical connection that Fréjus had with the French co-
lonial project and omitted the fact that Fréjus’s rst mosque and rst pagoda 
were built by and for colonial soldiers of color forcibly conscripted to serve their 
French conquerors.
Many Fréjus residents would not join in Robion’s embrace of cultural uidity. 
Fréjus was one of several French localities where Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigrant 
National Front party emerged victorious in the elections of 2014; National Front 
mayor David Rachline, elected in 2014 at age 26, had made opposition to a large 
new mosque complex central to his campaign. The mosque, approved by the 
previous mayor, opened in January 2016, but the Rachline government unsuc-
cessfully sought a court ruling requiring its demolition on the grounds that the 
building permits had been illegally obtained.88 The reasons for the rise of the 
nationalist, anti-immigrant right in Fréjus, as elsewhere in France, are complex, 
and include disenchantment with the established parties as well as the popular-
ity of the National Front’s nativist, anti-European-Union rhetoric. Explanations 
o	en include the inuence of the pieds noirs in France a	er 1962, who formed 
an important source of support for the party and for Jean-Marie Le Pen, the 
ex-paratrooper and Algerian War veteran who led the party from its founding 
in 1972 until 2011. A	er the 2014 elections, nostalgic support for the French 
colonial project in Algeria gured prominently in the Rachline administration’s 
construction of nationalist patriotism and was embodied in a new monument 
“to all those who died so that France could live in Algeria.”89 Unlike the Indo-
china war memorial built in Fréjus in the early 1990s, this new monument made 
no attempt to balance competing views and experiences of the war and of French 
colonialism.90
Despite the immanence of the Algerian question in the distribution of aid 
a	er the 1959 Malpasset Dam collapse and in the work of memoirists and 
local historians of the disaster through the turn of the millennium, today the 
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Malpasset disaster seems to be absent from the rhetoric of Fréjus’s National 
Front and its critics and from the identity anxieties described by Robion. Nev-
ertheless, the history of ood of 1959 oers important insights into a strain of 
political culture within this town that has been so receptive to the message of 
the National Front, and to the Rachline administration’s support for an Algérie 
ançaise that had not existed for 	y years. No town is a monolith, of course, 
and there were contradicting voices, both in 1959 and in 2014. But in 1959 and 
1960, Fréjus’s rst right-of-center municipal government in decades spoke, 
wrote, and acted in ways that contravened ocial French policies and that cast 
Algerians—French Muslims from Algeria, citizens of the French Republic—as 
foreigners and outsiders and denied these disaster victims and survivors their 
fair share of disaster aid donations sent, not only by white Europeans, but by 
Muslims in Algeria and by Moroccans and Tunisians. This suggests that the 
appeal of the anti-immigrant Front National in Fréjus, insofar as it relates to 
nostalgia for the French colonial project and hostility to immigrants of North 
African descent, cannot be attributed simply to the post-1962 inuence of the 
pieds noirs settler-refugees, or to more recent events such as terrorist attacks of 
the 1990s and 2000s. The inuence of deep-seated colonialist ideas about the 
venality and alterity of North Africans was evident in Fréjus a	er the 1959 ood 
and cannot be attributed to the inuence of the pieds noirs. If one was to point 
to a turning point in the political history of Fréjus, it would not be the arrival 
of the “repatriated” refugees of 1962 but rather the end of Socialist hegemony 
in early 1959 with the election of André Leotard to the mayor’s oce (a local 
consequence of the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return of De Gaulle 
in 1958). Such a conclusion would be over-simplistic, however. The attitudes of 
the local authorities in Fréjus, revealed in the a	ermath of the ood, were rooted 
in the town’s long and intimate association with the French imperial project.91
Conclusion
The Malpasset disaster may have been “a global tragedy,” as Olivier Donat has 
written, but it was also an imperial drama. When the inanimate intervened in 
the lives of Fréjus’s residents by behaving in unexpected ways, the gradually un-
folding results of the sudden collapse of concrete and the rush of water were 
shaped by the history of France and its empire, as the local leadership acted to 
reinforce the distinction between colonizer and colonized, regardless of the 
strategies and policies that emanated from Paris before being overturned by the 
independence of Algeria. The solidarity of Algeria with France celebrated by 
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Fréjus’s mayor in 1959 did not extend in return from the mayor’s office to Fréjus’s 
most vulnerable population.
“Solidarity” campaigns for local catastrophes such as Orléansville and Fréjus 
were meant to function much like the war memorials to colonial troops dis-
cussed by Mann and Edwards. These fundraising drives were “simultaneously 
‘local’ and ‘national,’” serving to foster a sense of republican unity between the 
suffering, sacrificing locale and the benevolent, unifying empire, as Mann has 
argued.92 For the Algerians living in Fréjus, however, there was more suffering 
than benevolence. In the months following the collapse of the Malpasset Dam, 
an optimistic vision of imperial unity in the form of a new brotherhood of equals 
was advanced by the official proclamations of the French state, as well as by 
chroniclers of the disaster like Bonheur and Croizard. However, the long his-
tory of colonial distinctions between citizen and colonial subject could not be 
overcome. For the Muslim Algerians of Fréjus and for the municipal government 
that had the ability to help them recover from the 1959 disaster, the subordinate 
status of Muslim Algerians remained.
The French appeal for donations as a show of imperial solidarity did little to 
strengthen the affections of the colonized for the colonizer. Indeed, post-disaster 
solidarity could be turned to serve the interests of anticolonialism. Donations 
were also sent from Morocco, already independent but still struggling to nego-
tiate its post-independence relationship with France. Three months after the 
Fréjus disaster, when earthquake-stricken Agadir was in need, and French aid 
seemed to come with neocolonial strings attached, Moroccan nationalists would 
angrily recall the unconditional generosity Morocco had offered to Fréjus.93 Al-
though the disaster in Fréjus was a much smaller disaster than those that af-
flicted Algeria and Morocco during these years, Fréjus thus became part of the 
game of “disaster diplomacy” played by great and small powers in 1959 and 1960.
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Ch a pter 4
Poison, Paralysis, and the United States in Morocco, 1959
On September 10, 1959, three years after Moroccan independence, a previously healthy twenty-five-year-old man was brought to the Mo-hammed V hospital in Meknes, unable to walk. He had been suddenly 
afflicted with cramps in his calves the day before and had awoken to find he 
had lost control of the muscles in his lower legs and feet. He had no fever, but 
was subjected a spinal tap, which revealed no signs of polio or other pathogens. 
Ten more patients with similar symptoms arrived at the hospital later that day. 
Thirty more came the next day. Seven hundred more cases were identified by 
the end of the week. The epidemic of partial paralysis continued to spread, and 
by November, approximately ten thousand cases had been identified in cities, 
towns, and rural areas throughout Morocco.1
The origins of the epidemic remained a mystery for weeks, but investigators 
eventually identified contaminated cooking oil as the cause of paralysis. On 
April 13, 1959, Mohammed Bennani, an automobile supply wholesaler, had pur-
chased a large quantity of surplus jet engine lubricating oil from the US Air 
Force base at Nouasseur, near Casablanca. This oil contained triaryl phosphates 
and cresol phosphates. The lot purchased by Bennani was just one lot out of over 
fifty lots of various sorts of obsolete or excess oils sold from US airbases in Mo-
rocco that year. Bennani then sold portions of the oil, still in its original drums, 
to another merchant, Ahmed ben Hadj Abdallah. The oil was then resold to 
approximately two dozen cooking oil wholesalers, in Casablanca, Fez, and Me-
knes. The Meknes wholesaler later explained that he had been seeking a way to 
increase his profit margin from fourteen to twenty-four francs per liter. He had 
purchased several tons of the engine oil, mixed it with vegetable and olive oil, 
and bottled the concoction as cooking oil, labeling the bottles “Le Cerf” and “El 
Hilal.” As this oil went to market, he purchased another six tons of the engine 
oil, in expectation of increased demand from pilgrims arriving in Meknes for the 
coming celebration of Mouloud, the birth of the Prophet.2
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Soon a	er consuming the adulterated oil, the victims typically suered a brief 
period of gastrointestinal distress. This quickly passed, and all seemed to be 
well for just over two weeks. Then, however, the motor neurons of the spinal 
cord were damaged by the toxins.3 The victims began to experience fever, ac-
companied by numbness in the hands and feet. This also passed, but was re-
placed, within about forty-eight hours, by pain and weakness in the feet and 
legs, eventually leading to paralysis of all muscles below the knee, followed by 
spasticity and muscle atrophy. Most victims’ hands were also aected, and im-
potence aicted the men. For some, paralysis of the pelvic and abdominal mus-
cles rendered them non-ambulatory, but in most cases the paralysis was limited 
to the muscles of the extremities, so that the victims could still walk, with the 
“ungainly high-stepping gait” that soon became the identifying characteristic of 
the “Meknes disease.”4
The 1959 oil poisoning was an event produced neither by freak chance nor by 
malevolent intent. This disaster, like the Malpasset Dam collapse, might be un-
derstood as the product of what Jane Bennett calls the “distributive agency” of 
an “agentic assemblage” consisting of a “confederation of human and non-human 
elements.”5 Neither the former French colonizers, nor the US Air Force, nor the 
proteering oil wholesalers intended to poison thousands of people in Morocco. 
But declining colonial powers needed superpower allies, and, to be competitive, 
twentieth-century superpowers needed overseas bases and jet aircra	. Twenti-
eth-century industrialism produced synthetic cresyl compounds, providing lu-
brication for those jets and a means for grocery merchants competing in a capi-
talist economy to cut their production costs. Just as French colonialism and the 
neo-imperialism of America’s Cold War inuenced human thought and action 
to produce certain patterns of behavior and cultures of imperialism, they also 
produced particular arrangements of inanimate matter. Together, these arrange-
ments of the animate and inanimate constituted the military bases, schools, hos-
pitals, and embassies that were meant to serve colonial and neo-imperial goals. 
However, neither humans nor the inanimate behaved quite as the colonizers 
desired—and the behavior of manufactured chemicals could prove as intractable 
as those of colonial subjects or tectonic plates.
The very large scale and rather sudden onset of the Morocco oil poisoning 
produced eects that were in some ways akin to a seismic disaster or a ood. 
Much like the 1954 earthquake in Algeria, the paralysis epidemic overwhelmed 
the hospitals, tested the state’s ability to respond to the needs of the people, 
and opened the state, for its failures, to criticisms by the political opposition. 
However, unlike the earthquake in Algeria’s Chélif valley or the anthropogenic 
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ooding of Fréjus, the oil poisoning did not destroy the built environment and 
was not conned to a specic region or locality. The silent destruction and 
bloodless suering brought by the oil poisoning did not invite comparisons to 
the bombing campaigns of the Second World War, and when the disasters of 
Orléansville, Fréjus, and Agadir were discussed as kindred catastrophes, the 
oil poisoning was o	en le	 out. Nevertheless, the Morocco oil poisoning was 
connected to the other disasters, especially the 1960 earthquake in Agadir. The 
Moroccan political opposition made use of comparisons between the oil poi-
soning and the Fréjus ood to critique both the continued French presence in 
Morocco and the Moroccan state’s response to the oil poisoning. The Moroccan 
monarchy used both the oil poisoning and the 1960 earthquake to enhance royal 
authority and prestige, and international responses to these two disasters were 
interrelated. For the diplomacy of the United States, in particular, the oil poi-
soning and the Agadir earthquake were of profound mutual relevance.
The origins of the Morocco oil poisoning were inseparable from the social 
and political contexts of imperialism, the Cold War, and the still-incomplete 
process of decolonization. So, too, were human responses to this disaster. In 
1956, a	er several years of escalating violence, France had permitted its Moroc-
can protectorate formal independence. The Alaouite monarch, Mohammed 
ben Yusef, was retrieved from a two-year exile and became King Mohammed V. 
Morocco owed its independence not only to the courage and ruthlessness of its 
freedom ghters, but also to France’s determination to keep Algeria at all costs. 
Morocco’s independence meant that France could concentrate its resources on 
the ght against the FLN. It remained to be seen whether independence would 
lead to the French ending their military presence in Morocco, and whether in-
dependence would mean that the French would cede their political and cultural 
inuence over Morocco to the Americans, or, less plausibly, to the Soviets, or 
whether the Moroccan state would be able to assert full sovereignty.
In particular, responses to the oil poisoning by the French, American, and 
Moroccan states, and by the Moroccan political opposition, were tied to one 
of the legacies of colonialism that had not been undone by formal Moroccan 
independence: the presence, on Moroccan soil, of military bases occupied by the 
former colonizers and their American allies. Just as the question of whether or 
not Algerians were to be French shaped responses to the disasters in the Chélif 
and Reyran Valleys, responses to the oil poisoning by the Moroccan, American, 
and French states, and by the Moroccan political opposition, revolved around 
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the question of whether these remaining plots of foreign-occupied land would 
be decolonized.
Epidemiology and Crime
The mass poisoning in Morocco was distinctive in its relation to imperialism 
and the Cold War, but there had been cases of mass cresyl phosphate poisoning 
before. Tasteless, odorless, and soluble in vegetable oil, triorthocresyl phosphate 
has a particular tendency to nd its way into the food supply through a variety 
of means. In 1930 and 1931, as many as sixteen-thousand people were poisoned in 
the American Midwest through the adulteration of Jamaican ginger extract, or 
“jake,” an alcoholic patent medicine. In that incident, an unscrupulous entrepre-
neur had used triorthocresyl phosphate to circumvent government regulations 
stipulating the minimum solid content of alcoholic “medicinal” extracts. An-
other case aected hundreds of women in the 1930s who had consumed a parsley 
extract abortifacient that included the toxic chemical. There were also several 
cases in Germany in the 1940s in which food shortages had led to the use of 
engine oils in cooking as well as the accidental poisoning in 1940 of ninety-two 
Swiss soldiers a	er machine-gun cleaning oil was mistaken for cooking oil. In 
1942, forty-one people in Verona, Italy, were aicted with paralysis, which has 
been traced to ground contamination caused by the use of discarded military en-
gine oil containers in the handling of farm compost and manure.6 In its scale, the 
Moroccan case was most like the American jake poisoning; in its causes, it also 
resembled the German incidents, in which poverty incentivized the substitution 
of machine oil for vegetable oil, and the Verona case, in which the outbreak was 
caused by improper repurposing of military surplus material.
In 1959 Morocco, it took some time for investigators to determine the chem-
ical and human vectors by which imperialism, industrial capitalism, and the 
Cold War had led to mass paralysis in Meknes. Initially, polio or other viral 
infection was suspected. The appearance of a few cases between August 31 and 
September 2 followed by an explosion of cases between September 18 and 24 
suggested a pattern of contagion. Indeed, the delayed onset of paralysis follow-
ing consumption of the poison mimicked the incubation period of a contagious 
disease, making the true origin of the crisis dicult to identify. In addition, 
all of the aicted lived in poor neighborhoods, suggesting disease vectors re-
lated to housing patterns and unsanitary living conditions, such as sewage or 
insects.7 Fearing the outbreak of some new virus, King Mohammed V ordered 
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the cancellations of all festivities for the September 19 celebration of Mouloud, 
which had already brought pilgrims to Meknes from the surrounding region. 
The King also banned all travel and public meetings; public pools and athletic 
facilities were closed.8
Yet the symptoms did not correspond to polio or any other known illness, 
and blood and spinal uid showed no infection.9 By the end of September, the 
hospitals in Meknes were overwhelmed, and the sick were being housed in ad 
hoc locations. The French military hospital in Meknes opened beds to the af-
icted, and French military doctors arrived from Casablanca to help treat the 
inux of patients.10
In late September, Dr. Youssef Ben Abbes, the Minister of Public Health, met 
with doctors from the Avicenna Hospital in Rabat, and the sta of the National 
Institute of Health. The doctors and investigators were puzzled by the odd dis-
tribution of the malady. While all of the victims were poor (typically the families 
of day laborers), the very poorest members of the society (who had been too poor 
to buy oil that month) were spared, as were infants. Furthermore, the “absolute 
immunity” of Europeans (with one exception) and of Jewish Moroccans seemed 
to defy explanation simply in terms of superior sanitation, and very few of the 
	y thousand people who traveled to Meknes from other regions for the cele-
bration of the Mouloud in mid-September had become aicted. Of the hundred 
Moroccan soldiers stationed in Meknes, only two suered from paralysis.11
Several patients had pointed to the strange, dark, reddish-colored oil as the 
probable cause of their aiction. One family, described by a doctor Baillé, had 
noticed that a bottle of cooking oil that they had recently bought was unusually 
dark in color—in hindsight, “as dark as old motor oil.”12 A	er using the oil to 
cook a meal, they had been concerned enough to oer a portion to their dog. 
A	er the dog seemed to suer no ill eects, they went ahead and ate, but remem-
bered the strange oil a	er they later fell ill.
The experts, however, were not to be convinced by anecdotal evidence alone. 
Albert Tuyns, a Belgian epidemiologist working for the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO), began to investigate the outbreak, applying the methods of the 
“new epidemiology” of the period, which included expanding epidemiological 
analysis to include maladies other than infectious disease. Tuyns initiated a sur-
vey of 250 patients on September 21 and found that cooking oil was the common 
factor in all the responses. This conclusion was also supported by the correlation 
of paralysis cases, noticed by the Ministry of Health, with the areas frequented 
by street vendors who sold fried pastries and by the suspicions of the patients 
themselves.13
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When the cooking oil was identied as the cause of the paralysis, the inves-
tigators suspected a neurotoxin was involved and sent a sample of the oil to the 
Institute of Hygiene in Rabat. The initial chemical analysis on September 30
indicated the presence of “phosphates, phenols, and cresols.” World Health Or-
ganization investigators identied triorthocresyl phosphate as the culprit, al-
though other triaryl phosphates and cresol phosphates also present were later 
seen as having a signicant role.14 These chemicals were binding with acetyl-
cholinesterase in the neural synapses, causing a buildup of the neurotransmit-
ter acetylcholine and a breakdown in the functioning of the motor neurons. 
This diagnosis was not good news; there was no pharmaceutical cure—the only 
course of treatment was physical therapy, and in certain cases of severe spasticity, 
orthopedic surgery.
Once the chemical cause of the aiction had been determined, the focus of 
the investigation shi	ed from the epidemiologists to the police. By October 9, 
the Moroccan government’s Criminal Investigation Division in Meknes tracked 
the tainted oil to a warehouse in Meknes, where they discovered a second ship-
ment of “six tons of oil in 31 drums ready for bottling and delivery to consum-
ers.”15 Initially, the investigation focused on Meknes, and warnings to the public 
identied only the local brands Le Cerf and El Hilal as potentially dangerous. 
Soon, however, it became evident that this was not a localized disaster; nor was 
it contained. The number of diagnoses continued to rise sharply around the 
country, reaching ten thousand within a few weeks. On October 28, the Moroc-
can government declared a “national calamity” and provided emergency funds 
(one hundred million francs) to the Ministry of Public Health for rehabilitation 
and treatment of those aicted.16 The government also began a public informa-
tion campaign, warning the public against the purchase of any oil that was not 
bottled in a factory, and identifying twenty of the more inexpensive brands of 
cooking oil sold throughout the country as potentially dangerous. Orders were 
issued that all persons should turn over bottles of the suspected brands to the 
police, and the government announced that that house-to-house searches would 
be conducted to conscate any undeclared household stocks. Following the ini-
tial arrests of alleged culprits in Meknes, interrogations led the investigators to 
other wholesale centers in Fez and Casablanca, from which the toxic oil had 
been sold across Morocco, and thirty-one people were arrested. The authorities 
seized 190 metric tons of suspected oil, including 600 kilograms of machine oil.17
As in the Chélif region of Algeria in 1954, however, the mountainous territory in 
parts of Morocco and the dispersal of the rural population inhibited the disaster 
response, and authorities feared that the inhabitants of villages in areas “with 
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neither radio nor roads” might continue to possess and consume adulterated 
supplies of oil.18
The impact of the disaster extended beyond the individuals aicted and was 
economically devastating to entire families. Minister of Health Youssef Ben 
Abbes estimated that “there are at least 30,000 made destitute” by the disas-
ter.19 Abdelmalek Faraj, head of the National Institute of Health, noted that 
80 percent of the aicted were unskilled workers, who lived by means of their 
physical labor. Such workers had already been struggling to sell their labor in an 
economy characterized by high unemployment; for the newly disabled, nding 
work would be impossible. Moreover, as Faraj noted, aicted families o	en lost 
both wage labor and the unpaid labor of women and children, producing a des-
perate situation.20 Medically, the long-term prognosis was equally grim. WHO 
physicians oered little hope of recovery, stating that “a probable 10,000 cases, 
including small children, will be completely paralyzed for the rest of their lives, 
and their upkeep will depend on the good will of their neighbors or the State.”21
Treatment and the Habits of Imperialism
In November, the World Health Organization sent Denis Leroy, head of the 
anti-polio center at the University of Rennes, to Morocco. Dr. Leroy stressed 
that physical therapy needed to begin immediately for the many thousands of 
people aicted, and Leroy developed a plan for a massive, long-term rehabilita-
tion eort, led by the international Red Cross.22 Departing from their usual pol-
icy of providing only immediate, urgent disaster relief, the Red Cross launched 
an eighteen-month eort that began in January 1960 and that would involve 
167 foreign medical professionals (typically in rotations lasting several months) 
as well as 150 Moroccan nurse’s aides.23
Five treatment centers were established around the country. In the most severe 
cases of spasticity, medical and surgical treatments were attempted, ranging from 
alcohol injections and casts to the surgical severing of tendons.24 For the most 
part, however, the program was based on physical therapy, while also addressing 
the social impact of the catastrophe described by Faraj. In Khemiset, 	y kilo-
meters west of Meknes, a reportedly successful program of occupational therapy 
was implemented, thanks to the presence of a Swiss occupational therapist, the 
only occupational therapist present at the start of the program. Vocational re-
habilitation programs were also later initiated in Meknes in May 1960 and in 
early 1961 in Fes, Sidi Slimane, and Sidi Kacem. In Khemiset, the Swiss therapist 
developed a program providing groups of sixty patients at a time with practice in 
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“weaving, tapestry-work, sewing, leather-work, knitting, production of strings 
of perlas, embroidery, cord-knotting, basket-work, mat-plaiting, writing, paint-
ing, drawing, type-writing, wood-work and gardening.”25 These activities were 
chosen partly for their value as physical therapy: they “favored the rhythmic 
change between contractions of agonists and antagonists,” and therefore, it was 
claimed, were not fatiguing. 26 Vocationally-oriented tasks were also included 
in hopes that they would provide paths to employment for those who could no 
longer work in their prior occupation or who needed occupational therapy to 
relearn skills. The choice of tasks obviously was inuenced by the predominance 
of women among the aicted, although the medical professionals who reported 
on the program were almost silent on the role of gender; the signicance of the 
fact that the Swiss occupational therapist was female went unremarked, despite 
the relevance that her gender must have had when treating female patients. No 
occupational therapy program was implemented at the treatment center in Al-
hucemas; it is unclear whether this was related to the predominance of men 
among the patients in the northern region.
In addressing the “social aspects” of this disaster in independent Morocco, 
the international assistance teams went beyond the treatment of aiction and 
assumed a role once played by colonial schoolteachers and doctors. Medicine had 
long been an instrument of colonialism in Morocco. As historian Ellen Amster 
has written, “Histories of colonial medicine illuminate how native bodies were 
invented as objects of scientic knowledge, racisms were naturalized, and health 
dictatorships were designed to sanitize, rationalize, and control native bodies.”27
The occupational therapy program operated on the assumption that the patients 
needed not only to recover the use of their extremities but also to adopt West-
ern, industrial attitudes toward work and time. Like the French doctors and 
educators of the colonial (“protectorate”) era, the international rehabilitation 
sta made Moroccans into objects of observation, engaging in what, given the 
brief period of time spent in residence, must have been a very supercial study of 
“native arts and cra	s.”28 However, they also asserted knowledge of their Moroc-
can patients’ mental characteristics, which they aimed to improve through the 
bodily discipline of physical therapy. Doctor W. M. Zinn, of Switzerland, wrote 
that “the majority of patients were illiterate, owned no watches, and o	en had 
no concept of time,” traits that complicated the scheduling of outpatient treat-
ment.29 Consequently, the goals of the rehabilitation program came to include 
the remediation of these perceived failings. Zinn reported that, in Khemiset, 
“the patients were gradually accustomed to working increasingly long hours, in 
the end six hours a day, and to turn up for work regularly and punctually.”30
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Amster has argued that the colonized were o	en successful in resisting such 
discipline, refusing to adopt the norms and standards of their Western doctors 
and teachers.31 Whether this was the case in the physical therapy centers is dif-
cult to assess. In terms of the more measurable goal of vocational rehabilita-
tion leading to employment, only the Khemiset treatment center had success 
in nding jobs for its patients upon completion of treatment. In part, this was 
attributed to the delayed start of occupational therapy in other locations, leading 
to less successful recovery of patients’ hands; in Khemiset, the early presence of 
an occupational therapist and the use of therapeutic hand splits prevented irre-
versible hand deformities from developing. Largely, however, the success of the 
Khemiset program in the economic reintegration of victims was attributed to 
the area’s relatively low unemployment rate; elsewhere, nding jobs for patients 
with impaired mobility was virtually impossible in an economy in which, as in 
Meknes, 80 percent of the adult male population lacked permanent employ-
ment.32 The state of the local economy was the determining factor rather than 
the content of the curriculum or the transformation of the Moroccans’ mind-
sets—a reality experienced by colonial schoolteachers in earlier decades.33
Latent colonialist habits notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the in-
ternational physical therapy eort made a positive dierence in rehabilitating 
the bodies of the patients. In January 1961, half of the ten thousand victims of 
the oil poisoning were still receiving physical therapy, but ve thousand had 
been judged t to discontinue the treatment; of these, three thousand were kept 
under supervision, and two thousand were considered “cured to all extents and 
purposes, and able to resume their former occupation.”34 In June 1961, a Red 
Cross “follow-up” review judged 6,695 to be functionally rehabilitated; another 
732 were still using orthopedic devices such as splints, but were no longer in 
need of physical therapy. Only 399 were still receiving treatment. This does not 
mean that the “recovered” patients suered no permanent loss of motor function 
(and the persistence of impotence was not addressed by the review). Further-
more, over three thousand patients, probably in rural areas, were not included 
in the 1961 review, and the closure of most of the treatment centers meant that 
outpatient care only remained available in Meknes, creating an incentive to 
classify patients elsewhere as suciently recovered. Some initial gains would be 
reversed over time, as mobility impairments exacerbated the eects of aging, and 
vice versa. Nevertheless, the outcome for the victims was better than had been 
feared, and the physical therapy program was believed to have played a signi-
cant role in this outcome, although patients’ recoveries were also attributed to 
reinnervation.35
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The Opposition, Fréjus, and the King
For the Moroccan political opposition, the salient connection between neoco-
lonialism and the oil poisoning lay not in the paternalism of the occupational 
therapists but in the toxic oil’s origins on one of the many foreign military 
bases—French, American, and Spanish—that remained on Moroccan soil three 
years a	er independence. Most American forces had been evacuated from North 
Africa soon a	er the end of the Second World War, including those at a wartime 
base at Agadir, although the United States had maintained a naval presence at 
Port Lyautey (Kenitra) since 1942 (albeit under a French ag since 1948).36 How-
ever, a 1950 agreement with France—made without consulting the Sultan—had 
permitted the United States to once again expand its military presence in Mo-
rocco with the construction of three Strategic Air Command bases, as well as 
naval and Air Force communications and radar installations, making Morocco 
an important part of the American nuclear deterrent against a Soviet assault 
on Western Europe.37 Moroccan independence had thrown the status of these 
bases into doubt, as Moroccan nationalists of various political parties challenged 
the validity of previous US agreements with France, the former protectorate 
power. The ongoing Algerian revolution undermined America’s relationships 
with nationalists across North Africa, as the United States played what Mat-
thew Connelly has described as a “double game,” providing food aid and refugee 
relief to Algerians while providing France with arms to ght the FLN, includ-
ing the retaliatory bombing of Algerian refugees by American-made planes at 
the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Yousse on February 17, 1958.38 Initially, the 
nationalists’ demands had focused on the evacuation of the bases of France, the 
former colonial power. However, according to I. William Zartman, the nation-
alist press’s discourse on the bases had begun to shi	 in 1957 from “regularizing” 
the American presence, in light of Moroccan sovereignty, to demanding evacu-
ation—a goal that was adopted by the Moroccan government and monarchy in 
1958. The American intervention in Lebanon in July 1958 further associated the 
American military with Western imperialism in Arab lands, and demands for 
the evacuation of bases intensied.39
In this context, it was inevitable that the oil poisoning would have implica-
tions for the question of bases and Morocco’s relationship with foreign powers. 
The government desperately needed US medical, economic, and military aid, 
and refrained from openly pointing ngers. The press, however, was quick to 
raise the issue, demonstrating the growing divergence between the nationalist 
movement that had led the independence struggle and the newly independent 
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state. Avant Garde, the newspaper of the newly-created Union Nationale des 
Forces Populaire (UNFP), the party of the royally appointed prime minister, 
printed an article on November 15, 1959, suggesting that “foreign military au-
thorities…may have been negligent,” in the sale of the oil.40 This did not mean 
that Prime Minister Abdallah Ibrahim agreed. The party was fractured, and 
Ibrahim served at the pleasure of the monarch: a few weeks later Ibrahim would 
ban his party’s paper and have the editor arrested (for questioning the authority 
of the king to appoint the government).41 But Avant Garde was not alone in 
pointing out the causal role of the American military presence in the oil poison-
ing. In early December, the photo magazine Al Machahid (described as a Moroc-
can version of Life magazine) had run the headline “American Military Surplus 
are at the Root of This Disaster: Those who Exploit the Weakness and Poverty 
of the People: 10,000 Moroccans, one Frenchman, zero Jews Poisoned.”42 While 
the text of the article was more nuanced, the inammatory headline reected 
the role of the disaster in exacerbating nationalist concerns about the American 
bases in Morocco.
The dominant nationalist party throughout the postwar period had been 
Istiqlal (“Independence”), but the main Istiqlal leadership had been forced out 
of the cabinet by King Mohammed V in December 1958 in favor of the Ibrahim 
government, and the le	 wing of Istiqlal, including Ibrahim, split o to form the 
UNFP in 1959.43 The remaining conservative body of the Istiqlal party found 
itself the party of opposition and was subjected to a ban on its publications in 
early October 1959. On November 29, the party’s National Council passed a 
resolution denouncing the “negligence” of the authorities with regard to the oil 
poisoning and demanded aid and compensation for the victims; a separate res-
olution demanded the evacuation of all foreign troops, “considered an assault 
on the sovereignty of Morocco, a humiliation, and a permanent provocation.”44
When the weekly newspaper Al-Istiqlal resumed publication in December, 
it addressed the crisis of the oil poisoning in an article titled: “From Meknes to 
Fréjus: The Responsibilities in the Oil Aair.” Al-Istiqlal accused the govern-
ment of failing to fulll its responsibilities on two fronts: it had failed to protect 
the health of the people and had failed to bring an end to the colonial legacy 
of foreign “enclaves” on Moroccan soil. The Americans, the author asserted, 
knew full well that the oil being sold was toxic. Although the article stopped 
short of stating that the Americans knew the engine lubricant would be added 
to cooking oil, the author faulted them for their willful ignorance of Moroccan 
laws and regulations. The article then went on to implicitly connect the Amer-
ican presence not only to the paralysis epidemic but also to food shortages and 
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famine by comparing this contamination of the Moroccan food supply to the 
recent introduction of crop parasites from foreign sources. Yet the Americans 
were not the only target of Al-Istiqlal ’s wrath. The author asked, “Could they 
[the unscrupulous merchants] have done it if the minister of Agriculture had 
exercised vigilant control over foodstus, as is his responsibility? Could they 
have continued their deadly trac if the minister of Health had not, through his 
delayed declarations, failed to sound the alarm?” Once the epidemic had begun, 
the authorities had compounded the crisis through incompetence and indier-
ence—they had been too slow to identify the cause of the paralysis and too slow 
to realize that the problem extended beyond Meknes and beyond the two brands 
of oil initially identied as contaminated. According to the article, the ultimate 
blame lay with the Moroccan government for its lack of “vigilance.” Al-Istiqlal 
contrasted this portrayal of Moroccan state incompetence to a rosy view of the 
national solidarity shown by the French state and people for the victims of the 
Fréjus ood. While the Moroccan authorities responded with an “indierence” 
which stemmed from a “convenient fatalism” and an overreliance on foreign aid, 
French authorities had immediately begun to investigate the causes of the Fréjus 
dam collapse and to search for those responsible.45
In fact, the French inquiries into the dam collapse would, in the end, identify 
no wrongdoing (as discussed in Chapter 3), while Moroccan government had 
not only conducted inquiries but made arrests. King Mohammed V had issued 
an edict, or dahir, on October 29, retroactively legislating the death penalty and 
creating a special court for “those who have consciously manufactured, stored 
with intent to sell, distributed, put up for sale or sold products or foodstus des-
tined for human consumption, which are a danger to public health.”46 Far from 
demonstrating passivity or indierence, the king’s response was suciently de-
cisive to alarm American ocials, who correctly sensed a portent of the monar-
chy’s tendency toward authoritarianism; the French ambassador called the edict 
“very severe.”47 The Moroccan state cast a wide net in identifying those respon-
sible and erred on the side of arresting marginal suspects, including grocers who 
sold the bottled oil directly to customers and three men who were unconnected 
to the adulterated cooking oil but were using the American machine oil as an 
ingredient in “brilliantine,” or hair oil. When defense lawyers argued that the 
king’s edict specied only those who sold harmful substances for the purpose of 
consumption, judges ruled that one could consume a substance through the hair 
follicles as well as by mouth.48 In pretrial hearings, defense attorneys also chal-
lenged the arbitrariness of the king’s ex post facto decree, but without success. 
Al-Istiqlal, however, though quick to point ngers at the Ibrahim government 
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and the bureaucracy, would not go so far as to challenge the king. Bowing to 
royal authority in a time of crisis, the paper would later present the king’s edict 
as an exception to normal rules justied by the gravity of the disaster.49 Catastro-
phe thus bolstered the king’s authority.
Disaster Diplomacy
An examination of the Morocco oil poisoning oers insight into the public 
health consequences of Cold War militarism, the culture of international hu-
manitarian activities, and the politics of Moroccan nationalism soon a	er inde-
pendence. In addition, the diplomatic archives concerning the epidemic also per-
mit a historical case study in what has become known as “disaster diplomacy.” 
Most such studies have focused on very recent disasters, related to weather and 
volcanic or seismic activity. The 1959 oil poisoning provides an opportunity to 
extend such investigations to the diplomacy of the Cold War and decolonization 
and to an overtly anthropogenic disaster.50
As Gaillard, Kelman, and Orillos have written, “scholars across the disci-
plines have recently shown an increasing interest in ‘disaster diplomacy,’ which 
focuses on how and why disaster-related activities do and do not yield diplo-
matic gains, looking mainly at disaster-related activities aecting diplomacy 
rather than the reverse.”51 This literature has aimed to illuminate the potentially 
positive eects of disaster response on relations between otherwise antagonistic 
states.52 The Morocco oil poisoning, however, suggests that a broader approach 
to the study of diplomacy and disaster is warranted. The oil poisoning involved 
semi-adversarial relations between allies and potential allies (the United States, 
France, and Morocco), and also involved non-state actors, including the Red 
Cross and the Istiqlal party. Furthermore, this case involves a complex reciproc-
ity between the eects of diplomatic strategies on disaster relief and the eects 
of disaster relief on diplomatic activities. In post-independence Morocco, dip-
lomatic concerns not only incentivized but also distorted and inhibited disaster 
response, as American fears of acknowledging culpability overshadowed the 
desire to make a show of American generosity to an emerging Cold War ally. 
Furthermore, the examination of this tragedy also allows the historian to ex-
plore how responses to one disaster can be intertwined with the experience and 
diplomacy of other disasters—in this case, the earthquake of 1960.
In 1959 and 1960, Moroccan, French, and American diplomats, as well as 
the Moroccan political opposition, were keenly aware of the potential impact 
of disaster responses on diplomacy, for good or for ill. For the Moroccan state, 
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the goal was to maximize aid from both the United States and France without 
oering concessions that would undermine the government’s nationalist cre-
dentials or add credibility to the arguments of its domestic critics, most notably 
the Istiqlal party. For the United States, the explicit goals of disaster diplomacy 
were to promote the tenure of the American airbases in Morocco and to promote 
a positive image of the United States in comparison to the Soviet Union, its 
Cold War rival.53 French diplomats were likewise concerned about the future of 
French military bases and about international communism but also had broader 
goals of maintaining France’s inuence in Morocco and preventing the United 
States from usurping this role. The Moroccan state proved adept at exploiting 
the anxieties and rivalries of its international benefactors.
American disaster assistance, like other forms of US humanitarian aid, con-
stituted part of what Kenneth Osgood has called Eisenhower’s policy of “Total 
Cold War,” a means by which the “United States would wage the Cold War as-
sertively through nonmilitary means in the political and psychological arenas.”54
Since 1958, when US military personnel had responded to oods and res in Mo-
rocco with search and rescue teams, the State Department had self-consciously 
sought to use disaster relief as a form of diplomacy to promote a positive image of 
the United States in Morocco. In June 1958, US airmen from Nousasser had re-
sponded to a major re in the Derb J’did bidonville (shantytown) in Casablanca. 
In December 1958, US Navy and Air Force squadrons had provided emergency 
relief when oods struck the Gharb plain north of Rabat, distributing food and 
airli	ing people to safety, feats the Americans would reprise when the Gharb 
was inundated again in January 1960. Among American ocials, however, views 
were mixed as to whether such eorts produced satisfactory coverage of Ameri-
can heroism in the Moroccan press.55
If the positive publicity generated by disaster response was sometimes under-
whelming, the oil poisoning presented American ocials with a looming public 
relations catastrophe: the specter of ten thousand disabled Moroccans living out 
their lives as permanent, visible symbols of American imperial harm. Would the 
Moroccan public, or the Moroccan political leadership, blame the Americans 
for that damage? By November 5, 1959, the American embassy received word 
that the US airbase was suspected to be the original source of the adulterating 
substance. This suspicion was soon conrmed a	er the Moroccan authorities 
requested samples of machine oils from the airbase, which the Americans pro-
vided.56 At the request of Moroccan ambassador Ben Aboud in Washington, the 
State Department called upon the US Surgeon General to consult with Ameri-
can experts on rehabilitation.57 As the weeks passed, the Moroccan government 
92 chapter 4
made no ocial complaint but anxiously requested American assistance in re-
sponding to the disaster.58
The Belgian WHO epidemiologist Alfred Tuyns told American diplomats 
that the Moroccan government was plagued by fatalism, a complaint also ex-
pressed by the writers of Al-Istiqlal. According to Tuyns, the government shared 
the attitude of the victims that the aiction was an “Act of God”: “‘They are 
waiting to die,’ said Tuyns, ‘and one gets the feeling that the authorities share 
this attitude.’” Tuyns complained that, in the early weeks of the epidemic, the 
Moroccan government, although active enough in pursuing the perpetrators 
and conscating bottled oil, was guilty of “criminal” sluggishness in request-
ing aid from international agencies. This orientalist description of Moroccan 
passivity and fatalism was potentially reassuring to the Americans, who feared 
accusations of culpability but also suggested, to Embassy counselor David Nes, 
grave failings of the Moroccan state: “this account well illustrates the Moroccan 
Government’s deciencies in any decision-making process.”59 Tuyns’s descrip-
tion of Moroccan government passivity was contradicted, however, by Red Cross 
ocials who stated that Moroccan ocials were not blaming the United States 
for the incident but were “desperately anxious to hear what the US might be 
able to contribute” and were frustrated by the unwillingness of American orga-
nizations to do more than send survey teams.60 Moroccan hopes for American 
unilateral assistance might explain the delay in requesting international aid that 
had frustrated Tuyns.61
The magnitude of Moroccan need for US assistance limited the adverse dip-
lomatic impact of the tragedy for the United States. In addition to needing aid 
for the victims of the disaster, Morocco was heavily dependent on American 
economic aid, which totaled approximately $50 million in 1959, and the US had 
just begun to supply military assistance, valued at $30 million that year.62 The 
Moroccan government was also concerned that fears of adulterated oil in Mo-
rocco would harm the country’s canned sh exports, and Moroccan ocials 
hoped that the State Department would help to reassure “all interested agen-
cies” (presumably the US Food and Drug Administration and the Department 
of Agriculture) that Moroccan canneries had not been aected.63 Hostility to 
the American presence in Morocco was a public force to which the Moroccan 
government had to be sensitive, but the government had no interest in inam-
ing anti-Americanism. As one US diplomatic dispatch stated, “Whether or not 
there was any exploitation of the situation from hostile sources, the Moroccan 
authorities would certainly do nothing to foster unfriendly feelings. As far as 
the US was concerned, they were entirely preoccupied with the hope that they 
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would be receiving some favorable notication regarding the prospects of equip-
ment and personnel contributions very soon, in view of the desperate problem 
which the government faces.”64
The Moroccan government’s attitude was a relief for the American ocials, 
who were also relieved that radio appeals for donations for the victims made by 
President Bourguiba of Tunisia made no mention of America’s role in supplying 
the adulterated oil. The Americans, however, never felt condent of Morocco’s 
loyalty to the United States or of Moroccan dependence on American aid. The 
fear that Morocco might turn to the Soviets as an alternative source of aid, in-
cluding military aid, prevented US ocials from taking Moroccan dependence 
for granted. Normally, this insecurity would have led to a generous American 
aid response.65
However, for American diplomats, the origin of the toxic oil in an Ameri-
can airbase made the oil poisoning unlike other humanitarian crises in North 
Africa. The American response to the poisoning was restrained by the fear that 
American assistance might encourage the Moroccan public to associate the 
tragedy with the US military presence. The Nouasseur airbase willingly pro-
vided oil samples to the Moroccan authorities for chemical analysis and donated 
twenty-ve thousand dollars’ worth of surplus food supplies to the Red Crescent 
to assist with relief eorts, but otherwise, the US Air Force undertook to “re-
spond only to specic Moroccan requests for assistance with a view to avoiding 
additional publicity and appearance of culpability.”66 The American Embassy 
did not declare an ocial disaster, and hoped that the WHO and the Red Cross 
would be able to respond adequately to the crisis.
American disaster diplomacy was also shaped by tensions between funding 
rules, which emphasized visibility, and publicity guidelines, which stressed sub-
tlety. Ham-handed publicity about aid provided by the US might seem transpar-
ently political and calculated, drawing attention to the bases while undermining 
the goodwill generated by the relief eorts themselves. Since the work of Edward 
Bernays in the 1920s, “public relations” had emerged as an endeavor which, to 
be successful, had to conceal its own deliberate eorts, and its authors.67 Eisen-
hower had adopted this approach wholeheartedly: in the realm of Cold War psy-
chological warfare, “the hand of government must be carefully concealed, and, in 
some cases I should say, wholly eliminated.”68 This approach was not universally 
accepted. For example, Leon Borden Blair, the Navy political liaison, ardently fa-
vored more explicit publicity about the actions of US servicemen in relief eorts. 
Looking back in his 1970 history/memoir of postwar Morocco, Blair scorned the 
civilian diplomats’ approach; Blair believed that the key to American relations 
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with Morocco had been the open presence of American servicemen (especially 
the Navy men at Port Lyautey Naval Air Station in Kenitra), not only in disaster 
relief but also in day-to-day interactions with Moroccans.69
Nevertheless, the policy of public relations subtlety and restraint, enunciated 
in Washington, had been reinforced in Morocco during the summer of 1959, 
when an American payment of $15 million dollars to the Moroccan government 
was attacked as a bribe in the Istiqlal press: “Does this mean that this amount 
is the price paid for the American bases in Morocco? . . . American dollars have 
sealed the lips and appeased the Moroccan Government, may God forgive it.”70
The lesson learned from this blowback was reected in the instructions that 
USIS reporting on disaster aid in Morocco stress “mutual cooperation” rather 
than the heroism of Americans.71 American reluctance to draw attention to the 
US role in the oil crisis through overt generosity was clearly rooted in concerns 
about culpability, but such concerns were reinforced by the public relations prin-
ciple that publicity (and disaster aid was in itself a kind of publicity) should not 
be obviously related to its political purpose. US policymakers believed that the 
provision of supplies or personnel directly from the US bases would seem like 
too transparent a diplomatic ploy in the a	ermath of the oil poisoning.
The French Position
The French situation was dierent. The politics of decolonization gave the 
French state every reason to respond vigorously to this disaster. On November 
5, 1959, the French ambassador in Rabat, Alexandre Parodi, learned from Dr. 
Leroy that the American airbases had been identied as the origin of the epi-
demic. Parodi’s initial response was that this should be kept quiet, presumably 
either out of concern for France’s American ally or for fear that French bases 
might be maligned with guilt by association. However, the Foreign Ministry in 
Paris noted that Leroy had credited two French doctors, Hugonot and Georoy, 
and a French social worker, Ms. Barbet, as playing a crucial role in uncovering 
the cause of the epidemic. This oered an opportunity to create positive press 
for France at a time when France was subject to much criticism by ocial news 
outlets in Morocco. In addition, France had recently announced plans to test 
atomic bombs in the Algerian Sahara, tests which would take place on February 
13 and April 1, 1960. The foreign ministry feared that if the true cause of the pa-
ralysis was not widely publicized by the time the tests took place, rumors might 
spread that fallout from the atomic explosions was the cause of the paralysis.72
Consequently, Parodi asked Mohammed Taïbi Benhima, then the Secretary 
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General for the Moroccan health minister (later the governor of Agadir), to 
publicly credit the French doctors for their work; by November 12, the names of 
the French doctors and their contributions had been mentioned by Radio Ma-
rocaine.73 Moreover, the French state had rivals in its pursuit of publicity. When 
an FLN chapter of the Red Crescent donated 500,000 francs to its Moroccan 
counterpart in December 1959, and another million francs in March 1960, a new 
front opened up in the struggle for public opinion in Morocco.74 Faced with this 
competition, the French state, unlike the Americans, had every reason to take 
vigorous action.
The problem for French disaster diplomacy was a lack of budgetary resources. 
The French Red Cross was already overwhelmed by the needs of a massive pro-
gram in Morocco and Tunisia to address the needs of more than two hundred 
	y thousand refugees from the Algerian War.75 French diplomacy suered a 
setback in late November when Dr. Leroy mistakenly told Moroccan ocials 
that the French government would supply the buildings (“caserns”) needed to 
house the physical therapy program. When the French embassy informed the 
Moroccan government that this had not in fact been approved, Ibrahim and 
ocials at the Palace were furious. The French consulate in Meknes expressed 
alarm at “paradoxical” statements made by Moroccan ocials comparing the 
generosity of the Americans and the WHO to the “ill will of the French.” It 
was hoped, however, that this unfortunate turn of events would be smoothed 
over by a decision to oer 200 beds at the French hospital in Meknes to victims 
of the poisoning, and that any ill will would be mitigated by the “good sense” 
and inuence of Dr. Benhima of the Moroccan health service.76 Within days, 
the French government announced its plans to send a medical team consisting 
of two doctors and 8 to 10 physical therapists to participate in the international 
eort for a period of 4 to 6 months, and granted the Moroccan government 
the use of a casern in Fes, recently evacuated by French troops.77 Nevertheless, 
ocials at the French foreign ministry expressed concern that French aid would 
fall short of expectations. The French Red Cross could not respond adequately 
to Moroccan aid requests, and its contribution to the international response 
was smaller than that of other countries’ Red Cross contributions. Meanwhile, 
the Moroccan government had pledged 	een million francs to aid the victims 
of the Fréjus disaster, and French ocials feared that “this gesture may be quite 
adroitly exploited by it [the Moroccan government] to prove that, in propor-
tion, Morocco is more generous than France.”78 This was a prescient concern: 
Al-Istiqlal would make a very similar argument about Fréjus a	er the earth-
quake struck Agadir several weeks later. 79
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Charlie Yost’s Cold War
In contrast to the French, who sought to maximize publicity so that their re-
sponse to the disaster would be both “important and known,”80 American o-
cials endeavored to keep a low prole, hoping to minimize public associations 
of the United States with the toxic oil. Soon, however, US Ambassador Charles 
Yost began to press the State Department to commit to a more robust American 
response. Yost’s position on this matter may have been due to his regular contact 
with Moroccan ocials, who pleaded for additional aid. It may also have been 
due to Yost’s view of Morocco’s strategic role in the Cold War.
At the strategic level, the American government was divided as to whether 
the priority in Morocco ought to be to preserve the bases, in order to ght the 
Soviets in World War III, or to mitigate anti-Americanism, in order to ght 
communist propaganda. The Truman administration had recognized that, in 
Europe, “the primary threat was not that the Soviet Union would seize territory 
through direct military intervention but that it would capitalize on economic 
and social unrest, expanding its power through subversion and manipulation.”81
For North Africa in the Eisenhower years, however, this remained a point of 
contention. The construction of new bases in Spain and plans for long-range 
nuclear bomber routes from the US diminished the need for the North African 
bases,82 but the resulting policy change was gradual and fraught. Base tenure of-
cially remained the top priority for US policy in Morocco into the early 1960s, 
although friction developed over this question both in Washington, between 
State and Defense, and in Rabat, between the Navy and the Embassy. Yost was 
an early advocate of the view that preserving the bases was less important than 
preserving a positive image of America among Moroccans.83 Yost’s prioritization 
of public opinion rather than base tenure seems to have aected his approach to 
the oil poisoning. Yost saw base tenure as expendable in the larger, “total” Cold 
War. From this perspective, a vigorous American contribution to relief eorts 
might draw attention to the origin of the toxic oil at Nouasser, but if it promoted 
favorable views toward Americans in general, then that might do more to thwart 
Soviet ambitions in North Africa than the Strategic Air Command’s bombers 
ever would.
Yost requested that the State Department approve the release of “Cold War” 
(Mutual Security Act) contingency funds, or, failing that, a smaller $50,000 
emergency fund, to assist with relief eorts. The Moroccan government, having 
learned of the jake poisoning epidemic in the 1930s, hoped that American exper-
tise could oer something beyond the grim prognosis provided by the European 
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doctors. 84 Indeed, experts at the Bellevue Medical Center suggested that suc-
cessful treatment was possible and recommended that the United States send 
an “expedition team” comprised of six specialists representing various branches 
of medicine and therapy.85 Yost argued that the United States would not make 
itself conspicuous by providing such aid: the International Red Cross had issued 
a global call for assistance, which had been publicized in the Moroccan press. 
He noted that the Austrian government had already pledged to provide a one 
hundred-bed hospital,86 and Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Britain, and Switzer-
land were sending physiotherapists.87 When, on December 3, 1959, Moroccan 
health minister Ben Abbes announced the details of the Leroy plan for the re-
habilitation of the victims, the enormity of the Moroccan need for assistance 
became more evident.88
In this light, the American response started to seem stingy. The Institute of 
Physical medicine and the American Red Cross were willing to send a medical 
survey team for two weeks, and the United States agreed to pay for transporta-
tion, but the World Health Organization had proceeded beyond mere evalua-
tion and needed a “semi-permanent treatment team,” which the American orga-
nizations were unable or unwilling to provide.89 US Air Force C-124s airli	ed 
the twelve-ton Austrian eld hospital to Morocco, and American Red Cross 
did provide a donation of $5,000, but in the critical area of medical personnel, 
the Americans came up short.90 The State Department took care, in its con-
tacts with the international Red Cross, to stress American reluctance to provide 
further aid and “to avoid any impression that the United States is prepared to 
contribute.”91 The Moroccan government complied with the American desire to 
keep a low prole, and no public or ocial request for aid was made to the Em-
bassy or the State Department. However, the international League of Red Cross 
Societies appealed to the American Red Cross for two complete eld hospitals, 
which American Red Cross president Alfred Gruenther urged the State Depart-
ment to provide, pointing out that thus far, the Europeans and Canadians had 
been providing all the personnel. The international Red Cross suggested that 
President Eisenhower’s upcoming visit to Morocco on December 22 might be 
the perfect occasion to announce such an American donation.92
Ambassador Yost repeatedly made the case for a more generous American 
response, pointing to the more generous responses of European countries and to 
the threat that the Soviet Union might seek to gain an advantage from the cri-
sis.93 Yost also argued that, while the Moroccan government had been silent on 
the issue of American culpability, the Moroccan press had not, and he nervously 
anticipated the return of Al-Istiqlal to the news shops: Mohamed Lyazidi, editor 
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of Al-Istiqlal, had indicated that his paper would demand an investigation into 
American responsibility when it resumed publication.94
Yost’s appeal for additional aid was complicated, however, by Eisenhower’s 
scheduled visit. Eisenhower was coming to Morocco as part of an “eleven-nation 
goodwill tour” intended to counter the publicity impact of Khrushchev’s visit to 
the US in September. The point of the tour was to counter Soviet propaganda 
and generate a positive image of the United States, and in Morocco, the US 
Information Agency had plans to make the most of Eisenhower’s visit using 
lm, radio, pamphlets, photographs, and window displays.95 The oil poisoning 
issue threatened to subvert the narrative that Eisenhower wanted to create: if 
Eisenhower announced the donation of American eld hospitals for Meknes, 
then the oil poisoning would dominate the headlines. The expected coincidence 
of the resumption of A-Istiqlal and the president’s tour was also unfortunate, for 
it assured that the focus would be on American culpability and not just Amer-
ican generosity. For these reasons, Yost recommended a “short postponement” 
of major American aid.96
Yost continued to be troubled, however, by the urgency of the human crisis 
and the inadequacy of the American response. Winter was setting in in Meknes, 
and on December 17, representatives of the health ministry contacted the Amer-
ican embassy and described the suering of the paralysis patients being housed 
and treated in tents. Yost urged the State Department to arrange to meet the 
Moroccan request for ten thousand each of long underwear, sweaters, wool blan-
kets, pajamas, and wool socks, ideally through the Red Cross.97 The American 
Red Cross soon arranged a shipment of sweatshirts and union suits from stores 
in Switzerland, but only a fraction of the number requested.98
What the international Red Cross rehabilitation program most desperately 
needed was personnel. However, the Americans were participating in the re-
habilitation program only minimally. The American Red Cross did arrange 
to send two nurses to Morocco but the fact that the Americans were sending 
no doctors or physiotherapists was noticeable, since the Red Cross societies of 
other Western countries had provided altogether a dozen doctors and thirty 
physiotherapists, as well as ten nurses. In the early months of the rehabilitation 
program, the American stang contribution was on par with that of Austria, 
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Norway, but was outstripped by the 
eorts of Canada, France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and Iraq.99 The American Red Cross cash donation of 
$6000 was more impressive, making up over half the total cash donations at the 
time, but it was less conspicuous, by design.100
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The return of Al-Istiqlal to publication on December 19 increased the politi-
cal pressure on the Americans, as expected, explicitly linking the oil poisoning 
to the American bases and to a general American disregard for Moroccan rights 
and sovereignty. Al-Istiqlal ’s December 19 article on the oil poisoning exempli-
ed the nationalist view that the American bases were colonial “enclaves” (im-
plicitly comparable to the Spanish enclaves at Septa, Melilla, and Ifni) although 
the article placed equal blame on the Moroccan state, as betted Istiqlal’s role as 
the political opposition.101
The Tide Turns
Four events soon transformed the landscape of American disaster diplomacy 
in Morocco: a treaty, a debarkation, an earthquake, and a trial. Together, these 
events brought an end to American reluctance to participate in the international 
medical response to the oil poisoning. First, at the end of December 1959, the 
Ibrahim government achieved a major success, reaching an agreement with 
America’s president Eisenhower for the evacuation of the US bases by 1963. 
This facilitated Moroccan relations with the United States and also solidied 
the nationalist credentials of both the monarchy and the Ibrahim government. 
The agreement did not end the need for US disaster diplomacy in Morocco, 
however, because the Americans still desired to negotiate a continuing military 
presence in Morocco under a dierent guise and needed to insure against pos-
sible demands for an earlier evacuation. 102 Nevertheless, the agreement meant 
that the nationalist opposition would largely shi	 its focus to the French bases 
and away from the role of the US. The editors of Al-Istiqlal announced the ad-
vent of a “new phase” of relations between Morocco and the United States and 
hoped that the example of the Americans would push the French and Spanish 
to make similar agreements.103 Protests in February 1960 focused on demands 
for French base evacuation, objections to the French atomic bomb tests, and 
Moroccan claims to the Algerian Sahara; the Americans were no longer in the 
crosshairs of nationalist politics.104 The US-Morocco agreement maintained the 
incentive for the United States to provide disaster assistance, while lessening the 
chance that the nationalist press or the government would attack the American 
military presence by invoking the origin of the toxic oil.
The second major event that altered American calculations was the material-
ization of responses to the disaster from the West’s Cold War enemies. Whereas 
Istiqlal had been pointing out the link between the health crisis and American 
bases, the international communist response had been muted. On January 4, 
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1960, David Nes at the American embassy expressed relief at the “puzzling” si-
lence of Soviet and Chinese ocials in Morocco, who seemed to be passing up a 
grand propaganda opportunity. Nevertheless, Nes argued that the potential re-
mained that the oil poisoning incident “could be used to channel the resentment 
and desperation of the great number of Moroccans aected—either directly as 
victims of paralysis or indirectly as indigents deprived of the support of bread-
winners—against the American military forces and installations in Morocco.”105
That same day, a Soviet ship, the Volkhovgen, sailed into the port of Casa-
blanca with nine tons of blankets, milk, and sugar for donation to the relief 
eort. The Soviets had entered the fray of disaster diplomacy in Morocco, giv-
ing credence to Yost’s warnings. The ship’s arrival provided an occasion for the 
Soviet captain and the Soviet ambassador to meet with Moroccan representa-
tives of the local Red Crescent chapter.106 The danger to American interests was 
compounded on January 5, 1960, when the minister of health in Qasim’s Iraq 
announced that Iraq was sending a “medical mission” to express the “solidarity 
of the Republic of Iraq…with the Arab peoples.”107 NATO had already lost their 
friends on the thrones of Egypt and Iraq, and American fears of Qasim’s ties to 
the Soviet Union were at their peak. Although neither the Soviets nor the Iraqis 
seemed to be publicly emphasizing America’s causal role in the tragedy, the com-
bination of Soviet and Iraqi activity and American inactivity concerned Yost. 
However, it also presented him with an opportunity: Yost now had signicant 
new evidence to bolster his argument for increased disaster assistance.108
However, although the US-Morocco agreement on base evacuation and the 
arrival of Soviet and Iraqi aid incentivized and facilitated a more generous US 
response to the oil poisoning, US policy directives continued to inhibit that 
response. Disaster assistance funds from the State Department’s Cold War “Mu-
tual Assistance” program account were only authorized for “meeting immedi-
ate needs.” This short-term assistance was meant to “obtain maximum political 
and psychological impact in meeting the immediate disaster situation and to 
forestall possible need for greater expenditures for other, slower forms of as-
sistance.”109 Long-term assistance to the Red Cross physiotherapy program for 
paralysis victims was a poor t for this State Department policy of concentrating 
aid where it was most noticeable and most temporary. When, in January 1960, 
the International Red Cross rehabilitation program faced a critical shortage of 
vehicles to transport therapists and outpatients in rural areas, Yost hoped that 
this might be an opportunity for the United States to more actively curry the 
favor of the Moroccan public. The embassy once again pled with the State De-
partment for a generous response, proposing that the State Department arrange 
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for the Department of Defense to not only provide vehicles but also mainte-
nance for them as well. Yost reminded the State Department that the oil poi-
soning was still being covered in the Moroccan press.110
Yost was informed, however that the “Cold War” fund was “currently being 
reviewed,” and hence “unavailable,” and that disaster relief funds could not be 
authorized for uses other than “immediate and temporary relief.”111 Although 
this decision was inuenced by the looming threat of Congressional budget cuts, 
it was also part of an overall strategy of concentrating aid where it would be most 
visible, to the press as well as the public. Moreover, the principle that publicity 
should not be obviously related to its political purpose made the provision of 
vehicles directly from the US bases particularly problematic.
On the a	ernoon of February 29, 1960, Yost once again sent a telegram to 
the State Department, reporting that the Moroccan cabinet director for Public 
Health, Abdel Hamid Ben Yaklef, had again reached out to the Embassy, stress-
ing the “urgent need” for vehicles, and Yost lamented the view of Moroccan 
ocials that “the US is uncharacteristically at the tail end of the procession 
providing help for the oil victims.”112 That night, Agadir collapsed.
Agadir’s Loss, Meknes’ Gain
The earthquake struck Agadir shortly before midnight. News of the disaster 
reached Rabat, Paris, and Washington within hours, based on reports issued by 
radio from the French military base on the outskirts of the city. It was immedi-
ately clear that the devastation to the city and the surrounding area was enor-
mous: estimates of the death toll soon rose to twelve thousand and continued 
to climb. When the quake hit, French airmen from the naval base a few miles 
away arrived quickly. On March 2, a French eet arrived, as a well as a Dutch 
naval cruiser, along with American sailors from Port Lyautey, and airmen from 
the Strategic Air Command bases. Late at night on March 3, the USS Newport 
News arrived from Italy. The Americans brought with them heavy machinery 
for excavation.113 In sharp contrast to the oil disaster, the American response to 
the earthquake was immediate and vigorous.
Even more than the US-Morocco base agreement or the arrival of the Soviet 
and Iraqi aid, the Agadir earthquake transformed the politics of disaster relief in 
Morocco. The Agadir disaster, similar in scale to the oil poisoning but fresh and 
with greater lethality, created competition for aid resources, and the Red Cross 
immediately diverted personnel, equipment, and supplies from the paralysis re-
habilitation project to Agadir.114 However, the earthquake provided US ocials 
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in Morocco an opportunity to overcome any ill will created by the American 
sale of toxic oil as well as any perceptions of stinginess in the American response. 
The earthquake, unlike the oil poisoning, allowed the Americans an opportu-
nity to be innocent, helpful, and brave. It also altered the culture, habits, and 
budget of American aid in Morocco, changing the American response to the oil 
tragedy.
Analysts have been divided on the role that American disaster relief eorts 
played in the diplomacy of the time. In 1964, political scientist I. William Zart-
man argued that American disaster aid had been ineective as diplomacy aimed 
at preserving base tenure because aid benetted the masses, but decisions were 
made by an isolated elite. Yet the diplomatic archives now available to histori-
ans reveal that Moroccan government ministers were putting pressure on Yost 
with their repeated requests for American aid. This suggests that the ministerial 
class was not as indierent to the well-being of the disaster victims as Zartman 
believed. However, there is little to contradict Zartman’s assertion that good 
relations with ministers with portfolios such as Public Health and Public Works 
had little impact on the Moroccan Foreign Ministry.115 As Zartman noted, the 
nationalist attack on the bases was ideological, in that it was conceived within 
the context of anti-imperialism and based on questions of sovereignty and legal-
ity. The American bases had to be evacuated as part of the logic of decoloniza-
tion: they were Moroccan territory that had to be reclaimed. Consequently, ac-
cidental harm or humanitarian benet were largely beside the point. This made 
the oil incident less damaging to the Americans than they might have feared, but 
it also made humanitarian aid less eective in winning over either the relevant 
government ministers or the political opposition.
However, as Leon Borden Blair has argued, there was a parallel channel of 
diplomacy between the Navy and Crown Prince Hassan, not least Blair’s own 
personal diplomacy. Blair’s prominent position in the earthquake response as the 
embassy’s representative in Agadir, “with instructions to coordinate and direct 
the American eort,”116 combined with his close relationship with Hassan, sug-
gests that American earthquake relief was not entirely disconnected from the 
American diplomatic successes concerning the bases. These successes consisted 
not only of securing a continued role for the Navy at Port Lyautey, under the 
cover of a “Training Command,”117 but also the ability of the Air Force to remain 
at the bases until the agreed-upon deadline in 1963, which was by no means cer-
tain at the beginning of 1960.
Yet base tenure may not be an appropriate rubric for measuring the success of 
American disaster diplomacy in Cold War Morocco. Even if the United States 
Poison, Paralysis, and the United States in Morocco, 1959 103 
had won over the hearts and minds of the Moroccan government ministers (or, 
as Blair believed he had, the Palace), American disaster response eorts were in-
sucient to deate public criticism of the American military presence. As early 
as March 10, Istiqlal was once again protesting “sequels of colonialism,” arguing 
that American relief eorts, however welcome, were undermined by American 
unwillingness to evacuate the bases before the agreed deadline of 1963.118 The 
Embassy was uninterested in pushing for the preservation of the Air Force bases 
in the face of public hostility, and saw base tenure as secondary to the goals 
of rescuing America’s image in Morocco and bolstering the legitimacy of the 
pro-American monarchy.119
Of Fish and Angels
Whether the earthquake served as a “tipping point” in the diplomacy surround-
ing the American bases is debatable, but the earthquake certainly served as a 
critical juncture or tipping point in the American politics regarding aid for the 
toxic oil victims. 120 Unlike the poisoning incident, the needs of the earthquake 
victims were for immediate, short-term aid, and the images that earthquake re-
lief oered were purely positive: American soldiers bravely performing rescue 
work, in contrast to the feared images of Moroccans crippled by American poi-
sons undergoing painful physical rehabilitation.
The Agadir disaster also diered from the oil poisoning in that it was suit-
able for that other aspect of the American “total Cold War”—the cultivation 
of US domestic public opinion and congressional support. Although, unlike 
France, the United States was not (yet) bogged down in a war of decolonization, 
funding for foreign aid (both military and non-military) through the Mutual 
Security program was under attack by a group of congressmen led by Louisiana 
representative Otto Passman, whose erce opposition to foreign aid since 1953 
was approaching fruition. The Eisenhower administration feared that Congress 
would impose disastrous budget cuts.121 The earthquake struck just as Congress 
was about to begin hearings on the Mutual Security program.
At the hearings, both supporters and critics of the program noted their con-
stituents’ distaste for foreign aid spending. But the Agadir earthquake provided 
an opportunity for supporters of the program to argue that more aid was needed. 
The ongoing rescue eorts in Agadir were brought up during the testimony of 
Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon on March 3. Rep. James Fulton of 
Pennsylvania suggested that the $260,000 released by the State Department to 
fund rescue eorts was inadequate for a disaster of such magnitude and also 
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suggested that more publicity was needed for such eorts in the US, to create 
public support for foreign aid. Fulton also argued that the US would win more 
loyal friendship abroad in situations where it provided visible aid directly to the 
people. In Fulton’s words, “If an angel hands you some food you are certainly 
surprised and gratied and you thank heaven. But if you are walking along the 
seashore and you pick up a sh, it is you who has found it, because there is no par-
ticular source of it and you don’t thank anyone.” On the subject of US domestic 
publicity, Fulton suggested that more needed to be done: the “top angels” needed 
to get involved.122 These concerns were echoed in the Senate hearings, where 
supporters of the program stated that there was a need to inform the public of 
the magnitude of need in the developing countries, and also that aid might be 
better channeled directly to the people rather than through o	en distasteful re-
gimes.123 The Agadir catastrophe was perfect for both Moroccan and American 
consumption: an opportunity for dramatic, short-term aid provided directly by 
the Americans to the people of Morocco, with plenty of opportunities to involve 
the domestic American public as well. A	er Dillon’s exchange with Fulton at 
the House hearings, the State Department immediately doubled the earthquake 
relief funds to $500,000, to reimburse Defense for goods and services, in order 
to assure that military relief eorts could continue.124 In March, $1.5 million 
was designated for Agadir in a “Foreign Disaster Emergency Relief Account.”125
Meanwhile, charity drives were organized by private and public agencies across 
America (including a Navy clothing drive named “Angels for Agadir.”) Within 
days, donations of basic relief goods such as tents and blankets (from Europe and 
Tunisia as well as from the US) were in excess of what was needed.
As supplies and funds owed into Morocco, Yost saw an opportunity to re-
verse the American reticence in supporting the rehabilitation of toxic oil victims. 
Yost complained to the Secretary of State that American inaction on the Red 
Cross request for vehicles was becoming “more and more embarrassing.”126 Al-
though the State Department was unwilling to approve additional funds for the 
oil poisoning response, the Air Force expected that its earthquake relief expenses 
would fall short of the $1.5 million account designated for the purpose. Conse-
quently, $16,000 was authorized on April 6 for use for the toxic oil response. 
This was a small sum, but its impact was magnied by the USAF’s cooperation 
in designating vehicles and hospital supplies as surplus, allowing the US Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency to obtain them at 10 percent of their normal value.127
On March 8 the US International Cooperation Administration oce agreed to 
fund the transportation cost of a team of American therapists out of its “techni-
cal support” budget.128 The gates of US aid were starting to open.
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The Trial
The trial of twenty-four men accused in the oil poisoning case began on April 
11, 1960, and constituted another major turning point in the international di-
plomacy surrounding the disaster. In its coverage of the trial, Al-Istiqlal again 
targeted the failures of the Moroccan state, arguing that, whatever penalty the 
accused might receive, real justice would demand that the government ocials 
who had failed to prevent the disaster should also be held responsible. In contrast 
to its earlier reporting, however, Al-Istiqlal now shi	ed blame away from the 
American airbases. Al-Istiqlal ’s article on the trial stated that the oil, when origi-
nally sold, had been clearly labeled as jet engine lubricant: “in white letters, on a 
green background, one could read: ‘Lubricating Oil Ancraf Gaz Turbine Engine’ 
[sic, in English], huile lubriant d’avion à la reaction. There was, therefore, no 
ambiguity about its purpose.”129 This provided context and corroboration for 
the testimony of Mohammed Bennani, the original purchaser of the American 
oil and a dealer in automobile parts and engine oil. Bennani, quoted at length in 
Al-Istiqlal, stated that the sign on his warehouse proclaimed, in words a meter 
high, “oil and grease for automobiles.” Bennani argued that Ahmed ben Hadj 
Abdallah, the customer who had repurposed the toxic oil as a comestible, was 
“only one of hundreds” of customers who bought oil from him, that no merchant 
could be expected to verify the uses to which his customers put his wares. Fur-
thermore, Bennani argued that he had sold the oil
in its original packaging: U.S. Army. I bought this oil by lots, according to 
the rules of sale by auction by submitting a bid to the seller, in this case the 
USAF. I paid customs on this merchandise. If by having sold this oil that 
I had bought, which I sold in complete ignorance of what my customers 
might do with it, is a crime or infraction, then I think that the commander 
of the American base who sold it to me is in the same position as I am, and 
logically speaking he should be at my side on the bench of the accused. 130
The court was not interested in pursuing the defense’s rhetorical attempt to 
put the US Air Force on trial, as Bennani undoubtedly knew. Not only had the 
Americans agreed to evacuate the bases, they had also become an important 
supplier of various forms of aid to Morocco, lessening Morocco’s dependence 
on France. When a defense attorney asked, “by virtue of what convention did 
the Americans have the right to sell in our country dangerous materials such as 
the oil that has caused this great catastrophe?” the advocate general intervened, 
saying, “address this question to the Foreign ministry. This question is outside of 
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the authority of this tribunal.”131 The court agreed. The court also dismissed the 
defense’s objections to irregularities in the trial procedure (“It is not the oil that 
is adulterated, it is the trial!” one defense attorney reportedly protested), and 
refused to allow the defense to call expert witnesses or to present as witnesses 
victims of the oil poisoning who had recovered from its eects.132
Five of the accused, wholesalers in Meknes, Casablanca, and Fes, were sen-
tenced to death; they were held responsible for using the jet engine oil bought 
from Bennani to adulterate vegetable oil in large quantities for sale to grocers. 
Three others were sentenced to life in prison. Judgment on the sellers of hair 
oil was deferred pending further inquiry. Bennani, however, was acquitted of 
all charges.133 For the victims, the Aaire des Huiles was far from over. For the 
Americans, however, the outcome of the trial was a tremendous source of relief, 
removing lingering concerns about culpability.134
By the time of the verdict, the Red Cross had grown impatient with the US 
and purchased from private sources a number of three-ton trucks to transport 
patients; the French had also donated ambulances. However, there was still a 
shortage of medical supplies, since the US had, at that point, declined to donate 
eld hospitals and the idea of supplying goods à la carte from base surpluses 
had not come to fruition. A	er the trial, however, the procurement of USAF 
medical supplies by the International Cooperation Association Mission was 
soon approved, and 75 tons of hospital equipment were donated and delivered 
on June 13. American ocials were pleased to note that the event was covered 
in the press.135
Conclusion
The conundrums of American disaster diplomacy in Morocco revolved around 
American and Moroccan attempts to assess the political implications of the 1959 
oil poisoning’s complex origins. This disaster could not be easily attributed to 
the culpability of a single human agent, but was rather the consequence of Ben-
nett’s “distributive agency” or what epidemiologists call a “web of causation.”136
American responses to the disaster were shaped by American uncertainties 
about how Moroccans would interpret this murky causality. The acquittal of 
Mohamed Bennani helped to alleviate this uncertainty, producing an author-
itative Moroccan rejection of the chain of events that could be traced back to 
American culpability. Even before the trial, however, the earthquake at Agadir 
had transformed the calculus and the culture of American disaster assistance in 
Morocco, liberating American ocials to respond more eectively to the needs 
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of the toxic oil victims. It was not just the budget for disaster relief that was 
liberated: a	er February 29, 1960, there were no more expressions of concern 
that American aid might invite thought of American culpability. In the minds 
of American policymakers, American aid no longer needed to be explained or 
excused: the images of American soldiers rescuing earthquake victims (displayed 
prominently in US publicity in Morocco)137 had changed expectations.
French and American disaster aid in Morocco was both motivated and dis-
torted by disaster diplomacy concerns, as decisions were made based on pub-
licity value rather than on the needs of the victims. In the end, thanks to the 
transformation brought about by the US-Morocco base agreement, the arrival 
of Soviet and Iraqi aid, the Agadir earthquake, and the outcome of the trial, the 
Americans made a respectable contribution to the international rehabilitation 
eort for oil victims. By the end of the rehabilitation program, which lasted until 
June 1961, the US had contributed not only a substantial amount of critically 
needed equipment but also the expertise of two American nurses, ve doctors, 
twelve physiotherapists, and one secretary, typically for six months, or more, for 
the non-doctors.
France, in contrast, contributed only two doctors, four therapists, and a nurse 
to the Red Cross eort, who were in residence only one or two months at a 
time.138 Although French sta at the military hospital in Meknes also treated 
patients, the Moroccan government was billed for a portion of the costs.139 Al-
though the Eisenhower administration’s agreement to evacuate US bases by 1963 
placed France at a public relations disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States and 
created an additional incentive for French aid, the war in Algeria was consum-
ing French resources, making it dicult for France to compete with the United 
States in the realm of disaster diplomacy.
As with the Algerian earthquakes of September 1954 and the Malpasset Dam 
collapse of 1959, responses to the Morocco oil poisoning were inseparable from 
the politics of decolonization. Just as the political struggles over Algeria’s rela-
tion to France shaped responses to the Chélif and Fréjus catastrophes, responses 
to the oil poisoning by the Moroccan, American, and French states, and by the 
Moroccan political opposition, revolved around the question of whether Mo-
rocco was truly sovereign over the land occupied by foreign military bases, the 
most obvious vestige of colonial rule. The disaster politics surrounding the af-
termath of the Agadir earthquake and the reconstruction of Agadir were, mean-
while, opening new elds of political contestation in Morocco and in France.
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Death, Diplomacy, and Reconstruction in Agadir, 1960
The earthquake that struck Agadir late at night on February 28, 1960, led to the deaths of twelve thousand to twenty thousand people. The densely populated Kasbah, high on a hill overlooking the south-fac-
ing bay and known to the Tashelhit-speaking population as Agadir Oufella was 
almost totally obliterated. The Founti quarter adjacent to the beach below also 
sustained very heavy damage, as did the Talborj, an ethnically-mixed commer-
cial and residential district situated on a plateau to the east of the Kasbah, as 
well as Ihchach, a village on the northern outskirts of the city. The Anza district 
to the west and the Ville Nouvelle to the east were damaged to a lesser degree; 
farther east, the industrial district and the French aero-naval base were largely 
unscathed. To many observers, however, there was an impression of almost total 
destruction. Mohamed Taïba Benhima, who would soon be appointed governor 
of Agadir, later described the scene: “At first sight, everything in Agadir built 
of reinforced concrete, buildings, mighty super-structure, was on the ground. I 
will go further: everything that was on the ground was twisted, tormented; from 
the pier of the port, however well-anchored, to the road network that the seismic 
shock had literally twisted.”1
The impact of this seismic event on human history was shaped by the legacy 
of French imperialism. In February 1960, Agadir, like the rest of Morocco, was 
still in the midst of decolonization, four years after formal independence. The 
demographics of the city had been shifting as French colonists “repatriated” to 
metropolitan France and to Algeria, but the French presence remained unmis-
takable. The 1960 earthquake was a cataclysmic environmental intervention in 
the decolonization process. The disaster precipitated a fresh exodus of the French 
population and offered a test of the French state’s commitment to its overseas 
citizens. Simultaneously, the earthquake challenged the Moroccan state’s ability 
to provide for the needs of the people. The increasingly authoritarian Moroccan 
monarchy took this opportunity to increase its power and prestige within the 
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Moroccan political field. The monarchy also made use of American aid to lessen 
the Moroccan state’s dependence on the French, another example of “disaster di-
plomacy” that does not fit the paradigm of hostile states growing closer through 
disaster response.2 Because of the prominent role of the United States in the 
disaster response and in planning for the reconstruction of the city, the Agadir 
disaster seemed to strengthen American relations with Morocco while weak-
ening French influence. Consequently, the disaster became a focus of anxiety 
for French officials and politicians worried about France’s declining role in the 
former protectorate, the future of French colonists in post-imperial spaces, and 
the post-disaster reconstruction of those spaces. The political contestation that 
followed the earthquake did not just concern the future of those who survived, 
however: the enormous numbers of the dead posed particular problems. After 
the earthquake, the treatment and disposal of the festering dead was intimately 
tied to controversies over power and boundaries in the postcolonial city. Even 
after the immediate disposal of corpses, French attempts to seek the repatriation 
of remains created new points of friction as the meanings of these burials and 
exhumations were created and negotiated. In both the disposal of the dead and 
the reconstruction of a new city for the living, the disaster became connected to 
the struggle to work out the meaning of decolonization.
In the hours of chaos and grief immediately following the disaster, survivors 
struggled to free their family members and neighbors from the ruins and to 
treat the injured as best they could. French and American sources (diplomatic 
correspondence, memoirs, and journalism) emphasize the role of French and 
American troops in the disaster response and tended to portray Moroccans as 
passive and helpless. However, Moroccan memoirs describe survivors engaging 
in organized rescue efforts. According to Tariq Kabbage, who was twelve years 
old in 1960, his father, local landowner Abbès Kabbage, organized nearby farm-
ers to bring workers and tractors to assist in the immediate rescue efforts; in 
the Kasbah, survivors reportedly organized themselves and began rescue efforts 
during the night of the disaster.3 As in Orléansville, however, the local authori-
ties seem to have been unable to respond effectively. The gendarmerie and police 
barracks had collapsed in the earthquake, killing many; other would-be first 
responders had died in their homes with their families or were searching for 
family members. The Royal Moroccan Army troops in the city had taken heavy 
losses. The Moroccan governor, Bouamrani, had lost several family members. In 
contrast, the French aero-naval base on the eastern edge of the city was largely 
untouched, and the commander immediately initiated operations for the rescue 
of the living, and the disposal of the dead.4
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Soon, however, the Moroccan state took charge. In the morning, King Mo-
hammed V and Crown Prince Hassan arrived by plane from Rabat, along with 
Colonel Mohammed Ouir. The king put Hassan in command of rescue op-
erations as Moroccan troops began to arrive from throughout the kingdom, 
followed by American, Dutch, and Spanish soldiers and sailors, and French 
reinforcements. Ouir was responsible for the refugee camps; he would later, 
as minister of the Interior, command the Moroccan state’s repressive security 
apparatus during Hassan’s reign as king.5
In a statement to the nation, the king presented the royal family as leaders of 
the disaster response:
A great and terrible catastrophe has struck our country. A horrible cata-
clysm has destroyed the city of Agadir, made its inhabitants victims, and le	 
it in ruins. Language is incapable of describing this calamity. It is not the 
hour for words, for those whom God has saved await your acts of solidarity, 
not your tears and words. We have charged our crown prince Hassan with 
directing the rescue and emergency operations. Likewise, we have charged 
Princess Aïcha with organizing a campaign of solidarity throughout the 
entire kingdom and to collect donations for the victims. We have also allo-
cated the funds necessary for the immediate response. Human, religious, 
and national duty demands of each person to come to the aid of our broth-
ers, survivors of the martyred city, and bring them all forms of assistance, 
cash and otherwise, thus manifesting his solidarity and accomplishing at 
the same time his obligations, both religious and national.6 
Patriotic, moral, and religious duties were thus to be united in service of the 
king. During the years of the struggle for independence, the monarchy and the 
nationalist political parties, particularly Istiqlal, had depended on each other. 
In contrast, the years of disaster, 1959 to 1960, were pivotal in the development 
of the authoritarian monarchy, and both the oil poisoning and the earthquake 
facilitated this development, as Ibrahim’s ministerial government was sidelined.7
Less than three months later, the king would take charge of the government 
directly, appointing himself prime minister, with Hassan as deputy-premier and 
minister of defense.8
For three days a	er the earthquake, under the direction of Hassan, Moroccan 
soldiers worked alongside foreign troops to rescue the survivors, and the troops 
commanded by Colonel Ouir established refugee tent cities for at least fourteen 
thousand Moroccans outside the of city limits.9 European survivors had dierent 
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options: the French military base became a makeshi	 refugee camp for over three 
thousand Europeans. The base also provided medical treatment to injured Mo-
roccans, but the guards turned away uninjured Moroccan refugees.10 Conditions 
in the Moroccan camps was less than ideal: despite the distribution of aid by 
the Red Cross, Ahmed Bouskous, who survived the disaster as a teenager, would 
recall the “inhumane conditions” of these camps.11 Later, temporary prefabri-
cated housing for the displaced Moroccan population was established in the areas 
around the existing workforce housing of the two industrial zones in Agadir.12
Meanwhile, thousands lay dead, buried in the rubble. In the immediate af-
termath of the earthquake, the handling of the dead was inseparable from the 
rescue of survivors, as bodies were dug out of the ruins. There was an eort 
to segregate bodies by nationality and religion, but the diculty of identifying 
many corpses sometimes made this impossible, with the result that some mass 
graves included both Muslims and non-Muslims, Moroccans and French. Most 
bodies identied as French, or of unidentied European origin, were initially 
brought to the French military base. A tent was erected to shelter hundreds 
of arriving cadavers, which were then buried in communal graves in what had 
been the athletic eld, wrapped in sheets or placed in crates or armoires scav-
enged from ruined homes.13 Moroccan dead were brought primarily to Ihchach, 
where French marines dug a large mass grave; soon hundreds of Moroccan bod-
ies awaited burial there.14 Thousands more were never recovered. Seventy-eight 
Moroccan Muslims were buried at the French base, most likely a	er arriving 
there alive, brought for medical treatment that proved to be in vain.15
Soon, the bodies of the dead began to be seen as a threat to public health. 
Crown Prince Hassan feared that the putrefying dead would soon produce ep-
idemics of cholera and typhoid, and the authorities cordoned o the disaster 
area, evacuating survivors from what became known as the “dead city,” which 
was blanketed with quicklime. (The possibility of dropping napalm on the ruins 
was reportedly discussed, provoking some alarm, but came to nothing.) The fear 
of pestilence meant that the treatment of the dead was as great a priority as the 
rescue of survivors. Hassan ordered a halt to rescue operations a	er three days, 
a decision which outraged both Moroccan and foreign residents and observers, 
and which was soon reversed, allowing for the rescue of a few more victims over 
the course of the following seven days.16 A	er that, thoughts turned toward as-
sisting the survivors, recovering the remaining bodies of the dead, and rebuild-
ing the city. None of these tasks could be accomplished without grappling with 
the meaning of decolonization.
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Diplomacy’s Discontents
The fears, frustrations, and resentments of decolonization and the Cold War 
permeated international public responses to the disaster. For advocates of the 
French empire, the earthquake unleashed resentments and fears related to grow-
ing American inuence and the decline of French hegemony in Morocco. Mean-
while, critics of French imperialism suspected malfeasance by the French state. A 
month a	er the disaster, the president of Liberia, William Tubman, accused the 
French of causing the earthquake by conducting a nuclear arms test at Reggane 
in the Algerian Sahara on February 13.17 This idea was also reected in a memoir 
by a French ocer at the base outside Agadir, who described the arrival of Mo-
roccans at the base immediately a	er the earthquake who had come to express 
anger at the French, which the ocer attributed to a Moroccan belief that the 
atomic tests had caused the earthquake.18
Both French and American diplomats hoped that disaster aid would bring 
“political benet,”19 particularly regarding the issue of base tenure. The inter-
national character of the disaster response was shaped not only by the legacy 
of French colonialism but also by the consequence of the Cold War geopoliti-
cal situation: the American military presence at Port Lyautey and three Strate-
gic Air Command airbases meant that American as well as French forces had 
played a prominent role in the immediate response, alongside Royal Moroccan 
Army troops. As in the case of the oods of December 1958 and January 1960, 
those French and American ocials who hoped to use disaster response to fos-
ter goodwill were disappointed when the resulting publicity fell short of expec-
tations. Competing to gain public relations capital in the Moroccan political 
market, both French and American diplomats complained that their NATO 
ally was suppressing information. The French embassy in Rabat complained that 
the Moroccan press gave full treatment only to American earthquake relief, a 
fact which ocials attributed to the more accommodating policy of the United 
States regarding base evacuation.20 In addition, a daily paper in Tangiers, Es-
paña, had run photographs of military rescue eorts provided by the US Con-
sul General there; one of these photos depicted French sailors and airmen, but 
they were not identied, and the credit caption “U.S. Navy” seemed misleading. 
An American diplomat meanwhile accused the Agence France-Presse and the 
French-language papers of Casablanca of giving short shri	 to American contri-
butions.21 The French also hoped that their eorts in Agadir would earn good 
publicity elsewhere in Africa, but expressed disappointment when the press in 
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Accra, forged in the anti-colonial struggle, failed to mention French disaster 
assistance when covering Agadir.22 
Both the Moroccan opposition press and the Palace were quick to capitalize 
on the apparent crassness of French hopes that gratitude for disaster aid would 
translate into the extension of French base tenure. Information Minister Ahmed 
el Alaoui stated that “Aid from a foreign country in such a catastrophe does not 
mean the foreign country has a right to bases there.”23 The Istiqlal opposition 
party’s Arabic-language daily, Al Alam, was more acerbic, stating that, if disaster 
aid were to result in permission to maintain bases, then it was the Americans and 
Spanish who should keep their bases, since, according to the paper, these coun-
tries had played the largest role in rescue eorts. Moreover, the paper asserted 
sarcastically that Moroccans might as well invite Italy and West Germany to 
establish bases, since they, too, had provided aid.24 The weekly Al-Istiqlal called 
upon Moroccans to remain focused on nationalist priorities despite the earth-
quake, citing the importance of not only base evacuation but also Moroccan 
support for the cause of Algerian independence and the pursuit of Moroccan 
control of the Sahara—the latter cause made more urgent by the French atomic 
testing “in our territory.”25
To the dismay of would-be disaster diplomats, voices of discord soon emerged 
among the French. In Orléansville and Fréjus in the 1950s, advocates of empire 
had stressed solidarity between the European French and the Algerians, who 
had recently been declared fully equal citizens of France. Journalists and com-
mentators such as Gaston Bonheur had o	en added their voices to the ocial 
chorus of solidarity. Because Morocco was independent, there was less French 
motivation to present a public face of solidarity, resulting in hostile polemics in 
the press.
Tangier, the most international of Moroccan cities, became a focal point of 
French anxieties. Far from the carnage, resentments about France’s new relation-
ship with Morocco erupted, resentments which centered on the apparent lack 
of a sense of dependence on the part of the Moroccan leadership, and on fears of 
France’s declining inuence vis-à-vis other foreign powers in the kingdom. On 
March 3, Pierre Bouanais, the French minister plenipotentiary at the Tangier 
consulate, accused Radiodiusion Marocaine of “disloyalty,” for “systematically 
minimizing the contributions of the French armed forces in organizing relief.”26 
Bouanais also resented the lack of coverage given by the Agence-France Press, 
which, in his view, should have devoted less front-page space to Sekou Toure’s 
visit with Mohammed V, and more to the Catholic mass for the dead celebrated 
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at the French church in Tangier. Bouanais blamed this on the “Moroccaniza-
tion” of the agency’s sta.27
Bouanais’s complaints went beyond the frustrations of underpublicized di-
saster diplomacy, however. A speech by Crown Prince Hassan declared that a 
new Agadir would be inaugurated on March 2, 1961, and connected this inau-
guration with the ve-year anniversary of Morocco’s independence. Bouanais 
alleged that French colonists interpreted this as a continuation of Moroccan 
“anti-French excitation campaigns.” 28 According to Bouanais, the French of 
Tangier had “reacted forcefully” against this alleged ingratitude, with the result 
that their “initial grand élan of solidarity with all the victims” became more “nu-
anced,” and the French community very quickly shi	ed their generosity toward 
the goal of assisting only the French disaster victims, making it dicult to coor-
dinate relief collection eorts with the Moroccan authorities. Bouanais linked 
the purportedly new “cleavage” between Moroccans and foreigners to anxieties 
about the new French relationship with the whole Arab world, “where Islam 
reigns, where the forces of pan-Arabism are unleashed.” Bouanais also stated 
that suspicions about religious discrimination in the distribution of donations 
had been expressed by Moroccan Jews and were shared by the French as well.29
French colonists, according to Bouanais, deplored what they saw as the hos-
tility and incompetence of the Moroccan state, characterized by “panic and inef-
ciency” as well as by publicity-seeking egotism. (How colonists in Tangier were 
well-placed to judge the emergency response in the Moroccan south remains 
unclear.) The French minister concluded that the root of the problem was “the 
power of the word in Arab countries,” and the “illusion” that words could sub-
stitute for eective government.30 The ideas expressed by Bouanais were not 
new: they echoed old colonial discourses about threats to French dominance. 
Accusations of “verbalism” had been a common disparagement of dissidents who 
challenged French power in the colonies.31
By March 12 the uproar in Tangier had reached Paris. Senator Bernard Lafay 
of the center-le	 Gauche démocratique formally asked whether the Ministry of 
Foreign Aairs might request that the Red Cross conduct an inquiry into the 
“hesitations” and “counter-orders” that had resulted in the deaths of individuals, 
buried in the ruins, who might have been saved by quick and resolute action.32
Going beyond Bouanais’s vague assertions of state “incompetence,” and La-
fay’s thinly veiled implication, Paris Jour explicitly accused Prince Hassan of 
misconduct for his decision to halt rescue operations on the third day a	er the 
earthquake.33 Al-Istiqlal responded by accusing Lafay and the French press not 
only of insensitivity toward Moroccan suering but also of violating Moroccan 
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sovereignty by questioning the handling of internal aairs. When catastrophe 
had struck Fréjus, the paper noted, Moroccans had sent donations without med-
dling in French domestic matters.34 
On March 30, Europe-Magazine in Brussels put forward still more acerbic 
accusations of Moroccan incompetence, alleging that Moroccan troops had ar-
rived tardily on the scene and had “accomplished practically nothing except issue 
lamentations and implore Allah” while French, American, and Dutch troops 
engaged in rescue eorts. The article went on to mock Moroccan ambitions for 
base evacuation, despite the role played by the bases in rescue eorts, and ridi-
culed plans for the reconstruction of Agadir (“With what money? Undoubtedly 
with ours, and that of the other European powers, and America.”) Hassan was 
accused of self-aggrandizement in pursuit of personal popularity in a country 
where he was “unanimously detested.”35 Similar arguments were expressed in 
still stronger terms in Le Figaro by André Figueres, who stated that more lives 
would have been saved “if the rescue work had been directed by someone seri-
ous.” Figueres singled out the thirty-year-old Hassan, stating that the “panic 
and nonchalance of a ridiculous adolescent had condemned people to death, 
undoubtedly including French families.”36 Figueres blamed the French le	 for 
handing over power to such incompetents: the problem, for him, was inherent 
in decolonization, which spelled doom for the accomplishments of the colonial 
period. For French diplomats, however, the anti-Moroccan sentiment exhibited 
in the wake of the disaster threatened French interests. The minister-counsellor 
at the French embassy, Le Roy, pointed out that Crown Prince Hassan was one 
of France’s most important allies within the Moroccan government, and that 
by attacking him, the French press was playing into the hands of the Palace’s 
opponents, presumably meaning the Istiqlal party that was demanding the im-
mediate evacuation of the French military bases. Moreover, Le Roy feared that 
these attacks might undermine any possibility that the positive role played by 
the French base in Agadir would lessen the king’s support for their evacuation.37
French Survivors and the Decline of Empire
Soon, criticisms emanating from French politicians and journalists shi	ed their 
targets from the Moroccan monarchy to the French state, and from unnecessary 
deaths to the alleged neglect of the living. Two years before the independence 
of Algeria in 1962, when the stream of repatriated colonists would become a 
ood, hostility toward an independent North Africa was already linked to the 
concerns of repatriated French refugees, as it would be in the politics of the far 
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right in France for the next four decades. Lafay became a supporter of victims’ 
organizations in Agadir,38 and an article by General Bethouart titled “Le scan-
dale d’Agadir” appeared in Le Figaro, contrasting the “magnicent” French res-
cue eort immediately a	er the earthquake to inadequate aid for survivors who 
hoped to reestablish their lives and livelihoods. Bethouart acknowledged that 
funds had been dispersed by the embassy, but the general pointed out that these 
met only the most immediate needs. Existing procedures for the disbursement 
of unsecured loans were being accelerated, but Bethouart argued that these ex-
isting programs failed to meet the unique needs of Agadir survivors. The gen-
eral supported proposals providing indemnities for “reconstitution de foyer,” the 
reestablishment of residences, but so far the government had failed to approve 
such measures.39
Bethouart’s editorial drew attention to three key distinctions. First, by com-
paring the “magnicent” immediate response with the inadequate post-disaster 
aid, the general was implicitly drawing a contrast between the heroism of the 
military and the ineectiveness of the civilian government. Second, Bethouart 
noted that “there are two sorts of victims: those who desire to remain in Morocco 
and those returning to France.” For the former group, Bethouart allowed that it 
might be necessary to wait until the Moroccan government had announced its 
policies before France could act. But for the latter, the decolonized, such delay 
constituted neglect.40
Third, Bethouart accused the French government of a double standard with 
regard to French citizens. According to Bethouart, the French state privileged 
the survivors of the Orléansville and Fréjus catastrophes while neglecting French 
citizens in Agadir: “For the administration, the French victims of cataclysm oc-
curring abroad have rights to nothing . . . . There are thus two categories of 
French, treated dierently: those of the metropole or overseas departments and 
those in foreign lands [de l’ étranger].” A	er 1962, the politics of decolonization 
and repatriation centered around the fate of Algeria’s pieds noirs, who migrated 
to France by the hundreds of thousands at the end of the Algerian War of Inde-
pendence.41 Since the mid-1950s, however, increasing numbers of French colo-
nists had been repatriating from Morocco and Tunisia. Bethouart felt that these 
colonists were being betrayed: “It was they [the French abroad] who, spread out 
across all the continents, who made our country a world power. It was they who 
created the markets supplied by French factories. It was they who taught and 
propagated our language. But, in exchange, they have rights to nothing, and the 
survivors of Agadir, who, in other times would have been indemnied, no longer 
interest the administration.”42 Bethouart’s anxieties about the commitment of 
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the French state to Agadir’s French refugees were intertwined with concerns 
that, with the end of empire, the government was turning its back on colonists. 
Notably, however, Bethouart, like many French in 1960, still believed that the 
Fi	h Republic would win its ght to keep Algeria.43 Hence, Bethouart still 
counted the French survivors of Orléansville among the privileged, French on 
French soil, though two years later they would become refugees and migrants 
themselves.
As the press continued to draw attention to the hardships of the French sur-
vivors of Agadir,44 the French government maintained that, since the disaster 
had occurred on foreign soil, in an independent country, “the indemnication 
of the victims of the Agadir earthquake is incumbent on the Moroccan govern-
ment.”45 (The French state would take a similar position toward the recovery of 
bodies and the reconstruction of the city.) The Moroccan government oered 
1,000 dirhams, or 975 new francs (about $200 in 1960), to each family that re-
mained in Agadir, whether Moroccan or foreign, for the purchase of household 
goods and would later oer a combination of grants and subsidized loans to 
cover the cost of reconstruction.46 As in Orléansville, Fréjus, and most other 
disasters, this meant that the vast majority of public aid would go to property 
owners, with minimal provision for the renting poor. The majority of the French 
property owners, however, were relocating to Casablanca, Algeria, or France, 
and were therefore ineligible for reconstruction assistance from the Moroccan 
government. The combination of political independence, exodus, and natural 
disaster le	 many French survivors, accustomed to being part of a privileged elite 
in Morocco, in an unusually weak position.
However, French ocials pointed out that French aid was already being given, 
and more had been approved. Each French survivor remaining in Morocco was 
eligible for an emergency payment of 300 new francs (100 for children) from 
embassy funds. 47 In order to allow survivors the opportunity to return to Agadir 
to retrieve belongings, a daily stipend was available until May 31st.48 Initially, for 
those who chose to resettle in France or Algeria, it was proposed that heads of 
household would receive 500 new French francs (equivalent to 102 US dollars in 
1960), and 300 new francs per dependent, renewable once, in addition to trans-
port and temporary lodging. However, apparently in response to pressure from 
senators Lafay and Tomsamini, larger subsidies were soon approved to assist in 
the reestablishment of households. Beginning May 7, both repatriates and those 
remaining in Morocco would receive compensation based on damages, capped 
at 2,500 new francs per head of household plus 500 new francs per additional 
surviving resident, although the French consul in Agadir argued that this was 
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not terribly generous.49 By the end of 1960, 1.9 million new francs had been dis-
tributed by the French government for this purpose.50 In addition, a solidarity 
campaign for French victims of the disaster, collected in Morocco and France, 
eventually raised over 700,000 new francs.51 Most of this solidarity fund was 
distributed by the French embassy to “survivors whose situation merited partic-
ular interest.”52 The remaining 70,000 was later spent on the Agadir cemetery 
for Europeans and on the exhumation, transport, and reburial of French corpses, 
both within Morocco and to France.53
In striking contrast to Orléansville, there was no expectation in any quarter 
that the French state should provide equal assistance to European and North 
African Muslim victims of the disaster. This was not just because of formal Mo-
roccan independence in 1956. Moroccans, unlike Algerian Muslims, had never 
been depicted as French citizens, or even as future French citizens. The protec-
torate arrangement had meant that, a	er 1912, Moroccans had remained sub-
jects of the sultan, producing a politics of “two weights and two measures,” with 
overtly separate systems of justice, education, and rights applying to the French 
and Moroccan populations. Nationalists during the protectorate period had 
denounced this “politics of racial privilege.”54 Independence, however, meant 
that the French state no longer faced criticism for its preferential treatment of 
French citizens in Morocco. French expatriates in Agadir had what Algerians 
in Fréjus had lacked: an embassy to look a	er their interests. However, the Mo-
roccan state—in many respects a continuation of the colonial state —now had 
to take care not to perpetuate the protectorate practice of special treatment for 
Europeans. In Agadir, this was as much an issue regarding the dead as regarding 
the living.
The Decolonization of the Dead
As French politicians, journalists, and diplomats in Tangier, Paris, and Rabat 
wrangled over the purported failings of the rescue eorts and the compensation 
of French survivors, another drama unfolded in Agadir concerning the bodies of 
the dead. As the chaotic initial phase of disaster response passed, a new question 
confronted both the Moroccan and French states. How much eort and expense 
would be devoted to extricating the thousands of bodies that lay buried deep 
under tons of rubble? In a modern state, the management of the dead is a criti-
cal function and demonstration of state authority. Since the 1930s, the colonial 
state—which in Morocco meant the sultan’s “Makhzen” state in Fez operating 
under the control of the French Residency in Rabat—had provided the land 
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necessary to accommodate the funereal needs of Agadir’s growing population, 
both Muslim and non-Muslim.55
The families of French colonists had not always wanted their loved ones to 
be buried where they perished, however, and it had been the French state that 
had regulated the transport of colonists’ bodies within Morocco and to France. 
Although the authorization of the French secretary general of the protectorate 
had been required for transfer of bodies out of Morocco, such requests seem 
to have been routinely granted. Some rather malodorous problems developed, 
however, involving the inevitable results of transporting bodies in hot weather. 
In the summer of 1950, there were unspecied “incidents,” in which bodies ar-
riving at their destination seem to have been rejected and returned to Morocco. 
This led, in May 1951, to a moratorium on such international transfers from June 
until the end of September each year.56 This moratorium remained in eect a	er 
Moroccan independence, exemplifying the o	en-noted continuity between the 
French and Moroccan regulatory state. In this case, the continuity is unsurpris-
ing— the management of the dead is a required duty of the state, and burials had 
not been at issue during the struggle leading up to Moroccan independence.57
New implications of the political independence of Morocco surfaced, however, 
following the Agadir earthquake.
Shana Minkin has recently explored the role that bodies and burials played in 
the implantation of European power in North Africa.58 In the era of decoloniza-
tion, mass migration of European colonists also produced burials and reburials 
that were fraught with cultural and political tension. In 1960, excavations and 
burials became central to the negotiation of boundaries between the French 
state and the newly independent Moroccan state and hence the very meaning of 
the political independence of Morocco that had been recognized in 1956.
The Agadir earthquake temporarily produced a transnational space where 
the boundaries of sovereignty and even citizenship were unclear, as the French 
and Moroccan states were overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster. For several 
days, French troops moved freely through a Moroccan city once again, while 
Moroccan police made irrevocable, crucial decisions about the fate of Euro-
pean bodies. Nameless French and Moroccan corpses were buried together in 
mass graves, an irreversible mingling of the dead. Of the French population, a 
total of 404 bodies were eventually identied. Another 131 were missing and 
presumed dead.59 Immediately following the disaster, a	er the burial of several 
hundred bodies at the French base,60 the base commander had declared that 
further burials posed a health risk. European bodies were then sent to Ihchach, 
on the northern outskirts of the city, where the Muslim dead were already being 
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buried. In the European cemetery there, Moroccan police oversaw the burial of 
Europeans in mass graves, generally without cons; a French municipal engi-
neer reportedly assisted.61 For the French dead, death certicates were lled out 
by military rst-responders and later ratied by the French consular authorities. 
About thirty victims, either dead or dying, made the journey to other cities in 
Morocco.62
Once the initial phase of emergency response had passed, French authorities 
showed no desire to shoulder the staggering nancial and moral burden of re-
sponsibility for the retrieval of corpses that remained buried under the ruins. 
The ocial French policy was “that the search for bodies is incontestably in-
cumbent upon the Moroccan authorities, and that the French state is not to 
substitute itself for the Moroccan state in this matter.”63 Nevertheless, Moroc-
can authorities granted the French base commander access to the burial sites 
of French military dead and involved the consulates of various countries in the 
process of identifying bodies. Many French survivors, however, expected their 
government to do more for French citizens.
The rst organized attempt at the excavation of ruins in order to retrieve 
corpses began at the Hotel Saada, an upscale establishment that had suered 
a catastrophic collapse. The rst four bodies were retrieved on March 12, 1960, 
and were identied as a Frenchman from Casablanca and a Frenchwoman from 
Paris, a German tourist, and a young Austrian woman. Although during the rst 
few days a	er the disaster, the French base commander had made unilateral deci-
sions about the disposal of bodies, the Moroccan authorities were now rmly in 
charge. The Moroccan state delivered cons from the French base to the hotel, 
which were numbered to correspond with new graves that the Royal Moroccan 
Army, under Colonel Driss, had dug at the Ihchach cemetery.64
But the excavation of the Hotel Saada was an exceptional eort, led by the 
Moroccan army, an eort that was no doubt motivated by the diplomatic im-
portance of retrieving the elite and foreign clientele entombed there. Otherwise, 
however, the retrieval of bodies came more or less to a halt. Thousands of unre-
trieved corpses remained, buried deep within treacherous ruins. International 
donations poured in, but the Moroccan state had thousands of refugees to feed 
and house, and resources were nite. In the two months a	er the earthquake, 
the excavation of the Hotel Saada, which had cost approximately twenty million 
francs (the dirham was not yet in use), was the “only [such] operation that had 
been methodically carried out and completed.”65
By early May, a transnational “Association of Disaster Victims” (L’Association 
des sinistrés d’Agadir) had been formed, led by landowner Abbès Kabbage, who 
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was a local leader of the UNFP (Union nationale des forces populaires), joined by 
representatives from the Red Cross and from French companies such as the Com-
pagnie du Souss. This association planned to present a variety of complaints, in-
cluding the need for action on the retrieval of bodies, directly to King Mohammed 
V.66 By this time, however, some French survivors (some of whom had just returned 
to the city to claim their moveable property), had also begun to pressure the French 
consulate and the French Red Cross to step in and take action to retrieve the bur-
ied bodies; these French survivors were frustrated by what they perceived as the 
“prolonged inaction” of the Moroccan state, “which they saw as incapable, due to 
lack of means and money, of carrying out the clearing of ruins.”67 The frustration 
of these survivors was sucient to worry the French ambassador that this issue 
might cause further scandal in the press. Far more alarming for the new French 
consul in Agadir, Jestin, were indications that some of the French survivors were 
prepared to take matters into their own hands and enter the cordoned-o area to 
excavate their own dead. Jestin feared that, with armed Moroccan soldiers guard-
ing the perimeter, under orders to shoot looters, new tragedies with international 
implications might result.68 The Moroccan government had agreed to study the 
possibility of a massive excavation project, but in the meantime, Jestin urged the 
governor of Agadir, Mohamed Benhima, to approve the excavation of one or two 
of the most suitable buildings, in hopes that this “rst swing of the pickaxe” would 
calm the nerves of the disgruntled French survivors.69
While awaiting Benhima’s response, French tempers smoldered. Rumors 
spread that in one building seven bodies lay on the surface, easily retrieved but 
for the inertia of the French and Moroccan authorities. An inspection of the site 
in question by embassy personnel revealed, however, that the bodies were visible 
but inaccessible, blocked by “enormous masses of concrete.” One French o-
cial had heard mutterings from his own disgruntled colleagues that some might 
storm the ruins of the old consulate building, where their fallen coworkers still 
lay. He added that the horric, nauseating odors emerging from the ruins did lit-
tle to calm the nerves of the bereaved. The French Embassy hoped that the Red 
Cross might serve to ll the vacuum between the French and Moroccan states 
and take the lead in the retrieval of bodies. However, the Red Cross indicated to 
French ocials that “’the Red Cross’ mission is to oer relief to the living; they 
were not in the habit of intervening for the dead.” 70
The case of the Hotel Saada as a successful example of excavation became a 
liability, rather than a model, for foreigners seeking more aggressive Moroccan 
action. The Saada excavation had been extremely expensive, and it had clearly 
been a case of special treatment for foreigners. This made excavation a sensitive 
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issue for the Moroccan authorities. Governor Benhima accompanied the French 
consul, Jestin, on a trip to meet with survivors outside of Agadir proper, and 
Benhima reportedly explained, both in public and in private, “the impossibility, 
for him, of undertaking systematic excavations of the modern city to recover 
the bodies of 300–400 Europeans, when, at the same time, nothing was being 
done in the quartiers where Moroccans were the majority.”71 The French Em-
bassy recognized that “it would be hardly imaginable to envisage that only the 
Ville Nouvelle (where most of the French resided) should be excavated, while 
classifying the Talborj, Founti, and Yachech [Ihchach] as zones destined to be 
necropolises in their current state.”72
To placate the French survivors, Benhima authorized individual excava-
tions, at private expense, reportedly to allow the public to see how dicult it 
was. Technicians employed by the Moroccan government (many of whom were 
French) estimated that excavating the collapsed consulate building, a project 
comparable to the eort made for the Saada, would cost eighteen million francs; 
to excavate the whole city would cost 1.2 billion. This, in their view, was “mate-
rially impossible.”73 Several private excavations did follow, (one large building, 
“Immeuble Le Nord,” and some small homes in the Talborj). Jestin argued that, 
rather than prove the unfeasibility of such eorts, as Benhima had predicted, 
they demonstrated the contrary, and, moreover, they had been better organized 
and consequently much less expensive than the excavation of the Saada. Jestin 
concluded that the Moroccan government would have to give in and engage in 
a costly and time-consuming excavation before beginning the planned recon-
struction of the city.74
Mass excavations did indeed begin on July 5, 1960,75 in both the Ville Nou-
velle and the Talborj but not in the Kasbah.76 In May, Benhima had subtly intro-
duced the formula which would determine the fate of Agadir’s fallen. Preferen-
tial treatment for Europeans was unacceptable to the Moroccan government and 
the Moroccan public, but a functional distinction approximated the national 
one: the site where the new city would be constructed would be excavated for the 
purpose of recovering bodies. The areas where seismologists had proscribed con-
struction—most notably the Kasbah, with its exclusively Moroccan population 
and its towering elevation—could be le	 to lie in their present state. By October, 
it was reported that 1,400 bodies had been recovered from the Ville Nouvelle 
and the Talborj. The latter, with its ethnically mixed and disproportionately 
bourgeois population, was just outside the area zoned for reconstruction but was 
excavated nonetheless. This suggests that Benhima’s formula provided political 
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Map 2. Agadir before the 1960 earthquake. The densely populated, Saadian-built 
Kasbah, atop Agadir Oufella (Agadir Heights), at an elevation of over 230 meters, 
towered high above the city’s other districts. (Erin Greb Cartography.)
cover for the excavation of areas housing Europeans and more privileged Moroc-
cans, while leaving the Kasbah untouched.77
Benhima remained sensitive to charges that the French were getting prefer-
ential treatment. When the French base commander asked that a representative 
from the base be present whenever excavations occurred involving the bodies of 
French military personnel or their family members, Benhima reportedly pro-
tested that the French were asking him for the “creation of a system of excep-
tion in favor of a category, the French, upon whom all the Moroccans had their 
eyes xed.”78 Although Benhima ultimately accommodated this French request, 
his concerns demonstrated the new politics surrounding the French presence 
in Morocco.
French expectations about the retrieval of loved ones were o	en accompa-
nied by a desire to repatriate the bodies for burial in France. The expense of 
shipping bodies out of Agadir to Europe, estimated to cost 4,000 new francs,79
remained prohibitive for many European families. Even burial in Morocco was 



























a burdensome expense for those le	 homeless by the disaster. Survivors were 
outraged in June 1960 when they learned that the missing and fallen were to 
be excluded in the calculation of the stipend authorized for the reconstitution 
of residences (“aide à la reconstitution des foyers”) for survivors. Many families 
had been counting on the extra 500 per deceased family member “either for a 
tomb or for reducing the cost of repatriating the bodies.”80 For those French 
survivors whose loved ones were buried at the French airbase, their burial in 
the soil of a French military cemetery may have been of some comfort. Some, 
however, hoped for a mass transfer of French corpses to the metropole. The rst 
suggestion that the French state undertake (and fund) the repatriation of the 
corpses of French earthquake victims came in April 1960, proposed by the for-
mer French consul in Agadir, who had been reassigned soon a	er the death of 
his son in the earthquake. The French foreign ministry’s Direction for Morocco 
and Tunisia was supportive, and noted that a collective repatriation would be 
more cost-ecient than individual shipments.81 Nevertheless, it would not be 
until the evacuation of the base that such a mass expatriation of the dead would 
occur, organized and paid for by the French state.
Four Decolonizations of Agadir
The destruction of Agadir in 1960 produced a far more dramatic demographic 
transformation than had occurred with the decolonization that accompanied 
Moroccan independence in 1956. In the 1950s, amidst the violent struggle for 
independence, the city’s French population shrank from 15,000 to 5,200. An 
estimated 535 French citizens lost their lives in the earthquake, but beyond this, 
the disaster precipitated sudden new exodus. A	er the earthquake, Agadir’s 
French civilian population dropped precipitously, to 200, by June 1960, with 
another 300 or 400 displaced to the nearby towns.82 The departure of many 
French survivors a	er the earthquake constituted a second decolonization of 
Agadir, a demographic revolution comparable to that of Algeria, two years later, 
at the end of the Algerian War.83
A	er years of polemics and negotiations, a third decolonization—the evacu-
ation of French military bases—would bring formal resolution to the national-
ist struggle to restore Moroccan sovereignty over what nationalists considered 
Moroccan soil (at least insofar as Franco-Moroccan relations were concerned; 
the Spanish and the FLN were another matter entirely). An agreement between 
France and Morocco was nally reached on September 1, 1960, providing for 
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the “progressive evacuation of operational bases by the 	h anniversary of in-
dependence [i.e., by 1961] and of training bases by the end of 1963.”84 Disaster 
diplomacy had failed to save the bases, but the evacuation agreement saved di-
saster diplomacy, removing a major political grievance against France that had 
frustrated French eorts to use disaster aid to win goodwill.
For Agadir, the base evacuation agreement meant that plans had to be made 
immediately, not only for the withdrawal of French troops but also for the fu-
ture of the bodies, French, Moroccan, and others, that lay buried in the base 
cemetery. For French families seeking the repatriation of loved ones buried at 
the French military base, the September 1 agreement was a boon, for the evac-
uation of the base included the exhumation and repatriation of those buried 
at the base cemetery: beginning a fourth decolonization of Agadir. A French 
naval vessel was used to bring bodies to Marseille, where they were shipped on 
to their nal destinations at private expense. Bodies that were unidentied or 
whose shipment to France was not requested by their families were exhumed 
and reburied at the European cemetery in Ihchach. Meanwhile, the families 
of some victims already buried at Ihchach seized the opportunity of the base 
evacuation and requested the exhumation from Ihchach of their loved ones and 
their transfer to France. This was accommodated, but only in the case of bodies 
buried in individual graves; the exhumation of communal graves was interdicted 
by the Moroccan government. In February of 1961, the French navy transported 
191 bodies of French citizens to Marseille.85
Grimm’s Tale
The evacuation of the French base in Agadir did not close the book on the de-
colonization of the French dead, however. Following the evacuation, a survivors’ 
organization was founded in Paris (“l’Association française des sinistrés et rescapés 
d’Agadir”), and politicians and private individuals lobbied for more exhumations. 
Some families also sought the repatriation of bodies that had been buried outside 
of the Agadir area and thus had not been eligible for the group expatriation in 1961. 
Others sought loved ones whose bodies had never been identied.86
In August 1962, the director of the Morocco oce of the mortgage bank 
Crédit Foncier d’Algérie et de Tunisie, Mr. V. A. Munier, wrote the French 
authorities about a particularly complex case of missing bodies. The remains 
in question were those of a Mr. Jacques Bordeaux, also an administrator at 
the Crédit Foncier, and his wife, Monique. Mr. and Mrs. Bordeaux had died 
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in the earthquake when the roof of their apartment building caved in, crush-
ing them.87
The bodies of Jacques and Monique Bordeaux were missing, and thus they 
were presumed to be among the thousands of victims of this earthquake who 
were buried anonymously immediately a	er the disaster or the following sum-
mer as the terrain was prepared for the construction of a new city. It was also 
possible that their unretrieved remains had been ploughed under with bulldoz-
ers, along with the wreckage of their homes. Although most bodies from the 
Ville Nouvelle had been recovered and identied, Mr. and Mrs. Bordeaux were 
not among them.
However, Mr. Munier, the author of the 1962 memo, believed that he knew 
where the Bordeauxes had been buried, and he wanted their bodies to be ex-
humed and repatriated to France. The evacuation of the base cemetery had in-
spired a urry of French requests for exhumation and transport of the deceased 
from other burial sites in Agadir. Munier’s request for the exhumation of the 
Bordeauxes was problematic, however, not because the whereabouts of the bod-
ies was in question but rather because Munier traced their postmortem itinerary 
to a grave shared with other disaster victims, some of them unidentied—and 
therefore of unknown nationality and religion. Even more problematic was Mr. 
Munier’s request that this grave be opened to retrieve the bodies of French citi-
zens when many hundreds of Moroccans remained interred in communal graves. 
Munier’s petition again raised this basic question of decolonization: would Eu-
ropeans still be treated as a privileged class in independent Morocco?
Central to Mr. Munier’s petition was the story of a certain Ms. Grimm, 
who lived across the landing from the Bordeauxes with her sister and her 
brother-in-law, the Macans. Both Mr. and Mrs. Macan died in the disaster. Ms. 
Grimm survived (“woke up on top of the body of her sister”), managed to extri-
cate herself from the ruins, and then le	 the building.
When Ms. Grimm returned to her home (reportedly a	er “a few moments” 
but probably at least an hour later), she discovered that the Macans’ bodies were 
gone. In order to nd them, she ran to the French base on the outskirts of the 
city, where many of the dead were being buried. Not nding the remains of her 
loved ones at the French military base, however, Mrs. Grimm hurried to the 
civilian cemetery for Europeans in Ihchach, north of the city, where burials were 
also underway. She arrived in Ihchach in time to witness the burial of her sister. 
Her sister’s husband Mr. Macan was not there, however.
Mr. and Mrs. Macan, who had died in the same bed, ended up buried miles 
apart. Apparently, the deceased couple had become separated from each other a	er 
Death, Diplomacy, and Reconstruction in Agadir, 1960 127 
a truck had delivered them to the base, just as the base commander was ordering a 
halt to the burials there, declaring that the cemetery was over capacity. Some of the 
bodies from that truck were among the last buried at the base, but others, includ-
ing Mrs. Macan’s, were again placed on trucks and sent to the Ihchach cemetery. 
Mr. Macan’s body had remained at the military base and had been identied only 
later, during the 1961 exhumations that accompanied the base evacuation.
Where, then, were the remains of the Bordeauxes, those neighbors of the Ma-
cans’ sought by Mr. Munier of the Crédit Foncier? Munier believed he knew: 
they had been transported by truck, along with the Macans, to the French mili-
tary base. Another surviving neighbor, the one who had rescued their daughter, 
had reported that he had identied both bodies there. There was no record of 
Jacques Bordeaux’s burial there, but the base’s burial records listed a grave con-
taining a Mrs. Bordeaux and a second where a woman was semi-identied as 
possibly a Mrs. Bordeaux. However, the exhumations that took place in 1961 
during the evacuation had revealed that neither of these two graves contained 
Monique Bordeaux—one turned out to be an unidentied man, and another 
was identied positively as a dierent woman. No other bodies exhumed there 
seemed to match the Bordeauxes. So where were they? Munier concluded that, 
like the Macans, their bodies must have been unloaded at the base, but then, 
with Mrs. Macan, they were shipped to the European cemetery at Ihchach.
At the Ihchach cemetery, ve communal graves were known to contain Euro-
pean victims of the earthquake, but only two contained unidentied corpses, in-
cluding one in which the Bordeauxes’s neighbor, Mrs. Macan, had been buried. 
So, Munier argued, the French authorities needed to arrange the exhumation of 
these two communal graves.88
Munier, however, was stonewalled by the French government, which empha-
sized the technical impossibility of exhuming and identifying entangled bodies 
in communal graves. He responded by citing expert opinion to the contrary. 
But the situation was not quite as simple as Munier claimed. A	er conducting 
an investigation, the French Embassy concluded that, a	er the transfer of bodies 
to Ihchach from the French military base in 1961, up to 156 French bodies were 
interred at Ihchach, including 14 unidentied corpses. Any of these, ocials 
argued, could have belonged to the Bordeauxes. The Embassy also estimated 
that 158 of their compatriots had been buried in unknown locations, without a 
“decent burial,” presumably in the large mass graves near the French base and in 
the razed Talborj quartier.89
Nevertheless, Munier was right to sense that the French authorities were of-
fering him imsy or phony excuses. It would have been a relatively small task to 
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give it a try and excavate the two small communal graves requested by Munier, 
and in 1963 the French consul in Agadir conceded that the Bourdeauxes were 
“presumably” in grave number two. 90 Ultimately, however, the real issue was not 
technical or budgetary, but political, and concerned the Moroccan state.
As then-governor Benhima had explained, the Moroccan state was obliged 
to treat European bodies and Moroccan bodies in an egalitarian fashion. It was 
politically impossible to permit the exhumation even of small communal graves 
in the European cemetery while denying a proper burial to thousands of Mo-
roccan Muslims.
Although there was obviously a concern about oending religious sensibilities 
by handling Muslim remains in reopened graves, the denial of Munier’s petition 
for exhumation, and others like it, was based on the distinction between com-
munal graves and individual graves and not between identied or unidentied 
corpses or even between Muslim and non-Muslim graves. One of the two graves 
identied by Munier (number ve) was determined to include only European 
bodies: but opening even this grave, it was feared, would open, in the memories 
and politics of a traumatized Agadir, undesirable repercussions. In the words 
of Consul René Cader, “The question of opening the communal graves at the 
Yachech [Ihchach] cemetery cannot be raised without evoking the memory of 
the thousands of dead who rest in the immense communal grave in the Talborj 
quartier (population very mixed) and in the no less immense communal grave 
located across from the military base.”91
Although in many respects the more signicant decolonizations of Agadir 
were those of 1960 and 1961, the decision to leave French dead in the communal 
graves at Agadir and not to decolonize them was predicated on the political 
and legal decolonization of 1956. The Moroccan state was sovereign over the Ih-
chach cemetery for Europeans, and Moroccan public opinion would not tolerate 
a protectorate-style system of “two weights and two measures” when it came to 
exhumation. In this matter, the French and Moroccan authorities were in agree-
ment, despite the objections of some French citizens. In matters concerning the 
retrieval and exhumation of bodies, we see here a case where—as in the decolo-
nization of Algeria in 1962—the desires of the French residents of North Africa 
conicted with what French ocials saw as state interest, the French state being 
much more willing to prioritize relations with the post-colony.
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Reconstruction
Another eld of contested decolonization concerned planning for the permanent 
reconstruction of Agadir. Urbanism and architecture became elds of struggle 
for the nal horizon of decolonization —ending the hegemony of French culture 
in Morocco—and would be fought out for many decades. In the short term, re-
construction was a desperate necessity for the Moroccan population of Agadir, 
who did not have the option of “repatriating” to France. For elites in Rabat, 
Paris, and Washington, however, other issues were at stake. Reconstruction be-
came a test for the ability of the Moroccan sovereign to respond to the needs of 
the nation, for the French to maintain their inuence, and for the Americans to 
demonstrate their resolve as Morocco’s new benefactors.
As rescue eorts wound down, Crown Prince Hassan declared that a new city 
would be constructed in a year’s time, and an Al-Istiqlal editorial called upon 
Moroccans to rebuild “not only a new Agadir, but also, and above all, a new 
Morocco.”92 French critics of decolonization responded with hostility. André 
Figueres proclaimed in Figaro that “Lyautey [Morocco’s rst French Resident 
General] had conjured Agadir out of the marvelous but deserted sands of the 
Moroccan south.” Now that the French had handed the country over to an ar-
chaic “feudal regime,” Lyautey’s legacy would be squandered. The reconstruc-
tion of Agadir, which the king had set for the 1961 anniversary of independence, 
would be a test to see whether “Morocco did not still need Lyautey.”93
While eager to show its ability to fulll its obligations as an independent 
state, the Moroccan leadership recognized that Morocco could not rise to this 
challenge unilaterally. But while French and American ocials in Morocco were 
quick to recognize the possible benets of disaster diplomacy, neither the French 
nor the American government wished to accrue major nancial obligations for 
the reconstruction of the city. The French repeatedly stressed their need to pri-
oritize relief for the French survivors of the disaster.94 Both nations stated that, 
in their massive contributions to the rescue eort and in providing immediate 
relief to survivors, they had done enough. Enthusiasm for disaster diplomacy was 
diminished by concern over the lack of initial publicity for the foreign role in the 
emergency response phase and by a recognition that the Moroccan government 
had in the past been resistant to publicizing foreign aid and to projects with an 
obviously foreign origin.95
Yet international power politics provided considerable motivation. French 
reluctance was mitigated by the fear of losing, to the Americans, its role as the 
primary provider of technical assistance, while American budgetary concerns 
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were oset by the fear, voiced also by the British, that the Soviet Union might 
step in with “a spectacular oer of aid which Morocco would be unable to ref-
use.”96 The US State Department hoped that an appeal to a United Nations 
agency such as the UN Technical Assistance Board might reduce pressure for 
Franco-American support, while diluting the impact of possible Soviet aid. This 
approach, however, also entailed risks that donations might be expected from 
member nations and “the risk that Afro-Asian enthusiasm could lead to a pro-
posal of unmanageable proportions.”97
For the French, anxieties about growing American inuence in Morocco 
dated back to the early years of the Second World War. Even before the land-
ing of a North American army on the shores of northwest Africa, the war had 
prompted a new intensity of transatlantic contacts. A	er the Fall of France in 
June 1940, French authorities in Rabat had sought American aid and trade to 
alleviate the economic hardships caused by the collapse of the French metropole. 
The British had grudgingly consented, and a modest American aid program 
operated, with some interruptions, until November 1942. 98 As rumors of the 
impending American invasion spread, French prestige faltered, and there were 
reports of Moroccan troops “refusing to obey their French ocers because they 
knew the Americans were coming.”99 In November 1942, they came, and by 
the end of the month there were sixty-ve thousand US soldiers in Morocco.100
Along with these troops came American lend-lease and an end to the partial 
British blockade: Morocco was “now open again to the markets of the world.”101
A	er the war, American imports increased, including cars and durable goods 
for the benet of the more well-to-do colons and the Moroccan elite.102 French 
anxiety about the growth of American inuence—political, economic, and cul-
tural—became a tool that the Moroccan state could use for diplomatic leverage.
Within days of the 1960 disaster, the Moroccan government approached 
the Republic of France to request assistance. The boundaries of the two states 
were still porous and blurred, four years a	er independence. Morocco’s Minis-
try of Public Works and its Service of Urbanism were still dependent, even at 
the highest levels, on French coopérants, thirteen thousand French professionals 
who worked for the government of Morocco under the terms of a convention 
signed between the two countries. The presence of these coopérants could serve 
as a backdoor diplomatic channel. It was two such high-level coopérants, the 
secretary-general to the minister of Public Works and the engineer-in-chief of 
the Service of Urbanism, who were dispatched to Paris on March 7 to request 
reconstruction aid from the former colonizer.103
Death, Diplomacy, and Reconstruction in Agadir, 1960 131 
These two Frenchmen requested that France send a team of urbanists to de-
velop a plan for the new Agadir, reinforce the sta of the Ministry of Public 
Works with an additional ten technicians, and commission three companies 
that had worked on the reconstruction of Orléansville to analyze and inventory 
damage to standing buildings and roads, and to dene anti-seismic building 
standards for reconstruction. The total cost was estimated at 1.6 million new 
francs, but there was a clear French interest in maintaining their inuence in 
the realm of culture and technical advising and thus in taking part in urban 
planning for the new Agadir. The extent of the proposed assistance went be-
yond city planning and represented more than the French wanted to spend, but, 
as one French ocial noted, if France did not rise to the occasion, other states 
would.104
The assessment that independent Morocco would not rely on France alone 
was correct. On March 4, Hassan had already outlined a plan to the American 
ambassador, Charles Yost, in which the US, France, and one other unnamed 
country would each contribute to the design and reconstruction of a dierent 
part of the city. Hassan requested that an “imaginative, modern” American 
planner be dispatched to Morocco as soon as possible.105 Over the next several 
days, it became increasingly clear that Hassan sought as much American support 
as possible. A formal request was made for an American city planner, preferably 
(Spanish-born) Josep Lluis Sert, dean of the Harvard Graduate School of De-
sign. The minister of Public Works, Abderrahmane ben Abdelâli, also requested 
the services of an American housing expert as well as a geologist, a seismologist, 
and an architect.106 This was a clear statement about distancing Morocco from 
its former colonial “protector” and signaled a Moroccan strategy of provoking 
competition between the two NATO allies.
From the beginning, French and American ocials were skeptical of Mo-
roccan ambitions about the future of Agadir. On March 12, Le Roy had voiced 
his suspicion that Hassan’s decision to halt rescue operations on March 4 was 
motivated, not only by epidemiological fears, but also by excess “haste to pass 
from the phase of disaster to that of reconstruction.”107 Americans ocials felt 
that Hassan’s ambitions for reconstruction were “grandiose.”108 The Americans 
pressed the Moroccan government to include the French in a joint planning 
commission,109 and initially expressed reluctance to displace France in the realm 
of civil technical assistance. Neither foreign government, however, wanted to 
be le	 out of the project altogether. As events developed and the Moroccans 
presented United States diplomats with opportunities to play a prominent role 
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in the “rebirth” of Agadir, the Americans felt obliged to be responsive to Mo-
roccan needs.
Alarmed by the growing American involvement, the French government also 
tried to accommodate Moroccan requests. France agreed to a Moroccan request 
to send a “grand urbanist” to Morocco and suggested several names.110 Abdelâli, 
minister of Public Works, wanted a bigger name, however, and requested the 
great planner Le Corbusier.111 For the French ambassador in Rabat, this was 
an important opportunity, “at a moment when international interventions are 
multiplying regarding Agadir.”112 
Le Corbusier, however, did not turn out to be the solution for the French in 
Agadir, although his visit to Morocco seemed to go well. When Le Corbusier 
arrived in Casablanca on March 25, he made a brief statement to the press in-
dicating that his experience working in Japan had prepared him well for the 
challenges in Agadir.113 In Rabat, he met with Abdelâli and the professionals of 
the Public Works ministry’s Service of Urbanism, and with Crown Prince Has-
san. However, bad weather prevented him from traveling to Agadir prior to his 
return to France on the 27th. This may have been an inuential environmental 
turn of events; perhaps scenes of disaster might have given Le Corbusier more 
motivation. Although by all accounts Le Corbusier made a ne impression, he 
did not reach an agreement with his hosts and seems to have declined to partic-
ipate in the project. According to one account, Le Corbusier chafed at certain 
requirements set forth by Crown Prince Hassan, who stated “I do not see Agadir 
without a mosque, and I do not see a mosque without green tiles.”114 French Am-
bassador Parodi noted that Corbusier “constantly expressed, with great frank-
ness, and did not conceal that he could not accept responsibility for the recon-
struction of Agadir unless he was given the liberty and the means necessary.”115
Although Le Corbusier’s visit ultimately failed to produce an agreement, his 
trip to Morocco provided leverage for Abdelâli to press the United States to send 
an “expert of similar caliber.”116 The State Department had approved the Mo-
roccan request for a housing expert to advise Public Works, but the Moroccans 
clearly wanted someone more prestigious for the urban plan. For US ambassador 
Yost in Rabat, the disaster diplomacy possibilities were clear: “American asso-
ciation with the rebirth of Agadir is so obviously desirable that special eorts 
appear more than warranted.” Yost argued that this would not imply additional 
commitments to the actual reconstruction, but added, however, that a prompt 
“no” would be better than an “embarrassing” delay.117 The implied priority 
was that the US be seen as a reliable partner. However, Yost stressed, as he had 
throughout the oil poisoning crisis, that American stinginess might provide the 
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Soviets with an opportunity. Yost also noted that communist China’s ambassa-
dor had already made a substantial cash donation to the king.118 The next day, in 
Moscow, Morocco’s ambassador reassured his American counterpart that Amer-
ican aid had in fact been much more forthcoming than Soviet aid and “showed 
Moroccans who their true friends were.”119 Despite the anti-Soviet character of 
the remark, the Moroccan diplomat nevertheless reinforced the connection be-
tween disaster aid and Morocco’s position in the Cold War.
The US State Department, however, preferred to “let the French take the 
lead, as they are doing,” and suggested sending, rather than a “top planner,” a 
“working-level planner,” who would participate in planning during a year-long as-
signment, but take no leadership role.120 Abdelâli, however, insisted that a top-level 
planner was necessary to build a city that would fulll the king’s desire to create an 
“expression of modern Morocco”; he noted that the Ministry of Public Works was 
already well-staed with rank-and-le planners quite capable of “following up and 
executing plans.”121 The State Department relented.122 Josep Lluis Sert was appar-
ently unavailable, uninterested or deemed unsuitable, and so the State Department 
selected the prominent American planner Harland Bartholomew, chairman of the 
Washington, DC, National Capitol Planning Commission.
The United States authorized $50,000 to pay Bartholomew for the planning. 
As American ocials put it, “although the project has materialized somewhat 
dierently than originally envisioned, withdrawal of US assistance at this time 
would not be easy to explain without embarrassment.”123 The Americans still 
wished to avoid paying for actual reconstruction, although a contingency policy 
was outlined in the event that political pressures required it. This would entail 
American involvement in the reconstruction of a single “model” residential area; 
“necessary safeguards would have to be taken to assure proper recognition of 
US sponsorship.” In this case, the “project would specically emphasize simple 
construction technique to permit maximum use of locally available labor.”124
This backup policy never came into play but demonstrates the gap between the 
expectations of Washington and Rabat. The king and crown prince wanted an 
impressive, modern city that would be a agship for the new Morocco; Ameri-
can ocials expressed anxiety about these “grandiose” ideas.125 In Agadir, how-
ever, a dierent dynamic would develop, in which Governor Benhima’s desire for 
a practical, swi	 reconstruction plan conicted with the more ambitious scheme 
proposed by Bartholomew and endorsed by Rabat.
In Rabat, Moroccan expectations were high. Abdelâli hoped that preliminary 
plans could be produced by late April.126 Bartholomew arrived in Rabat on April 
9. However, the American planner produced only a basic report, recommending 
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that the city be rebuilt on much of its current site (a major question among the 
seismologists in the preceding weeks), but that construction be prohibited in 
the Kasbah, Talborj, Founti, and Ihchach districts. Bartholomew stated that 
a rst dra	 of the comprehensive city plan would take two months, followed 
by meetings with Moroccan authorities and the sta of the Ministry of Public 
Works and then would require three months for revisions.127 The Moroccan 
state accepted Bartholomew’s terms.
InMay 1960, the king dismissed the government headed by Abdallah Ibra-
him, and appointed himself head of government, with Crown Prince Hassan as 
deputy-premier and defense minister. This was a momentous event in Moroccan 
politics, but because the monarchy had always been the main representative of 
the Moroccan state in the response to the earthquake, the impact of the change 
in government on the question of reconstruction was minimal.128 In a speech in 
Agadir on June 30, Mohammed V declared:
Here we see today Agadir at the hour of its resurrection, through the ex-
ecution of the plan, the preparation of which we have ensured: this plan, 
the essential objective of which is to reconstruct the city on a secure lo-
cation, chosen by the architects, Moroccan and foreign, a	er a detailed 
scientic study, and by modern methods which are applied in cities aected 
by earthquakes.
This program will make of Agadir a modern and active city, endowed 
with all the equipment necessary for life today: broad avenues, pleasant 
gardens, abundant light, mosque, schools, administration, etc. . . . Forward 
for the reconstruction of Agadir! Forward for the renaissance of the Sous! 
Forward for the new Morocco!129
The king thus associated the monarchy and future of Agadir with the “mod-
ern methods” of a transnational community of seismologists, engineers, and 
architects. It appeared that the United States would play a prominent role in 
this new Morocco. In contrast, French inuence seemed to be at a low point 
in the summer of 1960, eroded by the unpopularity of France’s ongoing war in 
Algeria, atomic testing in the Sahara, and France’s apparent intransigence (prior 
to the September agreement) on base tenure in Morocco. The United States, 
in contrast, was enjoying the benets of Eisenhower’s base evacuation treaty.130
Bartholomew’s contract for Agadir seemed to indicate a trend. French fears were 
compounded by the appointment of another American, George Schobinger, to 
serve as an advisor to Abdelâli, the Minister of Public Works. French ocials 
worried that they were losing “the traditional inuence of France in the domain 
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of public works.” This did not please American ocials, however. According to 
Marcus Gordon, the State Department’s director for Europe and Africa, “the 
worst eventuality would be that US assistance caused the French to become so 
angered as to make a complete withdrawal, leaving us with a void we could not 
possibly ll.”131 The State Department did not wish to be stuck with the bill for 
developing Morocco.
France’s role in civil engineering had not vanished: private French compa-
nies were contracted for the clearing of debris. However, the French consul 
in Agadir became concerned that even this role might be lost, due to the high 
prices charged.132 Moreover, in addition to the new role played by Americans 
in high-level technical assistance at Public Works, the ministry was engaging 
in a “Moroccanization” of its sta. The leadership of the ministry’s Service of 
Urbanism had already been Moroccanized. In June, the Public Works engi-
neer-in-chief in Agadir, a Frenchman, was replaced with a Moroccan engineer, 
Mohammed Faris. The consul recognized that, for the Moroccan state, “The 
reconstruction of Agadir constitutes, in eect, a political act; this gesture will 
only have full eect if the Moroccan authorities place technicians of Moroccan 
nationality as sector chiefs.”133 If the reconstruction of Agadir was going to be a 
national and royal act, an act of decolonization, it had to be done by Moroccans.
French hopes for a leading role in the redesign of the city were revived, how-
ever, when serious concerns emerged about Bartholomew’s commitment to the 
project. The Moroccan leadership expressed dissatisfaction with the American 
planner’s long absence through the summer of 1960; Bartholomew’s dispatch 
of a junior employee to Morocco in late July failed to assuage these concerns. 
Bartholomew’s representative presented plans which the high commissioner for 
the reconstruction described as “childishly supercial.” Even American ocials 
recognized that Bartholomew’s company representative was “obviously not of a 
caliber to deal as an equal with Ministry technicians.”134
For the US embassy, this was no longer just about Agadir. Minister of Public 
Works Abdelâli had survived the change of government, but he and the Amer-
icans had invested much political capital in each other, and they would stand 
or fall together, it appeared. As Ambassador Yost put it, “if Abdelâli fails on 
Agadir due to our promised support and is made to suer for it as he doubt-
less would, the future of our entire technical assistance program will be jeopar-
dized.”135 Yost’s alarmism was apparently inuenced by Abdelâli, who described 
the shortcomings of American assistance in the project as “shocking” and who 
emphasized the strength of internal opposition to the government’s increasing 
turn toward American aid.136 Bartholomew’s lackadaisical eorts had provided 
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an opportunity for those opposed to American leadership in the reconstruction, 
including “jealous” French coopérants within the Moroccan Ministry of Pub-
lic Works. Soon, Abdelâli’s frustration was compounded by the failure of the 
Americans to provide an advisor to Public Works in Rabat to replace George 
Schobinger, who departed in August.137
Thus began what became known as the “Battle of the Plans.” This was both 
a competition between France and the United States for inuence and pres-
tige, and between Minister of Public Works Abdelâli, who reportedly aspired 
to become the Moroccan Ambassador to the United States, and Benhima, the 
governor of Agadir, who had good relations with the French in Agadir and who 
was skeptical about the Bartholomew plan, nding it overly ambitious. Benhima 
wanted a plan that could be implemented more readily to house the displaced 
population of the city. Benhima and Abdelâli also diered in their attitudes 
toward Crown Prince Hassan: Benhima was seen as loyal to Hassan, while Ab-
delâli was critical, and reportedly disparaged Hassan’s leadership in the immedi-
ate a	ermath of the disaster as well as his continuing accrual of power.138
For the French coopérants at the Service of Urbanism, the desire for a leading 
French role in designing the new city was less about disaster diplomacy than 
about professional prestige. Their collaboration with Moroccan colleagues, like 
that of most coopérants, was, as described in American diplomatic assessments 
of the situation, “almost entirely insulated from the ups and downs which af-
fect French relations . . . on the political or economic level.”139 Already chang 
at Abdelâli’s decision bring Schobinger to Rabat to oversee projects in Public 
Works, the hiring of Bartholomew had been a great aront. According to his-
torian Thierry Nadau, who interviewed many of those involved, Bartholomew 
was “little esteemed” 140 by the French and Moroccan urban planners alike, “who 
would have gladly deferred to the master [Le Corbusier]” but who “protested this 
urbanisme primaire.”141
The French and Moroccan planners had a key factor on their side: the winds 
of nationalism and decolonization were with them. However many Frenchmen 
were involved, their plan would be produced by an agency of the newly indepen-
dent Moroccan state. Ironically, the Moroccanization of the Ministry of Public 
Works turned out to be an asset to French inuence. The Service of Urbanism 
was now directed by Abdesalem Faraoui,142 There, however, as in many parts of 
the Moroccan government, the French and Moroccan professionals had much 
in common. While subtler tensions no doubt lurked beneath the surface, out-
side observers of Franco-Moroccan technical cooperation noted that “it was 
frequently next to impossible to know whether the person one was dealing with 
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was a native or a Frenchman because of this similarity of speech and style.”143
The replacement of the French engineer-in-chief at Agadir with Mohammed 
Faris proved to be no loss to the French cause. Faris, who consulted regularly 
with the French consul in Agadir, considered the American plan too extravagant 
and impractical, and he was suspicious of American motives.144 Likewise, the 
French-educated modernists in the Service of Urbanism were an asset for the 
preservation of French inuence. Architect Mourad Ben Embarek, who would 
soon succeed Faraoui as head of the service, would present the reconstruction of 
Agadir as an opportunity, by proxy, for Le Corbusier to make his mark on Af-
rica, through the impact he had made on the younger generation.145 Yet despite 
the fact that it was sometimes referred to by diplomats and ocials as the “Plan 
Français,” the Public Works plan could be portrayed as an assertion of indepen-
dence. Several years later, the editors of Morocco’s premier architectural journal, 
A + U: Revue aicaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme, would portray the recon-
struction of Agadir as an example for developing nations of the utility of avoid-
ing dependence on foreign institutions.146 This was a bit of a stretch, considering 
the central role played by French nationals in the Service of Urbanism. However, 
both the French and Moroccan governments had, since independence, avoided 
publicizing the role of French coopérants in Morocco, each fearing domestic 
criticism of the ongoing Franco-Moroccan cooperation.147 The public face of the 
Ministry of Public Works’ urban planning service was Moroccan. This arrange-
ment served the interests of both France and Morocco—to the detriment of the 
Americans. As in the question of responsibility for the retrieval of the dead, the 
formal arrangements of decolonization served the interests of the French state. 
Nevertheless, American inuence remained an obstacle to French hopes for cul-
tural hegemony: the “Plan américain” seemed to be on the path to realization.
The Fall of Bartholomew
American attention to disaster diplomacy in Agadir was intensied by the 
Palace’s decision in November 1960 to purchase Soviet MiG jet aircra	. This 
deal shocked the State Department and demonstrated that Yost’s alarmism had 
been well-founded. The Soviet deal increased Moroccan leverage in extracting 
aid from the United States by demonstrating that, in the era of the global cold 
war, the Americans were not the only alternative to dependence on France. The 
purchase of the MiGs also increased Abdelâli’s importance to the Americans, 
and thus the importance of Agadir’s reconstruction, since Abdelâli was seen as 
“not only the most pro-American among the present ministers but is also the 
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strongest opponent in the cabinet of the Soviet arms deal.”148 Abdelâli made 
use of this leverage, stressing that the Agadir project was a “life and death ques-
tion for US-Moroccan relations” and insisting that the Americans extend Bar-
tholomew’s contract, which had ended with the completion of the master plan 
in late November, to supervise and manage the organization of reconstruction.149
The US had little choice but to approve $49,000 in additional funds, but made 
clear that this would not imply any further commitment to fund the actual con-
struction.150 It seemed that this was enough and that the Americans had sealed 
the deal. By December 26, the Palace had ocially approved the Bartholomew 
plan, and arrangements were made for Yost to attend an inauguration ceremony 
presided over by Crown Prince Hassan on January 17, 1961.151
Soon, however, the Agadir reconstruction project became engulfed in scan-
dal, leading to a decisive shi	 in the Battle of the Plans. It began slowly. A West 
German newspaper, Die Welt, ran a story accusing the Moroccan government 
of diverting two billion francs of international earthquake relief donations to 
“cover the chronic decit of the Moroccan budget.”152 The French press picked 
up the story. France Observateur connected the alleged mishandling of funds to 
the suering of the displaced survivors, portrayed as freezing in tents in the mid-
dle of winter. This, in turn, linked the issue to the earlier discourse in Tangiers 
and in Le Figaro about a negligent French government abandoning its colonists 
to the incompetence of the independent Moroccan state.153
The Moroccan minister of information, Alaoui, denied these charges, and 
stated that all foreign donations had been placed in a dedicated account, separate 
from Treasury funds. The government’s own funds from the 1960 budget had 
been applied toward the 4 billion francs already spent on reconstruction and 
demolition; foreign aid for reconstruction totaled less than 1.5 billion francs. 
Complete reconstruction of the city and compensation payments to victims 
(necessary to spur private reconstruction) was estimated at 24 billion francs. A 
special tax would raise 12 billion francs, supplemented by 2 billion from the 1961 
general budget.154
Nevertheless, the obvious gap between the estimated expense and the avail-
able revenue le	 unanswered questions about the project’s solvency. The press 
scandal increased scrutiny of both the nances and pace of Agadir’s reconstruc-
tion. Hassan had set an impossibly high standard with his hasty assertion amid 
the rubble in March 1960 when he declared that a new city would be inaugu-
rated in a year’s time. Alaoui had apparently exacerbated this problem by indi-
cating to the foreign press that the city was already largely reconstructed, when 
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the clearing of debris was not even completed, and the only new structures were 
prefabricated.155
The government’s cost estimates also raised questions about the future of the 
Bartholomew Plan. Already, in December 1960, Governor Benhima had hinted 
to the French that the Bartholomew plan might be discarded, and that what 
French diplomats viewed as the Plan Français might be adopted a	er all.156 At 
the end of January 1961, Chief Engineer Mohammed Faris told the French con-
sul that the Bartholomew plan was expected to cost 200 billion francs, while 
the Public Works plan would cost only 25 billion.157 In early February, High 
Commissioner for Reconstruction Mohamed Imani began to hold a series of 
meetings in Rabat; the plan for Agadir was once more up for debate.158 This 
was, apparently, a hotly contested question; in mid-March, a	er the unexpected 
death of King Mohammed V and the accession of Hassan II, Faris dejectedly 
predicted that the pro-American factions in the government and the Palace 
would prevail.159 Faris was wrong.
On June 2, Governor Benhima was suddenly appointed to the post of min-
ister of Public Works, replacing Abdelâli. Abdelâli had been accused of embez-
zling from the Agadir reconstruction fund generated by the “solidarity tax,” 
and smuggling the proceeds to the United States and Switzerland. Benhima 
was considered an able technocrat and a dependable supporter of the Palace, 
and Benhima had been openly critical of both Abdelâli and the Bartholomew 
plan. As Mohammed Faris saw it, this was a major reason the new king chose 
him for Public Works: his appointment served to indicate a clean break from 
both Abdelâli’s corruption and his policies.160 Of course, this scandal could have 
been merely a cover; Abdelâli’s hostility to Hassan may well have been the real 
reason for his dismissal, or the high cost of the American plan, in the face of 
public criticism about the nancing of the project, may have pushed Hassan to 
make a change.
In any case, Abdelâli’s fall spelled the demise of the American-designed “New 
Agadir,” although this would not be announced for several months. Benhima 
charged the French and Moroccan planners and architects at Public Works with 
the task of synthesizing elements of the two competing plans into a nal plan 
ready for immediate implementation by the end of September.161 The Service 
d’Urbanisme would also set forth the guidelines imposed on private builders; 
and the Service would call upon a dream team of European and Moroccan archi-
tects to design state-owned buildings in brutalist, modernist style.162
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Conclusion and Foreshadowing
Decolonization was not coterminous with political independence, at least not 
everywhere and in all respects. After independence in 1956, thousands of French 
continued to live, die, and be buried in Agadir. The seismic intervention of Feb-
ruary 1960 transformed this situation, however, prompting a mass exodus of the 
colonists. Then, in 1961, the French military base was evacuated, and the dead 
rose from their graves to return to France, although not without some assistance, 
to join the living who had fled after the earthquake.
The disaster created opportunities for the increasingly authoritarian Moroc-
can state to use American assistance to lessen Moroccan dependence on France. 
However, both the graves of the dead and the new city built for the living would 
continue to be centers of contestation in Agadir. The excavation of the Ville 
Nouvelle and the Talborj and the end of the “Battle of the Plans” did not mean 
the end of controversy regarding the reconstruction of the city or the treatment 
of the dead. For the generation of city residents who survived the earthquake, the 
ruins of the Kasbah have remained a festering wound, where the resting places 
of the unrecovered dead are despoiled by urinating tourists, beer-drinking Mo-
roccan youth, and most recently, cellphone towers.163 Meanwhile, to many Mo-
roccans longing for the cultural and architectural decolonization of Morocco, 
the new Agadir that rose from the ruins became a symbol of enduring French 
cultural hegemony.
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The Soul of a City
As Pierre Mas, one of the principal designers of post-earthquake Aga-dir, described it: “Few cities occupy a geographic position as remark-able as Agadir. A	er passing Cap Ghir, where the foothills of the High 
Atlas plunge into the Atlantic, the voyager coming from the north travels along 
a narrow shore of Mediterranean character for forty-some kilometers, before 
discovering the large bay of Agadir open to the south-west. The last foothill, 
adorned with ancient Portuguese fortications, the Kasbah, dominates the city 
and the plain of the South from its height of 230 meters.”1 Despite these pic-
turesque natural endowments, a peculiar idea about the reconstructed city of 
Agadir began to be expressed in the mid-1960s, one that would be frequently 
repeated through the 1990s and into the new millennium. Rebuilt Agadir, with 
its modernist architecture centered around a Mediterranean-style beach resort, 
became a pervasive symbol of disorientation and rootlessness. In 1967, a French 
writer, Péré, reported that it was already commonplace to hear people lament of 
Agadir that “it is a city without a soul.”2 By the 1990s, when the present author 
was living in Casablanca, the description of Agadir as lacking a soul had become 
commonplace in popular discourse in Morocco, accompanied by the assertion 
that Agadir was not really Moroccan. Descriptions of Agadir as a “dead city, 
without a soul and without a center” appeared repeatedly in the work of students 
graduating from the National School of Architecture in Rabat. However, this 
cliché has been contested by the inhabitants of Agadir, the Gadiris.
Do cities have souls? Recently, scholars Daniel A. Bell and Avner de-Shalit 
published The Spirit of Cities: Why the Identity of a City Matters in a Global 
Age, arguing that some cities, but not all, have what the authors alternately refer 
to as “spirit,” “ethos,” or “identity.” Prescriptively, Bell and de-Shalit argue that 
this spirit, as a focus of civic pride and activity, is a desirable bulwark against 
the negative eects of both nationalism and globalism. Descriptively, they apply 
what Frederick Cooper has called a “hard” denition of identity as a collective 
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phenomenon, “something deep, basic, abiding, and foundational.”3 The hazard 
of such notions of identity is that they impose theoretical unity on what is in 
fact a heterogeneous and plural subject: communities of many thousands of peo-
ple. As Bell and de-Shalit themselves acknowledge, the life of people in a city is 
shaped by many factors; they mention, in particular, economics, street signs, traf-
fic, density, segregation, hospitals, taxi drivers, and “great city planners.”4 Such 
diverse forces cannot create a singular entity that one can call an identity, spirit, 
or ethos—or “soul”—for an entire city. However, although cities may not have 
spirits or ethea or identities or souls, ideas about particular cities do exist, and 
some of these ideas circulate widely and are influential.5
It is clear that, in Morocco, many people, both Moroccans and foreigners, 
have believed that cities should have souls but that post-earthquake Agadir does 
not. This is due both to the particular ways in which the seismic event of 1960 
reshaped the built environment in Agadir and to the cultural history of colonial-
ism in Morocco. In neither Orléansville nor Fréjus did the destruction wrought 
by the catastrophes of the decolonization era become so directly associated with 
an imagined annihilation of cultural heritage and identity. The enduring con-
tours of disaster extend into many aspects of human history, but disasters (and 
decolonizations) do not all take the same shape. It was in Agadir that disaster 
most dramatically transformed the cultural and architectural shape of decolo-
nization and of local and national debates about identity and the legacy of co-
lonialism. In part, this was because the earthquake in Agadir destroyed the old, 
precolonial Saadian Kasbah (misidentified by Mas as Portuguese). Following 
the disaster, the Kasbah district, Agadir Oufella, would be left in ruins, while 
urban planners rebuilt the city according to the precepts of the mid-century 
modernism of Le Corbusier. However, the anxiety brought about by this dra-
matic change in the built environment was a product of the particularities of 
French colonial policy and ideology in Morocco and of the post-independence 
monarchy’s shifting approach to discourses of modernity and tradition.
In contrast to Agadir, Fréjus’s disaster and the architecture and urban design 
of the town’s reconstruction have not been central to debates about the town’s 
cultural identity. Today, Fréjus’s museums and histories mourn the disaster, 
while celebrating the city’s heritage of Roman and French military and colonial 
history. But the Malpasset disaster did not seem to separate Fréjus from its past: 
the floodwaters bypassed the old medieval city center, thanks to the slight ele-
vation of the hill on which it stood. Though the ancient Roman arena was not 
spared, it was reconstructed, and remains a major site both for tourism and civic 
events. Anxiety about ethnic boundaries shaped the immediate response to the 
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disaster, and the history of the 1959 dam collapse provides important clues to 
the deeper roots of Fréjus’s later political turmoil (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
However, the causes of civic anxiety in Fréjus in later decades have not been 
associated with the flood of 1959.
Nor did the 1954 earthquake in Algeria generate the sort of discourse of cul-
tural anomie that developed concerning Agadir. The Chélif Valley disaster did 
not bring about so dramatic and distinctive a transformation of urban space in 
Orléansville, renamed El Asnam in 1962 and Chlef in 1980. In contrast to Aga-
dir, the rebuilt Orléansville did not become a symbol of independent Algeria: it 
had been the French who had built Orléansville, and the French who rebuilt it, 
for the city’s reconstruction was largely complete by the advent of independence 
in 1962.6 As was the case elsewhere in Algeria, Orléansville’s pre-earthquake 
architecture was already influenced by the “structural classicism” of Auguste 
Perret and to a lesser extent, Le Corbusier’s functional modernism.7 As Aleth 
Picard has explained, post-earthquake urban planners transformed the city less 
than they would have liked: the narrowness of the city’s streets contrasted with 
the desire, among planners and architects, for more light and space, but in much 
of the city the existing street grid was partially maintained, largely because nu-
merous buildings remained usable. Chief architect Jean Bossu envisioned an 
architecturally cohesive “red city,” distinctive among Algerian cities, but due to 
the very rapid pace of reconstruction and the existence of neighborhood asso-
ciations of property owners who hired their own architects, guidelines for re-
construction were not consistently followed. With the exception of individual 
districts and buildings designed by Bossu (the Saint-Réparatus Quarter) and 
by Jean de Maisonseul, an admirer of Le Corbusier, the city that resulted was 
unremarkable from an architectural standpoint.8 In this respect, Orléansville 
was quite typical among Algerian cities: the Constantine Plan’s emphasis on a 
massive expansion of affordable housing and heavy industry had made aesthetics 
a low priority, and reconstruction was dominated by the directives of adminis-
trators and engineers, a pattern that would continue under the Algerian state 
after independence.9 Tragically, however, in the frenzy of construction the new 
seismic building codes enacted in 1954 were inconsistently applied, leading to 
the new catastrophe of 1980.10 After the 1980 earthquake, there were recrim-
inations about the state’s failure to implement the anti-seismic building code 
developed in response to the 1954 quake, but not about the city’s urban plan 
or architectural style. Although in the 1990s, architects in Algeria, like those 
in Morocco, sought to connect architecture with Arab and national identity, 
Orléansville did not become a focal point of such concerns.11 Like cities, streets, 
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and other places across Algeria, Orléansville got a new name after independence, 
but as an architectural representation of Algerian national identity, El Asnam 
after 1962 had neither more nor less to offer than did Orléansville before 1954. 
The inhabitants of the city mourned the loss of spaces in which they had lived, 
but Orléansville’s built environment had contained little that would allow its 
destruction to be portrayed as a loss of Muslim Algerian national heritage.
In Morocco, it was not just the historical accident of the seismic destruction 
of Agadir’s Kasbah that made the 1960 earthquake central to discourses about 
decolonization and Moroccan identity. Morocco had a particular colonial his-
tory of the idea of an âme, or soul, as a desirable characteristic of Moroccans, tied 
to culture and implying “something deep, basic, abiding, and foundational.”12 
French administrators in protectorate Morocco, terrified that colonial subjects 
might demand the rights of Frenchmen, as Ferhat Abbas had initially done in 
Algeria or as Blaise Diagne had done in Senegal, despised earlier colonial pol-
icies promoting assimilationism. Consequently, French cultural policy in Mo-
rocco sought to define what Moroccan culture was, and to control and preserve 
that culture, lest dangerous French notions of individualism and democracy 
corrupt the Moroccan population and subvert the protectorate arrangement, 
under which the population was ruled by “traditional” Moroccan elites who had 
become vassals to the French. Moroccan culture, although studied by French 
colonial scholars in minute, pluralistic detail, was reduced by administrators to 
a unitary and homogenous Moroccan “soul” or “psyche.” In the French schools 
of protectorate Morocco, the curriculum was intended to ensure that students 
understood the value of preserving their Moroccanness.13 Meanwhile, as will be 
discussed below, French urban planners of the early protectorate era attempted 
to ensure that the growing French presence in Morocco did not corrupt the 
Moroccan character of the kingdom’s cities. More recent discourses asserting 
that post-earthquake Agadir was “a city without a soul” must be understood in 
relation to this protectorate-era fetishization of precolonial Moroccan culture. 
The persistence of the idea that Agadir has no soul reflects the enduring legacy 
of French colonial policies and discourses linking culture, urban planning, and 
tradition.
The post-earthquake transformation of Agadir’s built environment and the 
legacy of cultural policy in Morocco interacted to shape the local implications 
of international debates about urban planning, infusing technical discussions 
of urban development with political and cultural meaning. Criticisms of mod-
ernist urban planning and architecture are not unique to Morocco, of course. 
Worldwide, such criticisms have been widespread and intense. One popular 
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British writer, Theodore Dalrymple, has recently compared Le Corbusier, who 
was greatly admired by Agadir’s urban planners, to Pol Pot, arguing, “Le Cor-
busier was to architecture what Pol Pot was to social reform. . . . Like Pol Pot, 
he wanted to start from Year Zero: before me, nothing; a	er me, everything.”14
With less hyperbole, the Belgian architect Jean Dethier argued in 1973 that the 
division of reconstructed Agadir into functional quarters “atomized” the urban 
environment, separating it into disconnected sections, with the result that the 
post-quake city was too spread out and insuciently dense. According to De-
thier, “this fragmentation [éclatement] of the modern city, established in all 
good faith in the name of hygiene, space, and circulation, annihilates in large 
measure the sentiment of the city, of community and animation.” 15 Modernist 
urban planning principles emphasizing the importance of open spaces and the 
functional dierentiation of city sections had created “a series of yawning, sol-
emn spaces, and abstract and imperative zones.”16 In Dethier’s view, these open 
spaces and functionally-dened zones (“imperative” in the sense that they com-
mandingly ordered city life) interfered with the activities of city residents. Such 
Map 3. Reconstructed Agadir, c. 2000. The reconstructed city grew beyond the zones 
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critiques were not unique to the realm of francophone urban planning. Both 
Dalrymple’s denunciation of Le Corbusier and Dethier’s more measured critique 
of the new Agadir resemble twentieth-century critiques of Robert Moses’s ur-
banism in New York. Jane Jacobs, in opposition to Moses, argued that successful 
city life requires not dogmatic planning but a “jumping, joyous urban jumble” 
of mixed-use neighborhoods and spontaneous, organic growth, rooted in local 
history.17 Dethier and Jacobs’s visions of urban life contrasted sharply not only 
with Moses’s work but also with the dominant principles in postwar French 
urban planning, which, as historian Paul Rabinow has noted, were based on “a 
total rejection of the organic city, which was composed, it was held, of unhealthy, 
inefficient, and uncontrollable accidents of history.”18 In Agadir, however, much 
of the “organic” city had been destroyed by another accident of history, setting 
the scene for a collision between the modernist desire to reshape urban life and a 
colonial legacy emphasizing architectural tradition as central to the preservation 
of Moroccan identity.
Like other developing cities, reconstructed Agadir presented many challenges 
to be addressed by urban planners and policymakers. Investment in tourism 
in later years, funded by Moroccans from outside of Agadir, focused on the 
speculative construction of hotels, not on the “animation” needed to appease 
the tourist’s nagging hunger for Moroccan authenticity. As Thierry Nadau has 
argued, such animation was also rendered difficult by the fragmented, function-
ally divided layout of the city, which failed to provide a central street to draw 
Gadiris and tourists together for events.19 Students at the National School of 
Architecture identified problems such as a lack of urban density, economic vi-
tality, and activities for tourists, problems they hoped would be solved by a new 
generation of urban planners through technical means such as improvements in 
transportation. However, these students consistently framed such problems in 
terms of Agadir’s alleged soullessness.20
Like so much else related to the disasters of the mid-twentieth century, crit-
icisms of post-disaster Agadir were closely related to the process of decoloniza-
tion. Moroccan independence in 1956 did not mean that the legacy of French 
colonialism had vanished, or that French cultural or economic hegemony had 
evaporated overnight. The city’s role as a vacation destination for European 
tourists grew, and for decades Agadir lost, to the nearby towns of Inezgane and 
Aït Melloul, much of the city’s former role as a trade junction and depot for 
agricultural goods arriving from the interior.21 The city remained economically 
dependent on Europe, and the most desirable spaces in Agadir became domi-
nated by European visitors. Even commentators sympathetic to the new Agadir 
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acknowledged that zoning according to the principle of functional division 
meant that a disproportionate share of the city’s natural assets—access to the 
beach, views of the mountains—were “monopolized” by the tourist district and 
tended to produce a “fragmentation” that was not even unambiguously good for 
the tourism industry, since it tended to keep tourists “parked in their hotels,” 
gazing at the sea rather than frequenting the town.22
More fundamentally, Agadir’s landscape became a field of struggle over 
what a truly decolonized Moroccan city might be. Criticism of the new Aga-
dir became intertwined with “an increasing search for national identity,” and 
the reconstructed city’s modernist architecture was frequently portrayed as Eu-
ropean rather than Moroccan in character.23 For Dethier, Agadir’s urban plan 
constituted a form of cultural imperialism masquerading as the application of 
universal norms. At a conference in Agadir in 1994, scholar Mohammed Charef 
expanded on Dethier’s denunciation of neo-imperialism in Agadir. For Charef, 
Agadir was “a city orphaned of its past and its memory, reconstructed by adopt-
ing the image of the Occident, in style as in organization.” Charef argued that 
the consequences of a disregard for tradition and heritage produced not only a 
lack of urban vitality but psychological suffering, a direct consequence of the 
imposition of the vision of Agadir’s urban planners, whom Charef depicted as 
alien: “The inhabitants find themselves with difficulty within this mechanistic 
conception; they feel lost, crushed, and would have certainly imagined a differ-
ent city conforming to their culture, if one had asked their opinion.”24 Like De-
thier, Charef connected Agadir’s soullessness to its modernist use of space and 
to the crushing cultural violence of a neo-imperialist universalism. This was by 
no means a dissident perspective in the 1990s. Echoing Charef ’s metaphor, the 
director of the kingdom’s state architectural service, Saïd Mouline, argued that 
neglect of architecture’s connection to patrimony would “condemn citizens to 
become orphans, amnesiacs, excluded and under-developed.”25
If we rephrase Bell and de-Shalit’s terms simply as “the idea of a city,” then 
clearly a strong idea about Agadir developed in the decades after the earthquake. 
If Paris, as they state, is defined as the “City of Romance,” Jerusalem as the “City 
of Religion,” and Montreal as the “City of Language(s),” then Agadir became 
known as the “City without a Soul.” Bell and de-Shalit note that ideas about 
cities often develop in contrast to other cities (Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, Montreal 
to Toronto.)26 As historian Moshe Gershovich has pointed out, the critique of 
Agadir as soulless is predicated on a contrast with other Moroccan cities, such as 
Marrakech and Fes, where the old city, or medina, has been preserved as a folk-
loric embodiment of Morocco’s cultural heritage.27 In comparison, one might 
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note that Fréjus is no Paris—but no one expects it to be. Agadir, on the other 
hand, is implicitly faulted for not being Marrakech, or at least Essaouira.
In Agadir, the discourse of “city without a soul” has not been universally 
accepted, but it has been impossible to ignore. Professor Mohamed Ben Attou, a 
geographer at the University Ibn Zohr in Agadir, has found it necessary to argue 
that today’s Agadir is neither a straightforward manifestation of the vision of 
the city planners, “nor a city without a soul,” but is developing, as all cities do, 
as a response to economics, demography, and the dynamic interactions between 
actors in the urban environment.28 In an interview published in 2011 in the Mo-
roccan newspaper Libération, M’bark Chbani asked the following of Agadir 
city councilman Mohammed Bajalat: “Some say that Agadir is a city without a 
history, without a soul: do you agree?” Bajalat, president and founding member 
of Forum Izorane, an organization devoted to promoting civic memory and civic 
pride in Agadir, responded unequivocally. Bajalat answered that the “without 
a soul” trope
is revolting . . . above all, in the obstinate desire to transpose the model of 
the imperial cities [Rabat, Marrakech, Fes] to Agadir. Finally, by what logic 
can we reduce a collective past to buildings? Certainly, the earthquake de-
stroyed many of the buildings and their occupants, but not the memory of 
the city.29
For both Bajalat and Ben Attou, the idea of Agadir’s soullessness is a mislead-
ing myth that needs to be countered. For Ben Attou, this is to be accomplished 
not only by means of academic rigor in the study of the actual city but through 
“the memory of each of its citizens” and through “a considerable effort to be 
deployed in order to share this collective memory.”30 Toward this end, Bajalat 
has taken a leading role in organizing his fellow Gadiris to preserve the memo-
ries of pre-earthquake Agadir through commemoration, while also celebrating 
Agadir’s modernity. This approach has been endorsed by Ahmed Bouskous, an 
earthquake survivor who had become the rector of the Royal Institute of Ama-
zigh [Berber] Culture. For Bouskous, the “soul of a city” was a work in prog-
ress: “to give a city a soul is the responsibility of local decision makers, and of 
the Gadiri population.” At the same time, however, the task, for Bouskous, was 
to preserve the memory and heritage of Agadir through “culture, song, poetry, 
cinema, theater, visual arts” and especially through Amazigh culture.31 Bousk-
ous’s approach to the question was not unlike the argument made against the 
“without out a soul” trope by Péré in 1967: Agadir’s soul, “whatever the shape 
of its walls” is rooted in “its location in the far south of Morocco, in its climate, 
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and its people, essentially Chleuh [Tashelhit-speaking Amazigh].”32 Bouskous 
and Péré would perhaps agree with Amazigh activists for whom the statement 
that Agadir has no soul is tantamount to a denial that Berbers have culture. For 
advocates of Amazigh culture, there is an alternate idea of Agadir: “Capital of 
the Berber South.”33
Tariq Kabbage (introduced in Chapter 5), who became the mayor of Agadir, 
has taken a different approach. “What is this soul of a city?” asks Kabbage; “We 
could philosophize about this until tomorrow morning.” The more pertinent 
questions, for Kabbage, were whether the inhabitants of the city felt comfort-
able in relation to the place where they live, and “whether this brings them a 
certain amount of pleasure, of joy.” “You know,” argues Kabbage, “when you 
lead a life of suffering, soul or no soul, that is not the question.” 34 Kabbage had 
little interest in the question of whether his city had a soul; his city had people, 
and it was their well-being that he cared about. Yet, as Bajalat and Bouskous 
recognize, a sense of civic memory and attachment to a positive idea of a city 
(Bell and de-Shalit’s “civicism”) helps to promote the sense of well-being desired 
by Kabbage. Conversely, the widespread claim that Agadir is a “city without a 
soul,” if not demonstrably deleterious to urban life, has at least been a source of 
anxiety for some inhabitants of the city.
Agadir Before 1960
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Agadir had been a strategic fortress 
and trading post of importance to the Portuguese, Saadians, and Dutch and an 
outlet for the caravan trade from the Sahara and the sugar production of the 
Souss Valley. The Portuguese had built an outpost, the fortress of Santa Cruz, 
near the beach in an area later called Founti. After defeating the Portuguese and 
destroying Santa Cruz in 1451, the Saadians constructed a larger fortress on Aga-
dir Oufella, the mountain overlooking the bay. The Saadians also constructed a 
port, and Agadir became a vital link in the sugar trade of southern Morocco.35 
By the eighteenth century, however, the city’s fortunes had declined. Agadir was 
struck by a severe earthquake in 1731, with reportedly total destruction, but soon 
recovered. As in the Saadian period, Agadir remained a key connection point 
between the southern caravan routes, the imperial capital at Marrakesh, and 
the European trade—and for this reason, was fought over in local power strug-
gles. This changed, however, when Alaouite Sultan Mohammed ibn Abd-Al-
lah opened a new southern port at Mogador (Essaouira) in 1774. Finding the 
Souss Valley’s elites rebellious and Agadir dangerously far from Marrakesh, the 
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sultan closed the port of Agadir. According to some accounts, the punishment 
of the rebellious Souss was a major reason for the construction of Mogador in 
the first place.36
By the dawn of the twentieth century, Agadir was little more than a fish-
ing village.37 Then, however, Western interests began to extend southward into 
the Souss Valley. The revelation that the Souss region contained iron ore made 
Agadir a place of interest to Europeans for the first time since 1774. While the 
struggle for the Sultan’s throne in Fes was at the center of international conflict 
over Morocco in 1911, competition among French and German prospectors in 
the south provided the pretext for the arrival of the German gunboat Panther. 
After German objections to a French takeover of Morocco were alleviated by the 
cession of a sliver of French Equatorial Africa to Germany, the French arrived 
in Agadir in force.38
French-ruled Agadir, unlike Moroccan cities such as Rabat, Casablanca, or 
Fez, exhibited only a superficial imprint of the French colonial philosophy of the 
1910s and 1920s promoted by Morocco’s first French resident-general, Hubert 
Lyautey, and his chief urban planner, Henri Prost. As a young officer stationed in 
Algeria, Lyautey had fetishized Arab culture, and disdained the French impact 
on Algerian society. He was disgusted by the French-built cities and towns he 
encountered there, with their rationalist regularity and lack of any noticeably 
Arab or African character, beyond “shoddy goods and pastiche.”39 To this root-
lessness, Lyautey contrasted the harmony of Mediterranean cities such as Rome 
and Naples, with architecture “well adapted to the local climate and mentality.”40 
As resident-general of Morocco, Lyautey hoped that urban planning would be a 
remedy to the two things he hated most: French republican universalism on the 
one hand, and cultural hybridization on the other.41 The result was the creation 
of new European districts separated from the Moroccan city centers, or medi-
nas, by greenspaces, or cordons sanitaires, to minimize cultural contamination. 
Lyautey instructed his underlings to “Touch the indigenous cities as little as 
possible. . . . Instead, improve their surroundings where, on the vast terrain that 
is still free, the European city rises, following a plan that realizes the most mod-
ern conceptions of large boulevards, water and electrical supplies, squares and 
gardens, buses and tramways, and also foresees future extensions.”42 For Janet 
Abu-Lughod, Lyautist urbanism amounted to a system of “cultural and religious 
apartheid” based on “minimum alteration in the Moroccan quarters. . . . the 
creation of a cordon sanitaire around these native reservations with a greenbelt 
of open land; and the design and construction of the most modern, efficient, 
elegant cities that Europe could produce.”43 Although his effort to prevent the 
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mingling of people and cultures was unsuccessful, Lyautey’s vision had a pro-
found impact on the development of Moroccan cities such as Rabat, Marrakech, 
and Fes.44
Far to the south, however, Agadir’s growth into a medium-sized city did not 
begin until the late 1920s. By this time, the influence of Lyautey and Prost was 
waning in a new, settler-dominated Morocco. As commerce grew at the new 
French-built port, the mainly Tashlehit-speaking Moroccan population almost 
tripled, from an estimated 700 to approximately 2,000 in 1930, while the Euro-
pean population grew to 1,650.45 Rampant land speculation led to the declara-
tion of an official urban development plan in 1932.46 The 1932 plan, in Lyautist 
fashion, called for a new European “Ville Nouvelle,” separated spatially from 
the two historic Moroccan quarters: the towering heights of the Kasbah, and 
the fishing hamlet Founti adjacent to the beach below. The slopes of the Kasbah 
provided a sort of natural cordon sanitaire, as did two riverbeds east of the Kas-
bah: the Wadi Tildi, which separated the Talborj and administrative plateaus 
from the Ville Nouvelle, and the Wadi Tanaout, separating the Ville Nouvelle 
from the industrial quarter.47
On the Talborj plateau, however, geography and events were already produc-
ing a spatially separated commercial-residential center which attracted both 
Europeans and Moroccans. This district, not the Ville Nouvelle, became the 
heart of the city. As the Moroccan population had grown in the overcrowded 
Kasbah and Founti, which could not expand due to the steepness of the slope 
abutting the Kasbah, a new district was constructed, the Talborj. As this became 
the center of commerce for the city, the Moroccan inhabitants—Berber-and 
Arabic-speaking Muslims and Jews—were soon joined by Europeans. In cities 
such as Rabat and Casablanca residential segregation eventually broke down as 
affluent Moroccans moved into the Ville Nouvelle, while drought and colonial 
land policy emptied the rural areas into new peripheral neighborhoods beyond 
the initial dyad of old medina and Ville Nouvelle. In Agadir, in contrast, it was 
the Ville Nouvelle that became peripheral, while the ethnically mixed Talborj 
became the center of urban life.48
After 1945, a new commercial boom occurred, based on the export of citrus, 
canned fish, and minerals. During the postwar economic recovery, construc-
tion blossomed in both the Talbordj and the Ville Nouvelle. By the early 1950s, 
the total population grew to around forty thousand, including close to fifteen 
thousand Europeans. The tourist industry also began to develop, as new hotels 
were constructed and the International Federation of Travel Agencies promoted 
Agadir as the “Moroccan Nice,” “Pearl of the South,” and “city of three hundred 
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days of sunshine.”49 Boom, however, was followed by bust. Crises in agriculture 
and in the cannery business between 1955 and 1958 converged with political cri-
sis, as Moroccan independence provoked an exodus of Europeans. In Agadir, the 
European population dropped to 4,700 by 1959. Only the small tourist industry 
seemed to be thriving: the city’s 200 first-class rooms and 60 second-class rooms 
were, reportedly, fully booked when the earthquake struck.50 Over-construction 
of both buildings and roads gave observers the sense of a half-empty city: “one 
sees there a network of roads, often unnecessary, delimiting numerous vacant 
lots, interspersed with a small number of buildings.”51 To Pierre Mas, planner 
of the new Agadir, pre-earthquake Agadir was “inorganic, dissolute, a city with 
neither a center nor coherence.”52 This critique would have discursive staying 
power, and would be echoed in the critiques of the new, post-earthquake Aga-
dir as well.
The postwar years had seen the rise of new approach to the use of urban 
planning to shape society. After Prost had departed Morocco in 1923, and Ly-
autey in 1925, the interests of speculators and settlers had weakened the role of 
statist urban planning throughout Morocco. However, it was the rise and fall 
of Vichy that thoroughly discredited Lyautey’s culturalism. In urban planning 
as in colonial education, French colonial policy returned to the universalism 
that Lyautey had rejected. In 1944, the Office of European Habitat took on the 
task of housing the Moroccan population and dropped the word “European” 
from its name. Two years later, in 1946, Michel Ecochard was appointed to head 
urban planning in Morocco; Ecochard created the Service of Urbanism in 1949, 
which was placed within the department of Public Works. Ecochard’s modern-
ism, modeled on the principles of Le Corbusier, signaled a sharp break from 
Lyautey’s approach. 53 Urban planning thus became divorced from the study 
of particular cultures. Rabinow describes Ecochard’s approach as the “neglect, 
which bordered on contempt, of economic and political considerations” and as 
a “refusal to acknowledge local practices.” Under Ecochard, the protectorate 
undertook a massive but belated effort to cope with the demographic growth of 
Morocco’s urban populations, striving to offer the trâme Ecochard to the masses: 
a sixteen-by-eight-meter living space endowed with access to light, air, and space. 
“Culture” was no longer part of the equation.54
The Impact of the Earthquake
It has often been said that there is no such thing as a natural disaster. Despite the 
extent of the destruction in Agadir, the earthquake had an estimated magnitude 
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of only 5.75 on the Richter scale, as measured on seismographs in Casablanca 
and in Europe. Seismologists blamed the high death toll on the location of the 
epicenter near the earth’s surface and near population centers. Engineers blamed 
the prevalence of unreinforced masonry and the use of improper techniques in 
constructing buildings of steel-reinforced concrete.55
However, the growth of Agadir since the 1930s and especially during the post-
war economic boom also amplified the destruction and lethality of the earth-
quake, as the Kasbah population grew and, in the postwar Talborj, buildings were 
hastily expanded upward with additions of second and third stories made of un-
reinforced concrete.56 The lethality was not evenly distributed; the much higher 
survival rate of the European population was directly related to their economic 
domination in modern Morocco, which allowed many to live in the more expen-
sive Ville Nouvelle, where a third of the buildings withstood the quake in repa-
rable condition, while the Kasbah and Talborj were almost entirely destroyed. It 
should be noted, however, that Europeans residing in the devastated Talborj (ad-
jacent to the “administrative plateau”), fared worse than Moroccan workers living 
in the eastern industrial quarter, which avoided much damage, due to greater 
distance from the epicenter, less multistory housing, and many corrugated-metal 
buildings.57 Had the Lyautist model prevailed in Agadir, the discrepancy between 
European and Moroccan survival rates would have been greater.
After the earthquake, there was a powerful modernist consensus about the 
goals for reconstruction among those elites who were able to give public voice 
to their visions. Foreign seismologists and engineers advised that a new, bet-
ter Agadir should be built of steel-reinforced concrete in the area occupied by 
the Ville Nouvelle and the eastern industrial district. As Daniel Williford has 
pointed out, this meant closing the book on traditional Moroccan architecture, 
on affordable, low-cost construction methods, and on the entire sections of the 
old city where the Kasbah, Talborj, and Founti had once housed the majority 
of the Moroccan population.58 King Mohammed V endorsed this vision and 
sought an ambitious urban plan to create a new city that would be an “expres-
sion of modern Morocco.”59 Al-Istiqlal called for the construction of “not only 
a new Agadir, but also, and above all, a new Morocco.”60 Rebuilding Agadir was 
not just about housing the survivors, mitigating risk, or restoring the port as an 
outlet for the agricultural produce of the Moroccan south: the city’s recovery was 
to be a model for the future of the nation as a whole. One of the earliest enun-
ciations of the idea that the Agadir disaster had created a unique opportunity 
(a common response to modern earthquakes) was found in a report by a West 
German technical assistance team, which concluded with the declaration that
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the unique possibility offered by the reconstruction of the new Agadir 
should be fully utilized. . . . Decisions concerning the reconstruction of 
the city, and the plans, should of course be governed by the general welfare 
of the city, without any consideration for certain private interests. This is 
the only way to build a new modern Agadir. Certain mistakes made in the 
past could be avoided, and the city could become an example of a modern 
progressive Morocco.61
The disregard for private interests embodied in this transnational modernist 
response provided an opportunity for a Moroccan monarchy interested in con-
solidating its power over the country. This was not at all unprecedented: ambi-
tious urban planning had long been linked to authoritarian rule, and disasters 
have often provided opportunities for authoritarian modernism. The destruc-
tion and reconstruction of Lisbon in the eighteenth century had provided the 
opportunity for the rise of Carvalho’s absolutism in Portugal. In 1830s France, 
cholera epidemics had spurred some intellectuals to advocate “the equivalent of 
a technician’s coup d’état, arguing that only a planned and hierarchically coor-
dinated effort was adequate to the crisis. Engineers could save France, but only if 
far-reaching changes in private property were undertaken.”62 In contrast, grand 
urban schemes after the London Fire of 1666 and the San Francisco earthquake 
of 1906 had been stymied by the assertions of property rights by the bourgeoi-
sie.63 Hassan would not allow this to happen in Agadir, and initiated a vast proj-
ect of property expropriation and state regulation of reconstruction.
For Hassan, the architecture and urban design of Agadir was “the expression, 
in stone and in space, of the aspirations of the national macrocosm” 64 Just as 
Mohammed V in 1960 had made the monarchy the center of Moroccan hu-
manitarian responses to the earthquake, in 1966, King Hassan II linked the 
modernist reconstruction of Agadir to the unity of the Moroccan nation and 
the nation’s embodiment in the person of the king. As Hassan declared, the goal 
of reconstruction was
Not to simply restore the old, the replaceable, but to make a new work, 
alive, essentially opening on the future; to give men back reasons to live 
and to hope, it is necessary that these reasons merit the confidence of the 
dispossessed and that they are thus guaranties, sanctioned by the King and 
by the People as a whole, in short, that the reconstruction of Agadir be 
conceived as a work [that is] above all, national.
And in fact Agadir was constantly for the entire country the site of a 
magnificent élan of solidarity, of abnegation, of union. All the nation felt 
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involved, challenged, all the nation, under the firm and lucid guidance, the 
example of our regretted father, His Majesty Mohammed V, then with We 
Ourselves, mobilized its means, its intelligence, its heart.65
The young king’s embrace of modern planners’ ability to build a new future 
without regard for the past seemed to be absolute, as he described the new Aga-
dir as “a total city, virtually a dream city, rethought in entirety, remade by man 
for man, by the Moroccan for the Moroccans and Morocco.” This vision of the 
new city was tied to a forward-looking vision for the nation as a whole: “The 
reconstruction of Agadir becomes as the symbol and the concrete projection of 
what the country wants to be, faced with any problem in the national life: the 
deliberate and total union of all for a better life for all and for each.” 66 In this 
vision, the choices of individuals counted for little; the unity of the whole, under 
the authority of the king, counted for everything.
This approach was enthusiastically endorsed by planners such as Mourad 
Ben Embarek at the Moroccan Service of Urbanism. Morocco’s urbanists thus 
joined a long line of planners, from Carvalho’s chief engineer Manuel de Maia to 
Lyautey’s Henri Prost, who found their work made easier by an autocratic state 
that removed the obstacle of local community resistance to a central vision.67 
This symbiosis was evident in Agadir. The link between state power and city 
planning was made explicit by the editors of the Moroccan architectural journal 
A + U: Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme who declared, reflecting 
on the reconstruction of Agadir, that “more and more, urbanism should affirm 
itself as a means of governing.”68 For Mourad Ben Embarek, urban design and 
state control went hand-in-hand in a tourist city: “user comfort” was paramount, 
views of the sky and the sea had to be preserved, and “commercial and specu-
lative considerations cannot and should not affect this concept.” Unregulated 
building would lead to overly dense construction, ruining the city’s aesthetic 
potential and creating “regrettable chaos.”69 For Ben Embarek, one only needed 
to look north across the Mediterranean to Spain to see a coastline that had been 
“ravaged” by a lack of regulation.70 For the monarchy, Agadir was important 
because of its historic role as a crucial outpost for the assertion of northern Mo-
roccan power over the south, a role it would reprise in the 1975 Green March. 
After the earthquake, however, it also served as an opportune laboratory for the 
assertion of royal power.
And autocracy could be efficient. Even Jean Dethier, who condemned the au-
thoritarianism of the planning process, was compelled to acknowledge that in its 
efficiency, Agadir was “an extraordinary success. . . . Regarding the financial level . . . 
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it was a tour de force. On the technical level also: 5 years after the earthquake, the 
new city was more than 75% constructed.”71 In lieu of a voluntary fundraising 
drive like those that had funded disaster relief in Orléansville and Fréjus, the 
state imposed a mandatory National Solidarity tax. To prevent uncontrolled 
reconstruction both inside and outside of the zone determined to be safe for re-
construction (mostly the area of the old Ville Nouvelle and industrial zone), the 
state expropriated as many as one thousand parcels of private property, covering 
400 hectares. In compensation, property owners were allowed to choose lots of 
equivalent size defined in the new urban plan. While the government provided 
grants (up to 50 percent) and loans subsidizing reconstruction costs, property 
owners had to submit detailed plans to the office of the High Commissariat 
for Reconstruction. Once an edifice was completed, the High Commissariat 
for Reconstruction also had to give approval before the new building could be 
inhabited. These measures aimed to ensure that both seismic and architectural 
standards were met.72 Daniel Williford notes that the losers in the expropriation 
process included poorer Gadiris who lacked legal title to their homes.73 However, 
the process also excluded the land speculators who had purchased land in the 
Ville Nouvelle during the postwar period and who had not built on their prop-
erty. These absentee owners of empty lots, largely French, were ineligible for 
State subsidies for reconstruction, and properties considered abandoned were 
confiscated. The French consulate protested initially, but then relented.74 The 
earthquake thus permitted another significant step in the process of decoloni-
zation, with the redistribution of French-owned land to Moroccans, under the 
firm control of the Moroccan state.
The centralized power of the Moroccan state in 1960 was, however, a legacy 
of colonial authoritarianism. Laws enacted in 1914 under French direction had 
precisely regulated not only the “the width of streets, the alignment of buildings, 
the height and construction of buildings,” but also architectural style.75 Titles to 
land dispensed by the state in Meknes, Fes, and Marrakesh came with the condi-
tion that construction ensue according to the urban plan. As in post-earthquake 
Agadir, there were to be no lots left vacant by speculators. The new protectorate 
in 1914 had also pioneered legislation “permitting expropriation by zones,” rather 
than by specific lot or building, with zoning based on function.76 Like the colo-
nial state under Lyautey, under which all proposals for new construction in the 
Moroccan medinas were regulated by the Service des Antiquités, Beaux-Arts, et 
Monuments Historiques, and in the European districts by the Service d’Archi-
tecture et des Plans des Villes, the Moroccan state ensured that private as well as 
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public construction would accord with the official vision of the state’s urban plan-
ners and architects.77 Now, however, that vision was something quite different.
Designing the New Agadir
Due to efforts to “Moroccanize” the newly independent Moroccan state, the 
Service of Urbanism was directed by Abdesalem Faraoui until 1961, and then 
by Mourad Ben Embarek.78 According to historian Thierry Nadau, who inter-
viewed the principal planners and architects, however, there was no discernible 
dichotomy between the service’s French and Moroccan professionals in terms 
of their approach to urbanism. Faroui and Ben Embarek were “little influenced 
by traditional architecture, [and were] even hostile to the medinas in which 
they had grown up.”79 Having received their professional training in postwar 
France,80 they had imbibed little of the Lyautist anti-assimilationism that had 
been promoted in the pre-1945 schools of the protectorate and that had been 
embraced by much nationalist discourse. Under the leadership of Faraoui and 
Ben Embarek, the core of the team consisted of the urban planner Pierre Mas 
and the landscape architect Jean Challet, who would become the primary de-
signers of the new Agadir; together, they would lead a group of European and 
Moroccan architects to design state-owned buildings in modernist style, and to 
set the guidelines imposed on private builders.81
The new Agadir, as designed by these French and Moroccan urbanists, re-
flected the prevailing modernist ideas of the postwar era, ideas which diverged 
from the principles of cultural preservation and segregation that had dominated 
urbanism and architecture in Morocco under Lyautey and Prost, in favor of the 
functionalist, universalist modernism of Ecochard and Le Corbusier.82 Mas and 
Challet aimed to preserve the city’s natural assets—most notably sunlight and 
the bay— but had little interest in preserving the Agadir of the past.83 They 
focused on adapting their designs to the natural environment rather than to 
Moroccan culture; architecture and urbanism were viewed in reference to the 
relation between universal man (an idea Lyautey had despised) and nature.84 Ar-
chitects designing individual buildings such as the new modernist city hall drew 
loose inspiration from the architectural traditions of southern Morocco, but this 
Moroccan-inspired modernism was a far cry from Lyautey’s efforts to preserve 
the traditional medina. Moreover, the urban planners, according to Mas, aimed 
to “link the quarters by means of constructed elements, creating a sense of urban 
unity and avoiding all social segregation.”85 This was the antithesis of Lyautism.
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The new shape of the city was conditioned by tectonic as well as ideological 
shifts. The earthquake had destroyed the “traditional” Kasbah. It would not 
be rebuilt, both because seismologists had advised against rebuilding northwest 
of the Wadi Tildi, and because Lyautey’s fetishization of Moroccan tradition 
was no longer in vogue among Francophone urbanists. It could be argued that, 
by 1960, Lyautism had been rendered irrelevant by structural and demographic 
changes in Moroccan cities in general and earthquake-ravaged Agadir in partic-
ular. The disaster had greatly accelerated the shrinking of the European popu-
lation, a process begun by political independence and economic crisis. Tectonics 
had destroyed the old city; demography meant that the new city was intended for 
Moroccans. What place was there for the Lyautey legacy of cultural separation 
and modernism-for-Europeans if the old medina was gone and the Europeans 
were leaving? Yet demography and tectonics did not in themselves determine 
Agadir’s fate: as Rabinow has noted, it was the culture of postwar urbanism that 
led the new city’s designers to treat Agadir’s residents as cultureless universal 
inhabitants of a theoretical modern world.86
Seismic considerations tempered the ambitions of the modernists: un-
like much of housing development in Morocco since 1947, there would be no 
high-rises.87 In other respects, however, the planners undertook to reshape the 
natural environment. A new urban unity, hitherto made impossible by geogra-
phy, was to be achieved by eliminating the division created by the ravine of the 
Wadi Tanaout: the ravine was filled in with debris from collapsed buildings, and 
an aqueduct was constructed with reinforced concrete to handle the water flow. 
According to Mas, “This operation permitted the unification of the site of the 
new city, making disappear a geological accident troublesome for its develop-
ment.”88 The Wadi Tildi became the new western boundary of the reconstructed 
city; beyond, lay the bulldozed wasteland of the old Talborj and the ruins of the 
Kasbah. As in Bartholomew’s American plan (discussed in Chapter 5), a tourist 
district east of the port directly abutted the beach. This tourist area’s hotels 
would largely house Europeans, but no cordon sanitaire would divide it from the 
Moroccan city. Instead, as Bartholomew had proposed, it would be immediately 
adjacent to the city center’s commercial-administrative district, just inland to 
the north; a pedestrian walkway over the filled-in Tanaout ravine was to facili-
tate movement between the functionally distinct zones.89
Another aspect of the Service de l’Urbanisme’s final plan was the idea of cre-
ating a “new Talborj,” which, according to Mas, “posed the most delicate prob-
lems.”90 The forty-five hectare quarter was to house ten thousand to twelve thou-
sand people, and to be the site of “traditional commerce.” It would be served by 
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two schools, a market, parks, sports fields, and a cinema. Here, in Mas’s words, 
he and his fellow planners attempted “to recreate, within islands, by means of a 
network of narrow pedestrian paths, the ambiance and scale of traditional me-
dinas.”91 Each lot had access to a road for motor vehicles as well as medina-style 
footpaths.92 The idea of a modernist medina provided a solution to a practical 
problem. Because of the high population density of the old Talborj, each house-
hold could claim only a small indemnity from the state for their property loss, al-
though a minimum compensation level was set at 6,000 dirhams per household, 
to allow minimum standards to be met. Consequently, reconstruction for these 
families had to be extremely modest. The New Talborj was designed to bring the 
population of this vital commercial district back together, on a scale they could 
afford and which would fit the designers’ conceptions of urban order.93 But there 
would be no cordon sanitaire here, either: the Talborj was immediately adjacent 
to the “modern” commercial and administrative sector.
This was not Lyautey’s vision of the Moroccan city. In the New Talborj, there 
was a faint echo of the “neo-traditional” design that characterized the new Ha-
bous neighborhoods constructed in Casablanca, which had attempted to repli-
cate the “organic image of the traditional media” but with automobile access and 
electrical and water infrastructure. In the Lyautist Habous, however, “all sym-
metry and geometricism were banned.”94 Agadir’s medina-islands, in contrast, 
were separated from each other by a regular pattern of main roads, and bore 
greater resemblance to the postwar construction projects in Casablanca’s Aïn 
Chock and Mohammedia’s new medina, with their “much less literal interpreta-
tion” of the traditional medina, and the obvious “modernist influence of cubism 
and Bauhaus.”95 The designers of the new Talborj and of public buildings such 
as the new town hall may have drawn on Moroccan precedents for ideas, but 
this was not Lyautey’s cultural preservationism; it was Corbuserian modernist 
planning with some local inspiration. 96
Over time, the tourist district grew beyond its intended boundaries, driven by 
European demand and Moroccan investment. As Thierry Nadau has argued, the 
growth of the tourist sector engulfed what the planners had envisioned as the 
commercial center of the city, which became an area of hotels, restaurants, and 
shops for tourists. Moroccans shopped elsewhere, and increasing lived elsewhere, 
too. State control of construction prevented an increase in population density 
in the planned city, and the new seismic codes made officially sanctioned hous-
ing more expensive. Consequently, non-tourist commerce shifted to the south-
east, pulled by the growth of residential construction beyond what had been 
originally conceived as the industrial zone.97 Consequently, there was no true 
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city center, and the New Talborj became just one neighborhood among many, 
never attaining the central role in city life played by its predecessor, west of the 
Wadi Tildi.98
A Return to Lyautey
Lyautism was not dead, however. In many respects, segments of Moroccan na-
tionalism had long embraced and adapted the Lyautey legacy. The authors of the 
1934 Plan de Reforms, arguably the first public articulation of protectorate-era 
Moroccan nationalism, had called for a renaissance of Lyautey’s principles, ex-
plicitly favoring cultural dualism in education, while denouncing French poli-
cies of “two weights and two measures” in the allocation of resources.99 Yet the 
nationalist embrace of Lyautey’s culturalism in their denunciations of assimila-
tion had no immediate impact on the policies or urban plans of the Moroccan 
and French architects and planners at the Service d’urbanisme, who “contin-
ued to follow the principles of Ecochard.”100 The resulting contrast between 
Lyautist-nationalist culturalism and the modernist universalism of Morocco’s 
city planners lay at the root of emerging critiques of the new Agadir as a “city 
without a soul.”
Beginning in the 1970s, the desire to affirm a culturally Moroccan approach 
to architecture and to reject Europeanization was expressed by European com-
mentators as well as Moroccans and crossed political boundaries of the Left and 
Right. Dethier’s 1973 critique of Agadir went beyond the notion that function-
alist divisions of city districts disrupted “community and animation”101 and de-
fined the more fundamental problem as one of neocolonialism. Dethier argued 
that urban planners had imposed a Western vision of cities, and he argued for a 
new urbanism that would “permit the abolition of systems of mental, economic, 
and technical dependence on the rich countries, and favor the development of 
new authentic cultures in the Third World.”102 For Dethier, modernist urban 
planners, however well-intentioned, practiced “a new paternalism, oppressive 
and constraining.”103 Dethier’s argument was paralleled by Abderrafih Lahbabi, 
writing in the Moroccan journal Lamalif. Citing Dethier and recognizing that 
decolonization was only partial, Lahbabi applied a Gramscian analysis to the 
problem. Lahbabi’s hope was that “a new language should gradually replace the 
deterioration of the dominant symbolic hierarchy.” This, in his view, should be 
the goal of architecture in Morocco. Believing that the working class needed 
to ally with other anti-imperialist groups, Lahbabi argued that liberation re-
quired not only social and economic emancipation, but “cultural identification.” 
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Consequently, Lahbabi denounced the abstract humanism of the Corbusier 
school. Moroccan architects needed to engage in “the search for a national ar-
chitectural identity” as a necessary step in the class struggle.104
On the opposite end of the Moroccan political spectrum, King Hassan II 
gave a speech in Marrakech in 1986 addressed to architects that also called for 
a connection between architecture and national identity. This speech signaled 
an abrupt departure from the modernist ideas of architecture and city plan-
ning that Hassan had supported during the reconstruction of Agadir. The 1986 
speech had two main elements: the first promoted the notion that architecture 
in Morocco should be tied to the maintenance of tradition and Moroccan cul-
tural identity; the second established the monarchy as the guardian of cultural 
authenticity in the kingdom. Hassan, who had been a driving force behind the 
reconstruction of Agadir, now denounced Moroccan cities that were not recog-
nizably Moroccan. Agadir, its ancient kasbah now nothing more than a field 
of ruins atop a hill, clearly no longer fit Hassan’s vision of what a Moroccan 
city should be. Without mentioning Agadir, the king lamented that there were 
cities in Morocco that, if one viewed them from a helicopter, would not even be 
identifiable as Moroccan. Hassan contrasted such cities (‘McCities’ one might 
call them) with cities, such as Azzemour, whose historical ramparts and kasbahs 
identified them as unmistakably Moroccan. The king declared that new archi-
tecture in the kingdom should also “reaffirm our authenticity” and “preserve the 
characteristics of our country. . . . We must not renounce our mother, the land 
where we were born and where we live.”105 Architects, to prepare for this task, 
were advised to visit the kasbahs of the Moroccan south and the Atlas Moun-
tains. To ensure that his new vision of Moroccan architecture should become a 
reality, Hassan proposed regulatory oversight of architectural plans for all new 
construction in the kingdom. Thus, Hassan extended to the entire kingdom 
the royal influence over architectural culture that he had exerted during the 
reconstruction of Agadir—but this royal influence was now directed toward 
very different ends.
Jennifer Roberson has argued that Hassan II’s transition from his support of 
Corbusierian modernism to this emphasis on national cultural authenticity can 
be traced to his traditionalist choices in the design of his father’s mausoleum 
in 1961, which grew into an effort to promote the “revival” of Moroccan tradi-
tional crafts skills in the 1970s. Roberson notes that by attempting to define and 
preserve selected aspects of Moroccan tradition, Hassan was following in the 
footsteps of Lyautey.106 However, promoting tradition was also part of a broader 
project of justifying authoritarian rule: the Alaouite monarch’s authority had to 
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be rooted in respect for the past, as a hedge against revolutionary demands for 
democracy. The monarchy’s change of position on architecture can be seen as 
part of its broader promotion of Islamic and traditionalist notions of Moroccan 
identity in response to political threats from the Left embodied in the 1965 stu-
dent riots in Casablanca.107 In the field of architecture, however, Hassan’s new 
approach harmonized with the anti-colonial Left’s call to challenge imperialist 
hegemony through an architecture of cultural identity. A new consensus was 
emerging that would reinforce the discourse of Agadir’s soullessness.
Calls from leftist intellectuals and the Moroccan king urging architects to 
embrace a connection with the past and with national identity were accompa-
nied by a trend in the architectural choices of wealthy Moroccans, who increas-
ingly incorporated traditionalist elements, or “green tile” architecture, in new 
construction. The results received mixed reviews. Like Lyautey in prewar Al-
giers, Lahdabi and others found the results to be inauthentic “pastiche” rather 
than a true expression of Moroccan culture.108 As Thierry Nadau put it in 1992, 
“The new buildings have nothing to do with the Moroccan. They are the pal-
aces of a Thousand and One Nights.”109 It was not only in Agadir, apparently, 
where architecture failed to fulfill the dreams of those who hoped to capture the 
essence of the Moroccan “soul.”
In the early 1990s, in the last years of his life, Hassan II sought a solution to 
this problem through monumental architecture. The construction of a tower-
ing new traditionalist mosque now meant that even Casablanca could pass his 
“helicopter test”: the city’s skyline became unmistakably Moroccan. Marrakech 
had the Koutoubia Mosque and Fes had the Kairaouine; now Casablanca had 
the Hassan II Mosque. The giant new mosque in Casablanca was, however, jux-
taposed in the skyline to a pair of monolithic, modernist commercial skyscrapers 
in the commercial district of the Maârif. Lyautey’s cultural dualism lived on in 
the policies of the monarchy. Morocco could be both modern and traditional, 
but the two remained stylistically and spatially distinct; “pastiche” and hybrid-
ization were avoided.110
Agadir thus became an anomaly, at least among Morocco’s larger and 
better-known cities. The planners and architects of the new Agadir, with their 
focus on functionalism, had rejected monumentalism.111 There were no tower-
ing buildings to dominate the urban space: no clock tower, no royal palace, no 
grand mosque. Only Agadir Oufella, a vacant, vast sepulcher, stood to memori-
alize the past. Were it not for the inscription “God, Country, King” emblazoned 
on the side of the mountain to fill the need for imperial grandeur, Agadir could 
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not pass the king’s helicopter test. Consequently, the “without a soul” trope that 
had originated in the 1960s continued to circulate.
While this trope was distressing to some residents of the city, it did not 
deter Agadir’s economic or demographic growth. The population of the city 
rebounded, rising from less than seventeen thousand after the earthquake to 
over sixty-one thousand in 1971.112 By 2004 it had more than quintupled, to over 
three hundred forty-six thousand. Architecture aside, this was an unquestion-
ably Moroccan city, including just 1,925 foreigners, barely half of one percent. 
Soul or no soul, in strictly demographic terms Agadir has been more thoroughly 
decolonized than a number of other Moroccan cities, largely due to the effects 
of the earthquake.113
Conclusion
Unquestionably, the discourse of Agadir as a “city without a soul” would not 
exist if the earthquake had not destroyed the Kasbah, if tourists from Europe 
and vacationers from Casablanca were able to combine their beach holidays with 
shopping trips in a densely populated and “authentic” Moroccan fortress. In 
neither Fréjus nor Orléansville did disaster so greatly transform the symbolism 
of the architectural landscape as the 1960 earthquake did in Agadir. In Morocco, 
however, the lament for Agadir’s soul was not just a product of the destruction 
of precolonial edifices; it was also the product of a colonial idea that emphasized 
the importance of preserving precolonial cityscapes. While Algeria’s national 
identity was connected to the idea of a revolution, breaking from the past, the 
Moroccan monarchy of Hassan II, like Lyautey’s colonial state, emphasized the 
preservation of tradition.
In Agadir, the disaster prompted an exodus of the European population and 
provided an opportunity for the Moroccan monarchy to assert its authority and 
to use American aid to lessen Moroccan dependence on France. As the victor in 
the “Battle of the Plans,” however, France salvaged its role as Morocco’s provider 
of technical assistance in the field of urbanism. Consequently, the destruction 
of Agadir permitted Morocco’s French and French-educated urban planners to 
apply their Corbusierian ideas of universalist modernism on the scale of an en-
tire city, untainted by the legacy of Lyautey’s effort to ensure that Moroccan cit-
ies preserve an essentialist conception of Moroccan culture. For some, this new 
urbanism came to represent a neo-colonial continuation of French hegemony. 
Consequently, although the earthquake facilitated a break with traditionalist 
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urban design in Agadir, this break fed anxiety and anomie concerning Mo-
roccan cultural identity, and contributed to a backlash against the putatively 
universalist ideas of the city’s planners. This backlash served the interest of the 
monarchy, which portrayed itself as the defender of Moroccan identity.
In Agadir, questions about the meaning of decolonization and the impact of 
the earthquake were intertwined and contested in the realm of architecture and 
urban planning over the course of decades because of Morocco’s particular his-
tory and because of the specific pattern of physical damage in Agadir. However, 
the long impact of environmental disaster and the long struggles of decoloniza-
tion also unfolded in the realms of memory, memoir, and literature.
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Rupture, Nostalgia, and Representation
The Tashelhit poet Ibn Ighil memorialized the 1960 Agadir disas-ter in an oral poem that framed lamentations of loss in religious terms. In the poem, Ighil grapples with the fact that people and places had sud-
denly ceased to exist. “Where is that place of the righteous men, of the carpets 
and of the trays and tea?” he asks, and the poem answers: “There is nothing in 
it but wind.”1 Ibn Ighil’s poem oered no comment on the relation between the 
environmental and political events of his time. As Kenneth Brown and Ahmed 
Lakhsassi have pointed out, the prevailing metaphor of Ighil’s poem is that of 
the Day of Judgement, in which all is destroyed as if by a “ooding wadi,” and 
reduced to “powder, powder.” 2 In this poem, there is no nation: “Morocco” is 
not mentioned; nor is the city’s history of French colonialism. The destroyed dis-
tricts of the city are listed, and the inhabitants are identied by religion, gender, 
wealth, and “righteousness.” The city exists in the space between God, the poet, 
and the dead, not “God, Country, King.”3
Unlike Ibn Ighil, other memoirists and creative writers have memorialized 
the disasters of 1954 to 1960 by explicitly exploring the relation between envi-
ronmental disaster and the political contexts of decolonization. These writers 
grappled with the realization that their loved ones had lived in colonial spaces, 
and that the end of colonialism had coincided with the destruction of the lives 
they had lived and the cities they had known. The physical places they remem-
bered were gone, unrecognizably transformed by catastrophic movements of 
matter. But other transformations were also sweeping away the pre-disaster, 
pre-decolonization contexts of their lives.
Fiction and memoir about the disasters of 1954 to 1960 provides insight into 
how survivors and observers conceptualized the long a	ermath of those events 
in later decades. Historians can make some cautious use of memoirs as sources 
to examine long-past events, such as the disaster response in Beni Rached, dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 in light of both Belgacem Aït Ouyahia’s 1999 memoir and 
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archival documents written soon after the earthquake. But memoirs such as Aït 
Ouyahia’s can also be used as contemporaneous primary sources, contempora-
neous with the experience of surviving decade after decade with the memory of 
the disaster, and its effects. All the sources discussed in this chapter, whether pre-
sented as fiction or memoir, differ from the archival sources relied upon in earlier 
chapters not in their greater or lesser veracity but rather in that they emerge from 
their author’s reflection on an “event” that begins with the sudden onset of envi-
ronmental catastrophe but that includes a long aftermath of months and years. 
Their object of study, in other words, is almost coterminous with the object of 
the present study. In contrast, archival documents such as diplomatic cables also 
present an author’s perception, memory, and representation of an event, but the 
event of primary concern is often one of much smaller scope—the arrival of a 
shipment, or a significant conversation—in which any portrayal of the disaster 
as a whole is usually relegated to the background, and always truncated in time. 
Even for reports that purport to analyze the “whole” event, like those of Marius 
Hautberg’s account of the successes and failures of the French response to the 
1954 earthquake or Alger Républicain’s journalistic chronicle of occurrences fol-
lowing the disaster, the “event” they describe is one with a short duration, since 
they were written only weeks or months after the onset of the disaster. Unlike 
the archival sources produced in response to the “short” events, the memoirs 
and literary representations of disasters considered in this chapter offer the his-
torian additional insight into the effects of time and memory on disasters and 
decolonizations, and on the perceived relations among these “long” events. The 
task undertaken in the present volume is to use these accounts—representations 
of both “short” and “long” events—to construct a critical representation of the 
“long” event that is transparent in its use of evidence and which reveals, from a 
differently informed perspective, what the individual sources cannot offer when 
read in isolation. The result demonstrates the ways in which, from the 1950s 
to the new millennium, humans experienced the events of environmental di-
sasters through their experiences of the political, social, and cultural events of 
decolonization.
Nationalist Ruptures, Survivors’ Nostalgia
The two earthquakes and the flood discussed in the present volume differed 
from the 1959 mass poisoning in Morocco and from other disasters such as 
droughts, famines, and epidemics, in that they destroyed the remembered 
spaces of the built environment. Consequently, writers and survivors have had 
 Rupture, Nostalgia, and Representation 167 
to grapple, not only with grief for the human losses but also with the memory 
of lost places, a memory often shaped by nostalgic longing. “Colonial nostalgia” 
has most often been examined by scholars with a focus on colonizers’ nostalgia 
for an imagined or lost past relationship between the colonizer and the imagined 
colonized subject, and on colonizers’ nostalgia for a home they have left and may 
no longer have access to.4 However, when disasters destroy cities, the disaster 
survivor also experiences the disruption of relationships and the loss of home. 
In this respect, the experience of the disaster survivor has something in com-
mon with that of the “repatriated” colonial settlers who, after decolonization, 
could no longer return to the physical spaces they remember. When, as in the 
cases considered here, the disaster occurred just before, during, or just after the 
process of decolonization, memories of the two were intertwined. The French 
of Orléansville lost the city they knew twice: once in September 1954, and once 
in 1962, when the violence of decolonization drove them north to France. For 
the French of Fréjus, the loss of Algeria was a more distant event, but because the 
war, like the flood, took so many lives in those years, the shock of Algeria’s rev-
olution remained connected to the memory of the flood in the work of French 
memoirists like Max Prado and Christian Hughes, discussed in chapter three. 
For the colonized, however, the loss of Orléansville in 1954 or Agadir in 1960 
exists in a different relationship to decolonization. Because of the near synchro-
nicity of these disasters with national independence, the memorialization of the 
lost places and people of the pre-disaster environment implicates the represen-
tation of life under colonial rule. Nostalgia for the pre-earthquake, colonial-era 
city sits uneasily with the triumphalism demanded by the discourses of newly 
hegemonic nationalism. Yet this tension, and the desire of disaster survivors and 
observers to give voice to grief, inspired complex representations of the pre-disas-
ter, pre-independence past, and of the fraught relationship between the victory 
of national independence and the tragedy of environmental disaster.5
One response to this tension between the survivor’s grief and the patriot’s 
celebration has been to celebrate the rupture brought by the disaster and to 
reject all nostalgia for the pre-disaster, colonial city. This was the response of 
Henri Kréa, discussed in the introduction to this volume, who celebrated the 
1954 earthquake in Algeria as part of the rupture with the colonial past, even 
while acknowledging the horror of the earthquake. Kréa’s treatment of the 1954 
earthquake left no room for nostalgia for the city it destroyed, and one might 
accuse Kréa of callous indifference to the actual ties that residents of the actual 
Orléansville may have had to the city before independence. For Kréa, writing 
in 1956 and 1957, Algeria’s hope lay in the future; the past held only oppression. 
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Orléansville as a city hardly exists in his play, which concerns the relationship 
between an abstract people and the imperial France/Rome.
In Kréa’s play, the earthquake was a “mystical sign”6 that awakens the peo-
ple from their acquiescence. In Aït Ouyahia’s personal memoir, the earthquake 
reveals the oppressive violence of imperialism and gives nationalist focus and 
meaning to the life of a young man hitherto ambivalent about his position in 
the colonial society. Both highlight the inequities and racial discrimination of 
French rule as the fundamental injustice of colonialism. The racist words of 
the French officer at the aid tent precipitated Aït Ouyahia’s conversion from a 
member of the collaborationist elite to a committed representative of the “Arab” 
people, ready to confront the oppressor. The archival record produced in the 
years from 1954 to 1962 does not permit the historian to accept, as a generalized 
truth, Henri Kréa’s and Aït Ouyahia’s portrayal of the earthquake as playing 
a strong causal role in the Algerian people’s nationalist awakening (although 
future research, particularly in Algerian archives, might provide additional ev-
idence). Regardless, however, it is clear that the archival record does reveal a 
complex web of interactions between responses to the earthquake and responses 
to decolonization in those years. Works such as those by Aït Ouyahia and the 
other writers considered below demonstrate that this web of interconnections 
extends further, into the years and decades after the disaster.
Rupture in Rocks and Lights
Like Kréa’s play, Belgacem Aït Ouyahia’s chapter on the Chélif Valley earth-
quake, “Orléansville 54,” eschews nostalgia for what the earthquake destroyed 
and portrays the event as triggering a positive rupture in the doctor’s political 
itinerary from the position of a privileged and proud collaborator to that of an 
active, though not heroic, nationalist. However, the “Orléansville 54” chapter 
stands apart from the rest of the memoir. The geographical and emotional center 
of his memoir, Pierres et Lumières, lies in Kabylia, where Aït Ouyahia grew up 
and where he returned to practice medicine. His account of the Orléansville 
earthquake (introduced in Chapter 2 of the present volume) thus takes the form 
of an excursion, a brief interlude during which he is called away from his first 
post in Kabylia to return to the stricken city where he had done his surgical 
internship. While the geography of the disaster relief expedition from Orléans-
ville to Beni Rached is described in considerable detail, the city of Orléansville 
is not: beyond the walls of the hospital, the reader sees little of the colonial-era 
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city before or after the disaster. In a nostalgic memoir full of detailed description 
of the places and ways of life of the narrator’s personal history, the Orléansville 
chapter is an exception, devoid of nostalgia: the focus is on a positive rupture 
from the colonial past.
Aït Ouyahia’s account of his Arab nationalist awakening in Orléansville is 
foreshadowed by his account of his work in Beni Rached, in the same chapter. 
Aït Ouyahia’s account of Beni Rached highlights the linguistic element in the 
young doctor’s break from his French-privileged past. When Aït Ouyahia en-
countered the bloodied survivors of Beni Rached, he found himself, uncharacter-
istically, addressing them in fluent Arabic: “I was surprised to hear myself speak, 
not because I felt that my words would comfort these unfortunates, but because, 
for the first time, I pronounced six or seven sentences in a row, in Arabic, with-
out a single word of French among them, as was my necessary habit, because of 
ignorance of the language.”7 Writing decades after independence, Aït Ouyahia 
contrasted his unexpected use of Arabic only with his more customary use of 
French. His native Kabyle is unmentioned in this passage, although his Kabyle 
roots figure prominently in his autobiography as a whole. The official nationalist 
ideology of the victorious Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) counted all Mus-
lim Algerians as Arabs (as popular French colonial usage sometimes had), and 
Aït Ouyahia’s Orléansville chapter presents a dichotomous linguistic world of 
Arabic and French. This is consistent with his account of his confrontation with 
the French officer, in which he steps forward to speak on behalf of all “Arabs.” His 
remembered identification with Arabs was a rejection of the sense of distinction 
derived from his status as an évolué—as a French-educated medical student and 
the son of a French-educated schoolteacher. His Kabyle background—elsewhere 
a central, nostalgia-infused theme in his memoir—is left out of the story. In both 
accounts of his personal heroism during the earthquake, the disaster creates a 
bond of solidarity among Algerians, presented as Arabs. On the question of Kab-
yle political identity, Aït Ouyahia is silent. His nostalgia for a lost Kabylia never 
appears when themes of nationalist politics are present. His separation of these 
two themes reflects the dominant ideology under FLN rule, and the political 
realities of independent Algeria in 1999, where a politicized Berberism would not 
be tolerated. Aït Ouyahia mentions his youthful fondness for Ferhat Abbas, the 
most moderate of the Arab-francophone nationalist leaders to join the FLN and 
to survive the revolution’s various purges; if the young doctor had been equally 
fond of the Kabyle nationalist thinkers Si Amar Boulifa and Hocine Hesnay-
Lahmek, the old memoirist would not, could not, have said so.8
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Aït Ouyahia’s story of his encounter with the French officer is unique among 
the portions of his memoir that deal with the movement for independence in 
that it emphasizes the young doctor’s nationalist clarity and strength of personal 
commitment. In other chapters, Aït Ouyahia seems interested in distinguishing 
his memoir from self-aggrandizing tales of nationalist heroics. The book opens 
with a quotation from fellow doctor Jean Bernard on the subject of writing the 
history of French resistance to the Nazi occupation: “Histories of the resistance 
seem to me to written in the form of a triptych. On the middle page, the truth; 
on the left-side page, the story told to the Germans after one’s arrest; on the 
right, the description told to one’s friends after the Liberation. I’m going to try to 
write on the page in the middle.”9 This epigraph situates Aït Ouyahia’s book as a 
memoir of resistance, in this case resistance to French colonialism, but also fore-
shadows the author’s skepticism about the ideological certainties of nationalist 
discourse. The Bernard quotation is immediately followed by a quotation from 
Baudelaire and by a Kabyle proverb; together, these epigraphs frame the text’s 
cultural landscape, shaped by the parataxis of Kabyle and French that pervades 
most of the memoir, though not the Orléansville chapter.
Aït Ouyahia seems to be supporting his claim to adhere to the “page in the 
middle” when he reveals the imperfections of his nationalist credentials through 
his treatment of several key events related to the nationalist struggle. In May 
1945, when Muslim Algerians were protesting and rioting, and the French were 
committing massacres in Sétif, Aït Ouyahia was in Algiers celebrating V-E Day 
alongside European settlers. Later, when a friend denounced the atrocities com-
mitted by the French, the young Aït Ouyahia expressed his faith in the French 
mission civilisatrice, repeating “sempiternal clichés about schools, roads, and hos-
pitals.”10 Eventually, Aït Ouyahia revises his position: in an anecdote set in 1955, 
his friend asks him to assist the nationalist cause by providing medical help to 
resistance fighters. Aït Ouyahia agrees, but he is distinctly nervous about keep-
ing potentially incriminating medical supplies in his office. Soon after, when 
put on trial by the French for his suspected actions, he equivocates, stating, “I 
have never been part of a political organization” and is set free.11 The memoirist 
makes no claim to be a paradigmatic nationalist hero; he explicitly seeks to move 
beyond such clichés.
Aït Ouyahia’s accounts of his involvement with the nationalist cause outside 
of the Orléansville chapter do not mention the earthquake as a turning point. 
The Orléansville chapter also differs from those sections of his memoir in its 
emphasis on the strength of his newfound ideological clarity and commitment. 
However, Aït Ouyahia’s refusal to portray himself as a hero does also appear at 
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the end of his earthquake narrative. The militancy of his confrontation with 
the French officer is interrupted by the salutary intervention of a French nurse, 
who fabricates an emergency in the hospital in order to rescue the young doctor 
from an altercation that he could not win. As in his account of his trial, set 
many months later, Aït Ouyahia avails himself of the opportunity to escape.12 
Here, too, the author’s actions are portrayed as less than heroic. Nevertheless, 
the earthquake chapter clearly presents a narrative in which his experience of 
the disaster constitutes a turning point, a nationalist epiphany.
Rupture in Khaïr-Eddine’s Agadir
Mohammed Khaïr-Eddine’s 1967 novel Agadir also presents seismic disaster as a 
point of rupture from the past, but without the embrace of nationalism conveyed 
by Kréa and Aït Ouyahia. Like Aït Ouyahia, Khaïr-Eddine was not a resident 
of the stricken city at the time of the earthquake but was part of the disaster 
response. Khaïr-Eddine had been born in Morocco’s Tashelhit-speaking south, 
not far from Agadir, and as a government functionary he lived and worked in 
Agadir immediately following the disaster, reviewing survivors’ eligibility for 
government assistance. His novel reveals a detailed interest in the actual impact 
of the earthquake on the city and the survivors. Whereas for Kréa, the symbolic 
meaning of the Orléansville earthquake was clear, Khaïr-Eddine confronted the 
meaninglessness of the disaster, portraying an incomprehensible ruined land-
scape where, as literary scholar Ahmed Raqbi has put it, “existence has no mean-
ing and where silence becomes king.”13 For Khaïr-Eddine, the rupture from the 
past is disorienting, but it is also fraught with longing, and the pull of nostalgia 
is powerful. Yet, for Khaïr-Eddine, nostalgia is a wound, “voracious nostalgia” 
from which his characters seek to be cured.14
Unlike Kréa, and unlike Aït Ouyahia’s representation of his younger self, 
Khaïr-Eddine placed no faith in decolonization as a cure for the ills of the past 
and certainly no faith in anti-colonial political revolution. Like other writers 
discussed here, Khaïr-Eddine portrays the violence of the earthquake and the 
violence of decolonization as inseparable; Khaïr-Eddine, however, does not dis-
tinguish the violence of decolonization from the violence perpetrated by the in-
dependent Moroccan state.15 Writing several years after political independence, 
an exile from an increasingly authoritarian Moroccan monarchy, Khaïr-Eddine 
saw the 1960 earthquake in Agadir not as the harbinger of a new order but as 
a horrific disruption of an oppressive totalitarianism that extended from the 
mythic past to the post-independence present. This disruption revealed the 
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fundamentally unmoored situation of the human individual, but Khaïr-Eddine 
offers no new narrative. His novel, a bricolage of “stream-of-consciousness, splin-
tered persona, multiple perspectives and other techniques of discontinuity”16 
prevents the privileging of a unifying interpretation of the disaster or of Mo-
roccan history. As Larbi Touaf puts it, “As a postcolonial novel, Agadir leaves 
no place for ‘fixity’ or ‘purity’ when it comes to questions of individual or col-
lective identity.”17 Alternating between prose and dramatic dialog, realism and 
hallucinogenic fantasy, past and present, Khaïr-Eddine’s novel offers no simple 
blueprint for understanding the catastrophe of the earthquake or the future of 
the individual after decolonization.
Originally from the town of Tafraout, 150 kilometers from Agadir, Khaïr- 
Eddine grew up in Casablanca. Discussing Khaïr-Eddine’s ancestral roots is 
problematic as a means of understanding his perspective, however. Hédi Abdel- 
Jaouad observes that “Khaïr-Eddine refuses to privilege the figure of the ancestor 
as a potential redeemer of precolonial identity. On the contrary, he is obsessed 
with the present in all its complexity.”18 Yet Touaf argues that Khaïr-Eddine’s 
rejection of grand narratives was conditioned by his Berber background, a cul-
tural heritage which ill-fit the dominant narratives of Moroccan nationalism 
centered on monarchy and on Arab and Islamic identity.19 In Agadir, a character 
called “The Corruptor” speaks to the head of the Armée de Libération Natio-
nale: “Our tribe is historically a people . . . lord, Berber since the placenta, before 
the drop of sperm.”20 Yet neither Berberism nor the military struggle against 
colonialism offered any solution. In the novel, the seventh-century Berber queen 
Kahina appears as one of a succession of tyrants including a caliph, a caïd, the 
dynasts of the Berber Almoravides and the Arab Saadians, as well as the mod-
ern minister of the Interior. The Romans called Kahina the “Serpent Queen of 
Barbary” she says, but she references Marx and calls herself a communist. Unlike 
Kréa’s Jugartha, Kahina provides no salvation. Whether she represents heritage 
or a vision of the future, the narrator says he does not know her and rejects her.21
On the opening page, the narrator’s unnamed traveling companion experi-
ences the disaster as liberating: although he has lost his house, wife, and two 
daughters, he had already wanted to repudiate them. The narrator confronts the 
futility of his own mission to aid the people of the city, for he can recognize no 
city: “They lied to me. There is not the least hint of a city here. . . . Little chance 
that I have of returning life to the people here. They are traumatized men. I am 
not the Good Lord.” According to the narrator, the attempt to find meaning 
by looking to the past, the lost city, is hopeless. The city of the past is a city of 
corpses: “But I sense clearly the subterranean presence of the cadaver of a city. . . . 
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Disturbing odors: exhalations of crushed rats, of human limbs in decomposi-
tion, the stench of disemboweled sewers.” The survivors’ desire to recover the 
traces of identity in the ruins of the past is presented as pathological, exemplified 
by the man who carries with him the severed finger of his dead wife. The narra-
tor states, “The population does not want to leave the city which is, it is believed, 
the cradle of civilization and the matrix in which History is formed. They don’t 
know that their history is already done. But what will and what faith they apply 
to get from the rubble that which is no longer usable.”22
The novel Agadir demonstrates a much more intimate experience of the 
earthquake than does Kréa’s play Le Seisme. Like his narrator, Khaïr-Eddine 
was sent to Agadir after the earthquake by the Moroccan state to process survi-
vors’ applications for state aid and had direct contact with the aftermath of the 
disaster there. The opening section situates the narrative, such as it is, firmly in 
the real space of post-disaster Agadir: in a prefab trailer, eight meters long, three 
and a half meters wide, and three meters high, equipped with a table and chair, a 
typewriter and a calculator, and adorned with portraits “of the dead king and the 
living king”23—portraits which frame the novel in the aftermath of the earth-
quake, after the death of Mohammed V in 1961 and the ascension of Hassan II.
This realism does not pervade the entire novel. In one section, the city is 
dominated by talking animals, most notably a powerful parrot and a cobra. 
Khaïr-Eddine’s feverishly depicted “ville zoologique” is defended by “brigades 
of monkeys” and inhabited by “alligators dozing in the infected water of rect-
angular pools,” as well as by cigarette-smoking dogs, makeup-wearing hyenas, 
and “gorillas with eyeglasses.”24 Khaïr-Eddine was likely referencing accounts 
describing pre-Islamic Berber reverence for sacred animals, ideas later incorpo-
rated into North African Muslim beliefs that animals might testify on Judge-
ment Day.25 Yet Khaïr-Eddine’s vision of a city of hyenas and infected pools 
prowled by scavengers also echoes archival accounts of the cordoned-off disaster 
zone, carpeted with quicklime due of fears of epidemics of cholera and typhoid, 
guarded by soldiers and prowled by scavenging animals. And when Khaïr-Ed-
dine writes of corpses, he references a massive epidemiological, cultural, and po-
litical problem that occupied the Gadiri public, as well as French and Moroccan 
diplomats, for months after the disaster, as discussed in Chapter 5 of this volume. 
The questions asked by Khaïr-Eddine’s narrator were the great political ques-
tions of 1960 and 1961: What would happen to the bodies of the dead, buried 
under the ruins? Would reconstruction take place over the bodies of the victims?
Khaïr-Eddine considers two options for building a meaningful future with-
out an oppressive attachment to the past: the construction of a new, modern 
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city, and emigration. Both scenarios are rooted in the historical experience of 
the city in the months and years after the earthquake; neither offers a satisfying 
solution to the problems of disorientation faced by his narrator. Khaïr-Eddine 
mocks the Moroccan state’s plans to build a new city, guided by the architec-
tural principles of modernist rationalism. The bulldozers and soldiers of the 
newly independent state, as much as the earthquake itself, have produced the 
disorientation felt by his narrator.26 Khaïr-Eddine juxtaposes the urban plan-
ners’ vision, written in capital letters and focused on creating an orderly and 
comprehensible future, to the vain search of a survivor obsessed with finding 
his lost home (and pet gazelle). For Khaïr-Eddine, both are equally absurd, or 
demented: “I have not yet grasped what I am looking for, and I never find my 
City. ONE MUST PERHAPS BEGIN BY BUILDING HOUSES WELL-
ALIGNED SIDE BY SIDE leaving a large enough space between them AND 
DISTANCING THEM FOLLOWING A METICULOUS GEOMETRY 
(but the problem that is posed in the first place is to know whether it is permitted 
to build on the debris of a dead city.)”27 In the political and physical realm, the 
solution in fact arrived at had been to excavate the bodies from the areas where 
rebuilding would take place—while leaving the fallen Kasbah in ruins as a mass 
grave of unretrieved corpses. For Khaïr-Eddine, however, this exemplified the 
larger issue: whether one could find one’s place in the present through reference 
to the past. Although he rejected all attempts to tie the future to nostalgically 
imagined pasts, Khaïr-Eddine was equally critical of the modernist urban plan-
ners’ hopes that mere architecture could solve the problems faced by the city’s in-
habitants simply by ensuring an environment of light and space. He mocked the 
utopianism of those who felt they could improve the human condition through 
architecture: “THE HOUSES CONSEQUENTLY WILL HAVE FORTY 
WINDOWS AND THE MONTHS FORTY DAYS in order to bring all into 
equilibrium and we will have parrots and birds.” Here, Khaïr-Eddine immedi-
ately repeats the central question: “Must one build on the site of the dead city?”28
Khaïr-Eddine also explores the possibility of an escape from the oppres-
sive legacy of the past through the option of emigration to France. However, 
Khaïr-Eddine, who in fact moved to France in 1965, presents this as a delusion-
ary hope. The Shepard declares “make me a passport I want to go to France / 
be a simple miner / in the rectum of the black soil.” His sheep (Le Troupeau), 
however, advise him to stay (“Don’t go, France, it is terrible”), as does the Goat 
(“What the devil will you do in France The cold the snow the daily duties your 
flute will you throw it away you will be a beggar oh do not go.”) The Billy-Goat, 
however, speaks of the fleshly pleasures available in France—“the whores come in 
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abundance calling / who wants a whore who wants one five francs the vagina”—a 
perspective for which the Billy-Goat is promptly lynched by the mob.29 At the 
end of the novel, the narrator’s uncle tries to persuade him to leave the city, but 
Europe is portrayed as a negation rather than a solution: “In Europe where I lived 
in the slums of rain in the voices of our brothers, incomprehensible We have no 
brothers I am your uncle and your father but the relations only exist because we 
wanted them One invents them ceaselessly.” Yet Khaïr-Eddine’s novel finishes 
on a hopeful note: “One must build on the void, voilà. Keep nothing from the 
past… past… bad [ellipses sic]; if not, if a memory is possible, but a reinvented 
past, in the colors of a new vision, and leaving healthy (sain), new [….] I am going 
to a land of joy, young and gleaming, far from the cadavers. So behold me naked, 
simple, elsewhere.” For Khaïr-Eddine, his concluding optimism (if not ironic) 
rests solely on the writer’s ability to break down identities, ideologies, and grand 
narratives: “I will leave with a poem in my pocket; that suffices.”30
Scholarly discussions of Khaïr-Eddine’s Agadir—the most discussed of all 
the representations of disaster treated here—have tended to neglect the author’s 
encounter with the historical earthquake, instead portraying his exploration of 
the disaster in metaphorical terms, as a symbol for the rupture of conventions. 
The earthquake is thus reduced to a mere instrument of the author’s desire to 
break from literary and linguistic conventions and produce “a writing in rup-
ture with conformism.”31 There is no doubt that Khaïr-Eddine’s culturally and 
politically transgressive work emerged in the context of “an interdisciplinary 
and transnational movement” and from the sociocultural matrix of avant-garde 
thinkers in Morocco that in 1966 became centered around the journal Souffles.32 
Nevertheless, I would argue that we should approach Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, like 
the other memoirs and representations considered here, from the point of view 
of its environmental as well as literary context, acknowledging the historical 
earthquake as a force of change. Ted Steinberg has argued that environmental 
history is not just the story of human thought and action inscribed on a passive 
environment; it is also the “less anthropocentric and less arrogant” story of na-
ture’s impact on human thought and action.33 Touaf writes of Khaïr-Eddine’s 
novel that “The earthquake in Agadir introduced a world of great instability, 
violence, and disruption. It aimed at shaking people’s blind faith and sapping the 
foundations of archaic social and aesthetic order, an aim that reverberated in the 
literary and political discourse.”34 This, minus the intentionality, is true not only 
of the earthquake in Agadir the novel but also the earthquake in Agadir the city.
To see Khaïr-Eddine’s portrayal of the earthquake as a product of his desire 
to depict a world of “instability, violence, and disruption” is to ignore the effect 
176 chapter 7 
of the earthquake itself. His desire to enact textual violence against literary con-
vention may have been a product of his literary milieu, but his very notion of 
violence itself was in no small part a product of the earthquake. Khaïr-Eddine’s 
portrayal of a city of rotting corpses, ruined buildings, scavenging animals, and 
severed limbs engaged with the tectonic, social, and political forces that shaped 
the process of burying, excavation, reburying, and reconstruction in the months 
and years following February 29, 1960, processes discussed in Chapter 5. The 
earthquake helped shape Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, a major work applying new 
approaches to Moroccan literature and to the remembering of disaster. Litera-
ture, like memory, is “socially-framed, present-orientated, relational and driven 
by specific agents,”35 but it does not exist independently of the past, that is, of 
the environmental, political, and social forces that shaped the history that is 
remembered or represented. While post-modernist and post-colonial decon-
structions of narrativity were part of francophone literary culture in the early 
1960s, Khaïr-Eddine’s groundbreaking use of non-linearity to represent the dis-
orientation of modernity cannot be separated from the historical experience of 
the disaster he both witnessed and experienced, working in the aftermath of the 
earthquake.36
In Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, the earthquake eclipses any historical rupture pro-
duced by decolonization, but the two are nevertheless portrayed as overlapping 
events, part of the alienation of the modern individual from the past, inter-
twined in Khaïr-Eddine’s non-narrative. Khaïr-Eddine’s novel rejected nation-
alist and monarchist narratives that portrayed decolonization as the transforma-
tional event which was to connect the Moroccan nation both to a modern future 
and to a celebrated heritage. Instead, he depicted a future of uncertain meaning, 
and the present’s violent separation from an inscrutable past.
Nostalgia in Rocks and Lights
Like Khaïr-Eddine’s Agadir, Aït Ouyahia’s memoir is narratively disjointed. 
Criticized by reviewer Dehbia Aït Mansour in the newspaper Liberté for the lack 
of a unifying structure or theme, Aït Ouyahia defended his approach in an inter-
view in Algérie-Littérature-Action, stating that “The digressions came on their 
own; they were not calculated. When writing, I even sometimes had the impres-
sion that they had neither head nor tail. . . . I realize that one might lose one’s 
footing sometimes. I did not want to write to be easy. And if the reader must 
search a bit, I can say that I chose this difficulty.”37 The tone of Aït Ouyahia’s 
response is in keeping with the tone of his memoir, which is peppered with the 
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aging medical professor’s critiques of the ignorance of the younger generation. 
The chaotic structure of his narrative might also be ascribed to the fact that Aït 
Ouyahia in 1999 was not a professional writer but an obstetrician who had hith-
erto published no other work aside from medical articles, even if he did later go 
on to write several novels. However, Aït Ouyahia in 1999 was a highly educated 
member of the francophone elite, and his assertion that his fragmented narra-
tive structure was a product of uncalculated stream-of-consciousness must be 
viewed with skepticism, for his book may reflect the influence of Khaïr-Eddine’s 
work or that of other francophone and North African post-modernists, or the 
doctor’s engagement with medical or literary scholarship on trauma. Regardless, 
the memoir’s lack of an overall narrative structure is a boon, for it allows space 
for many strands of thought and experience, undeterred by the hobgoblins of 
consistency or the tyranny of thematic focus.
The Orléansville chapter is disconnected from other themes in the larger 
memoir of Aït Ouyahia’s life, in which his involvement with the struggle for 
national independence constitutes a significant recurring theme, but that is 
nevertheless overshadowed by his treatment of his relationship with his father 
and grandfather and by his itinerary negotiating his Kabyle village background 
and his relationship with his French education. These themes are alluded to in 
the book’s subtitle: “Memories and digressions of an Algerian doctor, son of 
a schoolteacher ‘of indigenous origin.’” While the dominant narrative of Aït 
Ouyahia’s short account of the Orléansville disaster celebrates a nationalist rup-
ture, the book as a whole repeatedly returns to a nostalgic theme lamenting the 
destruction of the past and the loss of memory, while at the same time approv-
ingly narrating the transformation of Aït Ouyahia’s family from Kabyle villagers 
to French-educated elites.
The book begins with the destruction of Aït Ouyahia’s natal village in Kaby-
lia, and his grandmother’s home, by the guns of the French Operation Jumelles 
in 1959, a destruction that would be made complete after independence when, 
long after the war, the bulldozers of the new regime arrived to pave the way for 
a reconstruction that disregarded the past and rendered the village unrecog-
nizable. Like Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, this narrative does not portray national in-
dependence as salvation. In James McDougall’s terms, nationalist modernity 
imposed its own “disciplinary order” on this society, no less destructive than 
that of the colonizers.38 A great ash tree of the village, a symbol of heritage for 
Aït Ouyahia, survived the bombs but was felled, after independence, by the bull-
dozers. Post-independence, the destruction of the heritage of village life, sym-
bolized by the bombs and bulldozers, continued, as the residents’ way of life was 
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replaced by a new consumerism and a construction boom driven by expatriate 
remittances from France.39 The village of nostalgia was lost, and independence 
did not restore it.
This nostalgia for a lost Kabylia is tempered, however, by a narrative that 
portrays Aït Ouyahia’s family’s encounter with French colonial education, from 
the grandfather who forbade his children from entering the French school, to 
the father who became a schoolteacher, to Aït Ouyahia’s own education as a 
doctor. While Aït Ouyahia’s encounters with French racism play a part in this 
story, and he is occasionally critical of others’ aping of French ways, there is no 
hint of regret about his career trajectory, for that is what led to him becoming 
an obstetric surgeon. Aït Ouyahia describes his youthful belief in the “oeuvre 
civilisastrice” in which he took part as a French-educated doctor.40 Even in the 
Orléansville chapter, Aït Ouyahia portrays his anti-colonialism as built upon 
frustration with the hypocrisy of French rule, not on the rejection of its prin-
ciples. He was driven to nationalism by an accumulation of insults: first racial 
insults as a schoolboy (“Ils sont cons, les Kabyles”), then insubordinations by 
French nurses (“I did not come here to obey an Arab”), and finally those words 
that were “unworthy of a French officer” but that were nonetheless delivered: 
“All thieves, these Arabs.”41
Mostafa Lacheref ’s preface suggests that a recently revived interest among 
Algerian intellectuals in local histories and cultural diversity in Algeria, and 
particularly in Kabyle village life, was what made Aït Ouyahia’s memoir pub-
lishable. This interest, as much as chronology, may account for the concentra-
tion of passages focusing on Kabylia near the beginning of the memoir. A more 
disciplined writer or more ruthless editor might have trimmed much of the later 
material from the manuscript, which would have been a loss for the historian. 
Aït Ouyahia’s treatment of the 1954 earthquake seems disconnected both from 
his pervasive nostalgia for the past and from those portions of his memoir that 
deal with the movement for independence, and which make no mention of the 
earthquake as a formative experience.
His work as a doctor provides the one unifying theme throughout the mem-
oir. Aït Ouyahia’s true moment of heroism comes, not in his confrontation with 
the French officer outside aid tent or in his work for the FLN, but in his treat-
ment of the injured in Beni Rached. It is as a doctor, not a political actor, that 
he finds his calling. Yet, as symbolized by his sudden burst of fluency in Arabic 
at Beni Rached, the two are never fully separated in Aït Ouyahia’s writing. Else-
where in Aït Ouyahia’s larger memoir, there are instances in which, as in the 
Orléansville chapter, Aït Ouyahia portrayed the medical struggle against the 
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inanimate causes of human suffering as akin to the political struggle against 
colonial injustice.
Writing in his own voice as a much older doctor and professor of medicine, 
Aït Ouyahia inveighs against his young medical students’ ignorance of both the 
heroism of the Algerian combatants who gave their lives for independence and 
of the French doctor who pioneered treatment for osteomalacia, the softening 
of the bones, a common cause of maternal death during childbirth in colonial 
Algeria. Linking natural disasters, politics, and medicine, Aït Ouyahia writes 
that “History, when the cyclone quiets, when all the volcanos are extinguished, 
will someday recognize him, perhaps, as a benefactor of des femmes indigènes, or 
of femmes musulmanes, as they said also, indifferently, back then.”42 Aït Ouyahia 
portrays national independence as a crucial turning point in the medical strug-
gle, as he states that osteomacia has disappeared in Algeria “thanks to indepen-
dence…[sic] and also to socialism” which brought “bread and milk everywhere…
[sic] schools and pupils, with rosy cheeks and shoes on their feet.”43
Aït Ouyahia then launches into a story, which he recounted to his medical 
students, of his first breach (siege) delivery, in the snow, in the remote town of 
Icheriden. The linkage of medical work and nationalist struggle found in the 
Orléansville chapter appears in this anecdote as well. Aït Ouyahia, in a telling 
pun, labels this story “the siege of Icheriden,” recalling a French colonial military 
victory of 1857 in which a Kabyle village was destroyed during the French con-
quest of the area. After describing his obstetric accomplishments at Icheriden, 
Aït Ouyahia explains that he resisted the temptation to lecture his students on 
the nineteenth-century political-military events there. Instead, he tells them the 
story of Hassiba Benbouali, an eighteen-year-old ALN fighter who died for the 
Algerian cause. This is not a non-sequitur: both the obstetric and political hero-
ics seem to be included in Aït Ouyahia’s lament that “Algeria forbids history! My 
country forbidden its history, forbidden its heros!”44 Here, the revolution itself is 
the object of nostalgia, accompanied by nostalgia for the medical achievements 
of his own youth. Aït Ouyahia looks back from the point of view of a disappoint-
ing present in which Algerian society has seemingly turned its back on both 
the heritage of the village and the potential of the revolution. In support of this 
theme, Aït Ouyahia’s narrative of the earthquake serves as a vehicle to demon-
strate both the political clarity and the medical heroism that he associated with 
the years of his early adulthood. The revolutionary struggle against injustice and 
the medical struggle against suffering seem to be of a kind—even if Aït Ouyahia 
acknowledges that his own actions were more distinguished on the latter front 
than on the former.45
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Troubles in Childhood Paradise
Habib Tengour of Algeria and Jacques Bensimon of Morocco have both pro-
duced writings that combine themes of rupture and nostalgia. Their per-
sonal narratives of the earthquakes and other dramas of the era of decoloni-
zation address the ambiguous and complex relationships among events. Both 
are accomplished creative professionals: Tengour is a writer, while Bensimon, 
a Moroccan-born, Berber, Jewish writer and filmmaker, became chair of the 
National Film Board of Canada. Like Khaïr-Eddine, Tengour and Bensimon 
self-consciously confront the question of the relationship between memory and 
the events of the past.
Jacques Bensimon’s 2012 account of life in pre-earthquake Agadir, Agadir, 
un paradis dérobé (Agadir, a Stolen Paradise), like Khaïr-Eddine’s novel, and 
like the accounts of the Fréjus disaster written by Gaston Bonheur and Régina 
Wallet (discussed in Chapter 3), exists on the boundary—always blurred—of 
fiction and memoir. Bensimon, unlike Bonheur and Wallet, does not claim an 
absolute veracity for his work; nor does Bensimon purport to simply present his 
memories, without questioning their accuracy. Bensimon presents his work in 
the form of a narrative memoir but states explicitly that he has taken license to 
fictionalize elements of the story, “placing real people in romanticized situations, 
introducing invented personages into real contexts,” and he asks the survivors 
of Agadir to forgive him for such embellishments. Bensimon writes that his ap-
proach, inspired by his career as a filmmaker, is “to perpetrate here a ‘true novel’ 
or a ‘romanticized reality.’”46 This disclaimer, at the end of the book’s introduc-
tion, deliberately invites the reader to question the truthfulness of Bensimon’s 
account of his life in Agadir before the earthquake.
Bensimon’s Agadir presents itself, beginning with its title, as a nostalgic text. 
The narrative is framed by its introduction describing Bensimon’s return to Aga-
dir in 2010 for a reunion with childhood friends on the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the earthquake and by a conclusion discussing the author’s di-
agnosis with terminal colon cancer after his return to Canada. The nostalgia is 
clear in his opening chapters, in which Bensimon states:
This earthquake destroyed a city that is unique in the world, the city where 
I lived, and I wish today to bear witness to this epoch that now survives 
only in my heart and in my spirit. I want to inscribe this happiness that 
the stones, the streets, the faces no longer embody. I want to fix this life, in 
order to preserve the memory of this place.47
 Rupture, Nostalgia, and Representation 181 
Bensimon’s nostalgia is also implicit in his book’s closing sentence, expressing 
his final wish, to be buried in Agadir. In between, Bensimon provides fond 
descriptions of his family, his rascally friends, and the emergence of a pubes-
cent sexual awareness. Yet this nostalgia exists in tension with other elements 
within the text.
Bensimon’s family was not in Agadir in 1960, having emigrated during the 
upheaval of decolonization. Yet his opening chapters present the loss of the city 
where he grew up as a loss created not by decolonization or emigration but by the 
earthquake, which he learned of from a Radio Canada news broadcast: “With 
this earthquake, my life seemed to stop on February 29th, 1960 . . . a part of me is 
as if annihilated.”48 While for the survivors who remained in Agadir after 1960, 
life continued, and the city was reconstructed, for Bensimon the émigré, Agadir 
no longer existed. Up until that moment, he had felt that the home of his mem-
ories was still there, even in his absence. Then, the earthquake forced him to 
confront his irrevocable separation from the places of his past. Bensimon makes 
no mention of the controversies about architecture and the layout and identity 
of the reconstructed city, nor does he invoke the “city without a soul” discourse 
discussed in Chapter 6 of the present volume. The city he wrote about ceased to 
exist in 1960; the post-disaster city is not relevant to his memoir, appearing only 
in his opening paragraph describing his return to Agadir in 2010, dismissed with 
the sentence: “I recognized nothing.”49
There are elements in Bensimon’s text that run counter to his portrayal of 
the earthquake as the definitive point of rupture. There are hints that, prior to 
the earthquake, Agadir had already begun to be “stolen,” by the effects of colo-
nialism and modernity. French education had made the boy Bensimon and his 
classmates “strangers in their own country”; he could barely communicate with 
his own grandmother.50 The commercial success of his petty-bourgeois parents 
also produced alienation from the places and habits of Bensimon’s early child-
hood, most notably when his mother’s shop is moved to “a beautiful modern, 
avant-gardist store” owned by the Swiss company Bata.51 Much like the critics 
of reconstructed Agadir, Bensimon portrayed the building’s architecture as an 
affront to the cultural traditions of the city’s “oriental” residents. For Bensi-
mon, the alienation imposed by modernist architecture and lamented by the 
post-reconstruction purveyors of the “city without a soul” discourse seems to 
have arrived years before the earthquake, borne by the forces of global capitalism.
Despite these hints that not all was idyllic in Bensimon’s pre-earthquake 
Agadir, the mood of nostalgic reminiscence predominates for most of the 
book. Near the end, however, this mood is disrupted by two scenes of startling 
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violence. The first is the brutal rape of the narrator, aged “eight or nine” by one 
of his grandmother’s tenants. This scene, described in bloody, graphic detail, 
is presented as traumatic for the boy not only because of the pain, violation, 
and violence of the act but also because of a feeling of shame, exacerbated by an 
awakened awareness of his own homosexual orientation.52 Agadir, the reader 
suddenly discovers, was no “paradise” for young Bensimon, even in 1951 or 1952. 
The second scene of violence takes place two or three years later, in the shadow 
of a French-imposed curfew, among the tanks and bombings leading up to Mo-
roccan independence. This scene also involved sexual molestation, but this time 
connected to the French presence, now experienced as an occupation. Young 
Bensimon, despite hearing explosions in the city, had broken the curfew after an 
argument with his father, and after staying out all night, was watching a game of 
pinball through the front window of a café. An eight-year-old Muslim girl stood 
next to him, apparently doing the same, as was a legionnaire who stood behind 
her. But then Bensimon noticed the girl was frozen in terror; the legionnaire had 
taken out his penis and was rubbing it against the girl. Bensimon exploded in 
rage, striking the legionnaire with his fists; when the drunken soldier stumbled 
and fell, he kicked him with his feet, and continued until bystanders intervened. 
Bensimon awoke in the hospital; it was then, abruptly, that his parents decided 
to emigrate.53 Thus, in this part of Bensimon’s narrative, it was sexual violence, 
and the abuses of colonialism, that robbed him of “his” Agadir. Nevertheless, the 
introduction presents the moment of the earthquake as a sudden, defining mo-
ment of loss that separates Bensimon from the subject of his nostalgic longing.
Of Fish and Bullocks
While the Agadir earthquake marked an ending for Jacques Bensimon, Algerian 
poet and novelist Habib Tengour has written a short memoir in which the 1954 
earthquake marks the beginning of a coming of age story. Writing from the 
perspective of an adult academic who works and writes in both Constantine and 
Paris, Tengour establishes distance between his transnational adult perspective 
and the world of his childhood with a startling opening sentence that offers an 
explanation for the earthquake: “At that time, the earth was like a flat plate. It 
rested on the horn of a bull calf that was standing, precariously balanced on the 
tail of a fish. When the fish would move it made the earth tremble.”54 
For Tengour, the earthquake was not an obvious point of rupture. It struck 
when he was seven years old, causing minor damage and waking some of the 
residents of his hometown of Mostaganem, 130 kilometers from Orléansville. 
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Tengour’s opening phrase “at that time”55 designates a period of his Algerian 
childhood that continued after the earthquake, with schoolyard games and 
memories of his grandfather. His initial, mythological explanation of the earth-
quake is seamlessly followed by his grandmother’s invocation of God’s protec-
tion and his grandfather’s search for the family Koran, and by an understated, 
realist description of broken crockery and an overturned water jug. His opening 
locates his account of this period in the realm of mythology, and he describes his 
childhood Algeria as a world of stories—religious stories told by his grandfather 
and received with slight skepticism by the precocious boy, stories told by children 
during recess, and stories told by the people of the town.56
Within this mythic context, Tengour relates local explanations of the divine 
causes of the disaster, as fantastic as balancing fish and bull calves. According 
to one story, God was punishing the city because people had brought wine into 
a mosque; according to another, it was because a Muslim scholar (“mufti”) had 
gone to a brothel with a Koran in his coat pocket. There were also tales of orgies 
at religious sites. In yet another version of this story, it was said that prominent 
individuals in Orléansville “moistened their couscous with wine sauce and that, 
under the pretext of celebrating the Night of Error, they devoted themselves to 
fornicating with women and young men.”57
It is clear that the adult Tengour, the writer, does not believe these expla-
nations; they are stories. It is less clear whether the reader is meant to believe 
that these were actual explanations circulating in Mostaganem, or whether, like 
the story of the fish, these stories are the writer’s interventions or importations 
from other contexts.58 Tengour, like Khaïr-Eddine, avoids equating memory 
with truth.
Tengour’s account of his idyllic childhood begins with the earthquake but 
is distant from the epicenter and destruction. This childhood idyll is later dis-
rupted by the violence of decolonization, which produces a turning point within 
his narrative. It emerges, later in the account, that Tengour’s father was a politi-
cal prisoner of the French and was tortured, an event which apparently caused 
the young Tengour to suffer from stress-induced illness, interpreted as the “evil 
eye.” Yet the nationalist struggle does not define Tengour’s experience or mark 
the end of his childhood innocence. Rather, the intrusion of adult perspectives 
comes both through his awareness of his father’s struggle—portrayed as distant 
and abstract—and his growing knowledge of individuals like the family’s Jewish 
neighbors, the Senkmans, and French settlers, the Delages, whose decency and 
humanity disrupts local anti-Semitic beliefs (e.g. that “Jews wake up every morn-
ing with their mouths full of worms”) and nationalist/imperialist dichotomies.59
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Tengour portrays the Algerian Revolution as a common suffering, which 
brings the Muslim and Jewish families closer, as fellow victims of oppression. 
“Today, you are like us,” says Mrs. Senkman to Tengour’s grandfather, relating 
the Jewish experience to the colonial oppression of Muslims.60 Tengour’s father 
is made a prisoner; the Senkmans’ son Albert is conscripted for service in the 
French army, and the suffering of the Senkmans’ son, who after his demobili-
zation hides in his room for years, seems to parallel Tengour’s stress-induced 
ailments related to the imprisonment of his father. The penultimate paragraph 
in Tengour’s account of his youth ends with his grandfather’s words, “Madame 
Delage and her husband are good human beings. You must learn to open your 
heart to goodness, no matter where it comes from. Your father is fighting for the 
country’s independence. The French who torture him are not human beings.” 61 
This story of Algerian childhood which began with the earthquake ends with 
the juxtaposition of universal humanity with the inhuman violence of colonial-
ism. The final paragraph turns to the boy’s eagerness to explore Paris, where 
the family relocated in 1959,62 Unlike Khaïr-Eddine, Tengour portrays this exile 
uncritically, as a liberation that marks the end of the story of his childhood.
Tengour’s memoir, “Childhood,” (in an anthology of Algerian memoirs of 
childhood) presents both his early years in Mostaganem and his coming of age 
in Paris in positive, even nostalgic terms. His nostalgia for his early childhood 
is uncomplicated by the knowledge that these were the years of French rule in 
Algeria: the pre-adolescent Tengour seems initially unaware of the French; they 
are not part of his world. Moreover, this whole period of his life, “at that time” 
is pushed into the realm of mythology by the account of the fish and the bull. 
Between this idyllic beginning and the happy ending, Tengour’s memoir is a re-
alistic account, focusing on his growing awareness of the meaning of colonialism 
and decolonization.
How does the earthquake fit into this story? Tengour’s decision to begin the 
narrative with the 1954 earthquake stands in contrast with the narrative focus 
on decolonization as a coming-of-age story. Tengour’s inability to omit the seis-
mic event, which otherwise fits ill with the themes and structure of his memoir, 
demonstrates the prominence of the natural disaster in his memory of this time 
of war. For many writers, a story that begins with Algeria in 1954 is assumed 
to begin on the night of October 31. For Tengour, however, the earthquake of 
September could not be separated from the story that he tells: the earthquake 
marked the beginning of a series of violent events in the land of his childhood.
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Sites of Nostalgia
Unlike Dr. Aït Ouyahia’s nostalgic memoir, the works discussed here by Kréa, 
Khaïr-Eddine, Tengour, and Bensimon (three professional creative writers and 
one filmmaker, by trade) explicitly recognized that their representations of disas-
ter and decolonization were creative acts. Implicitly, the pseudo-historians Bon-
heur, Croizard, and Wallet, who depicted the Fréjus disaster, also accepted this. 
Local historians Lahsen Roussafi, Yazza Jafri, Abdallah Kikri, and Marie-France 
Dartois of Agadir, and Jacques Torres, formerly of Orléansville, have taken a 
different approach, going to great lengths to assemble documentation of the his-
tory of their pre-disaster cities, both textual and photographic. They have been 
aided by their comrades in civic organizations in Agadir or in the communities 
of the pieds noirs (“repatriated” Europeans of Algeria residing in France) from 
Orléansville. The fruits of this collaborative research, accompanied by (often 
fragmented) commentary by the authors, have been published in book form 
and online.63 Maps and photographs figure prominently on these websites. Dar-
tois’s website, mfd.agadir.free.fr, systematically reconstructs the geography of 
pre-earthquake Agadir, district by district. While members of Agadir’s Forum 
Izorane have aspired to the creation of a walk-through memorial park on the site 
of the ruined Talborj or Kasbah, this website offers a kind of virtual substitute. 
Both Agadir1960.com and Orleansville.free.fr also provide interactive forums 
for the shared construction of memory.
Academic historian Claire Eldridge, in her extensive examination of the me-
morialization of colonial Algeria by France’s communities of pieds noirs and 
of harkis (Muslim Algerians forced to flee Algeria due to their ties with the de-
feated French), has argued that “many pied noir associations take the view that 
memory is the source of history,” placing great faith in their own ability to accu-
rately represent the past and using documentary sources only when they accord 
with a nostalgic view of the colonial era, rejecting outsiders’ attempts to present 
more nuanced or contradictory views that might expose the injustices of the co-
lonial system.64 The work of Jacques Torres and his collaborators at Orleansville.
free.fr fits this description. On the website and in a self-published book, Torres 
depicts an idealized pre-revolutionary Algeria built by the French, but with the 
harmonious cooperation of Muslim Algerians. Torres’s contempt for academic 
criticism of the colonial project is palpable:
I am of the generation of May 1958 and I had to leave the land of my an-
cestors in 1962, chased by the “wind of history” declared by DeGaulle . . 
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. [ellipse sic]. Since then, politically-correct [bien pensantes] heads spew 
torrents of lies about the French presence in Algeria, denying the work 
accomplished by our predecessors—become indigenous—in concert with 
the aboriginals, the “Arabs.”65
Torres’s memorialization of colonial Algeria is framed as a response to decol-
onization, not geoenvironmental disaster; the 1954 earthquake is treated only 
briefly, and serves mainly to convey the impression that Muslim Algerians were 
well-cared for after the disaster, and perhaps overindulged.66 In keeping with 
the process of selective memorialization described by Eldridge, no trace appears 
of the suffering or even the complaints of the Muslim survivors in the wretched 
fall and winter of 1954.
Torres’s erasure of colonial violence and oppression can be seen as stemming 
from an ideological support of colonialism deployed both in order to construct 
a nostalgic image of the colonial past and to defend the pieds noirs against 
imputed guilt. However, the effacing of colonial violence evident in Torres’s 
memorialization of French Orléansville is also found in memorializations of 
pre-earthquake Agadir, and not just by French writers. Like Torres and the pieds 
noirs, both Moroccan and French survivors of Agadir found themselves cut off 
from the physical spaces they remembered because the built environment that 
had shaped their lives had been reduced to rubble. As in the work of Torres, 
the local history of Agadir compiled by Roussafi, Jafri, and Kikr is shaped by 
nostalgia and avoids addressing the injustices of colonialism. Roussafi, in per-
sonal communications and public lectures, speaks about the benefits that the 
French presence brought to Morocco, particularly in the form of the French 
lycée. Pre-earthquake Agadir, especially the doomed Talborj, is consistently 
portrayed as a site of inter-ethnic harmony; Roussafi has described life there as 
“perfect cohabitation.”67 Agadir1960.com and Dartois’s website, mfd.agadir.free.
fr, are the interactive products of collaboration between French and Moroccan 
Muslim survivors of the Agadir earthquake. In these spaces, the prevailing nos-
talgia and grief leave little room for memories of the violence of colonialism in 
the city that was lost. For these survivors of the Agadir earthquake, the environ-
mental trauma, not the trauma of decolonization, shapes an idealized memory 
of the pre-disaster city.
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Mapping Loss
The attention to memories of spaces and places found in these internet-era me-
morializations of Orléansville and Agadir were prefigured in Ali Bouzar’s 1985 
book-length memoir. Bouzar was in Oued Fodda during the 1954 earthquake 
and in El Asnam (previously known as Orléansville, today, Chlef) when the 1980 
earthquake struck. Bouzar had experienced the physical violence of environmen-
tal disaster even more intimately than had Aït Ouyahia or Khaïr-Eddine and 
much more directly than Bensimon (safe in Montreal in 1960) or Tengour (who 
experienced the 1954 earthquake from the safe distance of Mostaganem). While 
Jacques Bensimon portrayed a pre-disaster past that contained intense suffering, 
while nevertheless maintaining a nostalgic approach to that past, and Roussafi, 
Jafri, and Kikr focused on remembering an idealized, harmonious pre-disaster 
past, Bouzar’s disaster memoir Le Consentement du Malheur combined his nos-
talgia with an emphasis on the suffering caused by disasters themselves. Bou-
zar’s 1985 memoir is titled Récit: Témoinage sur la Catastrope d’El Asnam du 10 
Octobre 1980 (Narrative: Testimony on the El Asnam Catastrophe of October 
10, 1980), but Bouzar was also a survivor of the 1954 earthquake and of the years 
of the Algerian Revolution. His memoir combines “long” views of those events 
with his representation of his more recent memories of the 1980 earthquake. 
Like that of Roussafi, Jafri, and Kikr, Bouzar’s narrative demonstrates that, for 
some, natural disaster could eclipse the violence of decolonization.
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes described here, a predominant 
early response was to call for reconstruction—the product of a pressing need for 
shelter for the many, and, for a privileged few, a chance to take advantage of new 
opportunities. When such reconstruction came too slowly, incriminations were 
many. For Ali Bouzar, however, the proper response to the destruction of a city is 
memorialization, not reconstruction: “For this city of memory, of imagination, 
of childhood, no bulldozer, no engine of déblayage, even the most powerful and 
effective, could destroy it, make it disappear. No new El Asnam, well-conceived, 
beautiful, very beautiful, flowering white city of the future could erase it.” 68 In 
contrast to Kréa, Khaïr-Eddine, or Bensimon, Bouzar does not accept that the 
disaster has produced a rupture that renders the past unknowable or inscrutable 
or in need of creative representation. For Bouzar, the pre-disaster city still exists, 
indestructible in his memory, and he sets out to document it.
Unlike Aït Ouyahia, Tengour and Bensimon, whose treatments of the 
decolonization-era earthquakes in Algeria and Morocco are framed within 
the authors’ memoirs of their youth, Bouzar treats his youth in the context of 
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a memoir ostensibly focusing on an earthquake. Bouzar declares his intention 
to write only what he and his own family experienced themselves, organized 
with a “metallic path, the cold of a stopwatch,” denoting the timing of events on 
that fateful 10th of October 1980.69 Yet Bouzar warns his readers that they must 
excuse his “digressions, backwards turns, evocations of certain details which ex-
isted before, which I knew before.”70 Such details are important, argues Bouzar, 
because they constitute an important part of his memory of the city and because 
they offer a bit of comfort to the grieving asnamis, the people of El Asnam.71 Like 
Bensimon’s account of Agadir and like the later memorial websites, Bouzar’s 
memoir focuses specifically on the people and spaces of the city. After the earth-
quake, explains Bouzar, the city is enveloped in dust that obscures, rendering 
invisible buildings that have, regardless, been destroyed by the earthquake. The 
act of writing restores these buildings and these memories.72 Memorialization, 
for Bouzar (as for Jacques Bensimon regarding Agadir) is part of a search for 
healing. Through his digressions, Bouzar’s account folds together an account 
of the day of the 1980 earthquake with nostalgic memories of the Orléansville 
of his youth.
Bouzar’s memoir is structured as a travel narrative, beginning with a tranquil 
morning walk through the city the morning before the 1980 earthquake and 
ending with his voyage, by car, out of the devastated city. Through this travel 
narrative, Bouzar provides the reader with a catalog of his personal landmarks in 
the city—cafés, stores, streets—reconstructing and memorializing the author’s 
emotional geography, populating these spaces with memorable people both from 
the day of the 1980 earthquake and from his youth, “the time of French occu-
pation.”73 Along the way the reader is presented with descriptions and anec-
dotes spanning decades. The places destroyed by the 1980 earthquake are sites 
of memories of colonialism, of the 1954 earthquake, and of decolonization. By 
organizing his memoir geographically, Bouzar flattens chronology.74
Unlike Aït Ouyahia’s earthquake chapter or Kréa’s polemical play from the 
1950s, Bouzar’s memoir shows little sign of nationalism or anti-colonialism, aside 
from a single statement contrasting “national liberation” with “the atrocities of 
colonial repression” among a catalog of misfortunes. These misfortunes are por-
trayed not as exceptional events but as integral parts of the human experience: 
“like the death of a father. The things of life.”75 Bouzar displays little resentment 
toward the French; writing in the 1980s, Bouzar’s ire is reserved for religious 
ideologues. Contrasts between “the bipolarized society of the colonial period” 
and the “apparently egalitarian post-independence community”76 seem effaced 
in the stories of the eccentric characters whom Bouzar recalls from his youth: 
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Tifnini, the irritable merchant; Qabech, the enormous, simple-minded porter; 
Tonton Sennis, the black, French-naturalized, Muslim outcast; Bouzar’s mis-
chievous gang of lycée friends.
Decolonization is nevertheless inscribed in Bouzar’s memory of the built en-
vironment of the city. The very names of the streets and buildings invoke the 
manner in which the memory of the events of 1980 parallels memories from 
the era before 1962, due to an official process of decolonizing place-names after 
independence: “rue Dahnane” is “ex-rue Bugeaud”; “rue des Martyrs” is “ex-rue 
Isly”; and Bouzar’s apartment building, “al Nasri,” is “ex-Le Progress.” More than 
just names have changed; for each locale, Bouzar describes both what the place 
was in 1980 and what it had been before independence. For example, Bouzar re-
counts how, the morning before the 1980 earthquake, he leaves the café that was 
known “in the time of French occupation” as “La Rotonde” and walks through 
the An-Nasr residential development. Bouzar informs the reader that, after the 
1954 earthquake, this had been nothing more than a “stony wasteland, dusty 
in summer and muddy in winter.” Without warning, the narrative shifts to the 
context of the Algerian Revolution: “It was this stony wasteland that, one day, a 
man crossed like lightning, and passed very quickly in front of me. Then several 
seconds later, I heard an explosion, right on rue Isly, which I localized at the 
café La Rotonde. . . . In a fraction of a second, I found myself, an adolescent of 
15 years.” The violence of the anti-colonial struggle thus erupts into Bouzar’s 
narrative of the 1980 disaster. The adolescent Bouzar is confronted by a “pe-
tit-blanc” (working-class) European man with a gun. Smoke and dust filled the 
air, and “soldiers ran in all directions.” But Bouzar states that these were “already 
common scenes,” and his youthful self carried on with his daily tasks. Similarly, 
Bouzar the writer brings the reader back to the post-independence era, remind-
ing the reader that this place became the site of the An-Nasr apartment complex 
in 1962. Bouzar then proceeds with his narrative of October 10, 1980, leading to 
his arrival, after his morning stroll, back at his family foyer, shortly before the 
earthquake.77 When the earthquake strikes, Bouzar and his family survive un-
scathed, though covered in dust and emotionally shaken; not all of their neigh-
bors are so lucky. In his description of the moments of the 1980 disaster, Bouzar 
attributes his family’s survival to his experience of the 1954 quake, flashing back 
to the events of his childhood: “By instinct, with my son held by the arms like a 
sheep bleating in terror, I moved toward the center of the courtyard. By instinct, 
and also because I had the reflex, unaware that twenty-six years had passed, pre-
viously, from September 9, 1954.”78 The seismic shock erases time; the events 
blur together.
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Later, after the 1980 earthquake, Bouzar and his family are in their car, on 
their way out of the stricken city, and they stop to check on the well-being of 
family friends, and the narrative again swerves into the past. The car stops in 
a “rocky, dusty place, overlooking ‘Train-Car City,’” (Cité Wagons), which, as 
Bouzar explains, became a site of emergency housing after the 1954 earthquake, 
where livestock cars were repurposed as temporary refugee quarters. Vacant 
after 1958, the area became a hangout for Bouzar and his young friends, and 
the anti-colonial struggle again erupts into the narrative: “an explosion.” French 
soldiers posted nearby suspected an FLN bomb-making accident and responded 
in force, setting up roadblocks and conducting a manhunt. The explosion, how-
ever, did not originate from a revolutionary bomb-maker, but from one of Bou-
zar’s mischievous friends, who had built a rocket (he later became, according to 
Bouzar, a nuclear physicist for independent Algeria). Captured and dragged to 
the police station, the boy scientist escaped imprisonment only because one of 
his classmates was the son of the police commissioner: he was protected by the 
privilege of attending an elite French school with elite French friends. Bouzar 
and his pals also seemed buoyed by the resilience of youth (or the fog of mem-
ory): they experience the anti-colonial struggle in exciting anecdotes and the 
1954 earthquake as the creator of their childhood haunts.79 But when the nar-
rative abruptly returns to 1980, with the family driving out of the city, Bouzar’s 
digression is immediately followed by a statement that seems to encompass the 
violence of the past as well as the present: “I begin to be exceedingly tired of this 
city in ruins, this disaster, these dead, these injured, the mad, the neurotic, these 
human shadows who wander through the streets of the city, these victims.”80 In 
his narrative, Bouzar leaves the ruined city behind, taking the road to Algiers.
Near the end of the memoir, the road passes through his natal village of Oued 
Fodda, twenty kilometers outside of the city, where the ten-year-old Bouzar had 
experienced the 1954 earthquake. Here, Bouzar recounts his experience of that 
trauma: the family escaped harm but their home was so severely damaged it had 
to be razed, and the family agonized for two days, fearing that Bouzar’s father 
had died in Orléansville where he had been working.81 The memoir then ends 
with Bouzar’s successful arrival in Algiers. Yet Bouzar’s desire to escape to safety 
in 1980 stands in contrast to the author’s later nostalgia for the city of the past: 
through his writing, he attempts to rebuild the city that bulldozers cannot erase.
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Unspeakable
Bouzar’s memoir joins together his memories of the earthquakes of 1954 and 
1980 and of decolonization. These experiences, in his account, are inseparable, 
coexisting in the places of his memory. Bouzar apologizes for the digressive and 
nostalgic elements of his narrative, but makes clear that his real purpose is not 
the orderly representation of the chronology of the 1980 earthquake but rather 
the therapeutic recollection of the past: “to soothe the wounded heart of the 
Asnami survivors (sinistrés).”82 Bouzar sees the act of writing as presumptuous 
because the events he seeks to describe are beyond comprehension: “Unimag-
inable. What happened, in little more than half a minute, surpasses the lim-
its of the imagination, defies human understanding and meaning, and returns 
man to his first humanity, made of fragility, of temporality.”83 Bouzar points out 
that that the disaster produced not only the thousands of dead and injured but 
also “thousands more mad, neurotic, anguished, the mentally mutilated, and 
hundreds of thousands more, finally, who can no longer live like others do, like 
before.”84 Bouzar is one of the lucky ones: “Praise be to God! The drama that I 
just lived struck a blow to my imagination, shook my heart, but passed over my 
reason and my mind. It destroyed neither my reason nor my soul.”85 Bouzar says 
that writing his “testimony” is an act of betrayal (“parjure”) against the shame 
(pudeur) that envelops trauma in Algerian society, as well as an indiscretion in 
the face of the silence of the dead.86 Nevertheless, having recovered his powers 
of language, Ali Bouzar sought to put down in words what others could not. 
Bouzar states that he offers his account of the disaster as an act of altruism, like 
those who donated blood in the aftermath to aid the injured, and as act of con-
solation, like the prayers that Muslims around the world offered for the fallen.87
The Algerian poet Moufdi Zakaria, in a poem introducing Roussafi, Jafri, 
and Kikr’s locally published history of the Agadir earthquake, echoes Bouzar in 
describing the experience of some survivors of disasters, who find the horror and 
loss unspeakable, and who find the memories of the disaster, and of life before it, 
too painful to be expressed:
There are many victims of the Agadir earthquake who do not want 
to remember
the seismic disaster, and hate all mention of it, and it causes them sadness
and pain, and reminds them of its cruel effects, and also reminds them of 
those who are
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lost, loved ones and friends. They are, in fact, living in the disaster 
continuously88
Bouzar describes a similar phenomenon among survivors, who are silenced 
either by “the empire of terror and anguish, or . . . because shame, elemental, 
almost natural within our traditions, wants us to silence the suffering of the 
moment, the injury of the soul, the despair of being.”89 Bouzar recounts that 
there was a moment when he, too, was overwhelmed by the horror of the disaster 
and became speechless: “I am like an animal. . . . I imagine nothing, I no longer 
envision anything.”90 This experience of wordlessness and unspeakability seems 
to be a common response to disasters and has been identified in psychiatric and 
psychoanalytic contexts as a symptom of psychological trauma.
However, as Michelle Belaev argues, “the ‘unspeakability’ of trauma . . . can 
be understood less as an epistemological conundrum or neurobiological fact, but 
more as an outcome of cultural values and ideologies.”91 Bouzar’s allusion to the 
silencing effect of disaster suggests that he would agree with Belaev: the shame 
that silences is only “almost” natural—it is the product of traditions. Such tra-
ditions need not be assumed to be of ancient origin. Paulina Grzeda has argued 
that responses to painful events are also conditioned by “well-established con-
ventions,” including the conventions of writing about trauma.92 Emilie Morin 
has pointed out that the concept of “unspeakability” has also been “ubiquitous 
in accounts of the Algerian War of Independence,” reflecting not only the hor-
rors of torture, but also the silencing of voices by French censorship during what 
the press could only refer to as the “events” in Algeria, and the independent Al-
gerian state’s own silence about the divisions among Algerians during the war.93 
This suggests that, in the context of decolonization-era disasters in the Maghreb, 
invocations of unspeakability might be seen as responses conditioned by the 
experiences and cultures of decolonization as well as by the effects of disasters 
themselves.
Conclusion
For Moroccan, Algerian, and French writers, memories of the disasters that 
destroyed Orléansville, Fréjus, and Agadir have prompted not just traumatic 
silence but also a flowering of expression grappling with events and construct-
ing memories of the places and people who were lost. The memoirs of survivors 
and the imaginations of creative writers reveal the enduring interconnections 
between the environmental and political events that began during the years 
 Rupture, Nostalgia, and Representation 193 
of decolonization. These written works also often exhibit an appreciation of 
the disaster as actor; the inanimate becomes not just context but the author of 
human lives and deaths. These disasters, occurring during a sudden disruption 
of the West’s political and military mastery of the planet, reveal the weakness of 
the putative divide between the environmental and the social. They also reveal 
how the events of decolonization and environmental disaster, however sudden 
in onset, endure over time, not only in their observable, objective “effects” but, 
as Zakaria points out, in the ongoing experiences of those who grappled with 
the meaning of these events.
The events discussed in this volume—decolonization and environmental 
disaster—were linked by synchronicity. In the memories of survivors, however, 
the environmental catastrophes of 1954, 1959, 1960, and 1980 were also linked 
to decolonization through categories of suffering and violence, and through the 
geography of memory. It would be a mistake, however, to view these as mere 
coincidences that were later joined. To tell the story of decolonization without 
including these environmental catastrophes would involve assuming that politi-
cal events were autarkic in shaping Franco-Maghrebi experiences in these years; 
to tell the story of environmental disaster without reference to political change 
would be to impose a division of events that is alien to the documentary record. 
The memoirs and literary representations discussed here suggest that those who 
lived the violence of decolonization and environmental disaster did not con-
ceptualize or experience this violence in discrete categories. For these writers, 
narratives of decolonization could not be neatly separated from the other disas-
ters their communities experienced, and environmental disaster could not be 
separated from the transformations brought about by national independence. 
Yet the mutual imbrication of these events does not appear suddenly, decades 
later, in works of literature and memory. The archival record discussed in earlier 
chapters reveals that decolonization and environmental disaster were tightly in-
terrelated through webs of causation and meaning, in both the “short” and the 
“long” consequences and experiences of these events.
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Conclusion
Humanity and Environment
The history of disasters is both defined and obscured by the per-sistent tendency to privilege the results of deliberate human action in history.1 If Agadir or Orléansville had been leveled by a bomb, their de-
struction would be as widely recounted as the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
But even human-induced events are often neglected if they cannot be ascribed 
directly to human intentions.2 From this intention-centered perspective, our 
understanding of the history of Fréjus seems to hang upon the validity, or lack 
thereof, of the Schmidt-Eenboom hypothesis, and the history of the Moroccan 
oil poisoning upon the culpability of the US military. We tend to think that 
hundreds dead due to an attack matter in a way that hundreds dead due an unin-
tended event do not. If the Front de Libération Nationale blew up the Malpasset 
Dam, if we judge the mass paralysis in Morocco to be the fault of American im-
perialism, then these events attract our attention in a way that “mere” accidents 
do not. A great chasm in historical perception separates the intended from the 
unintended, the human from the inanimate. I would argue, however, that this 
imagined chasm limits our understanding of history.
As Timothy Mitchell writes, “We have entered the twenty-first century still 
divided by a way of thinking inherited from the nineteenth.”3 The tendency to 
forget or ignore the suffering provoked by non-intentionally-induced rapid-onset 
catastrophes is predicated on this way of thinking, which separates the human 
and the social from the nonhuman. For millennia, humans from a wide variety 
of cultural traditions tended to anthropomorphize the non-human forces that 
shape our lives (and voilà, the sun became Apollo, and Indra made the rain). 
The Western Enlightenment’s rejection of such explanations was accompanied 
by the partitioning of the physical world from the world of human agents. The 
former was assigned to science and engineering; the latter to history and politics.
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The notion of “environment” (etymologically, that which surrounds or encir-
cles) is predicated on its opposition to the human agent at the center. Despite the 
idea of motion imbedded in the root verb, virer, the environment is tradition-
ally depicted as relatively stable, changing only slowly (but for human interven-
tion).4 Thus twentieth-century scientists imagined the comforting stability of 
an eco-system in the dizzying activity of nature. The human actor, by contrast, 
moves impetuously within this “natural” environment, sometimes disrupting 
it. But this kinetically based distinction between agent and environment fails in 
the case of rapid-onset disasters, including both earthquakes and anthropogenic 
accidents in which human creations unleashed massive and unintended eects.
Philosopher Jane Bennett asks, “How can humans become more attentive 
to the public activities, aects, and eects of non-humans? What dangers do 
we risk if we continue to overlook the force of things?”5 Disaster survivors were 
o	en keenly aware of the “force of things” in human history, as decolonization 
and disaster merged into a single perceived event: sudden motions of the inan-
imate physical world (rocks, water) intermingling with the actions of humans. 
Of course, tectonic plates, bursting dams, and paralyzing chemicals do not 
possess intentionality. However, as neuroscience, biochemistry and philoso-
phy undermine the illusion of human intentionality, this point seems less and 
less relevant, and what remains of the agent-environment distinction depends 
largely on the distinction between motion (the agent acts) and context (the en-
vironment mostly just sits there, surrounding). Gregory Clancey has recognized 
that rapid-onset disasters appear to possess the unpredictability, arbitrariness, 
and suddenness of human actors—and also are humanlike in their tendency to 
thwart modern imperial eorts to know-in-order-to-control.6 This is not to say 
that slow-moving events like climate change, erosion or desertication do not 
have agent-like characteristics: they have eects in history, and the environment 
never really just sits there, surrounding. The inanimate world acts constantly: it 
is “vital, energetic lively, quivering, vibratory, evanescent, and euescent.”7 My 
point here is that this agentishness of the physical environment —what Ben-
nett has called “thing-power”8—is more visible in large-scale, rapid-onset events, 
making “rapid-onset disasters” a useful category.
My goal in this book has not been to avoid anthropocentrism, for that would 
be to write an environmental history of these events that makes human his-
tory irrelevant and thus reies the separation of the non-intentional from the 
historiography of the social and political. Instead, this volume has aimed to 
explore the role of the inanimate-in-motion in human history. Obviously, the 
scope of this book is delimited both spatially and temporally by human processes 
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and anthropogenic places: the era of decolonization; the French empire since 
1954; localities dened by patterns of human habitation. The focus through-
out has been on the human experiences and human actions that followed the 
unintended movements of rock, water and cresyl phosphates. I have sought to 
investigate the history of a neglected category of event, unintended disasters, 
and a neglected category of human suering, the suering of disaster victims. 
This book is, in other words, a humanistic project: there are no disasters for the 
inanimate, and rocks do not suer. The emphasis here has been on how humans, 
as the social animals that we are, interpret the movements of the inanimate in 
the contexts of sociopolitical experiences—in this case, in the contexts of empire 
and decolonization. Yet this book also strives to recognize that humans are not 
the masters of their own fate, and that the nonhuman world shapes the human 
experience. Human history is, in Mitchell’s words, “an alloy that must emerge 
from a process of manufacture whose ingredients are both human and non-hu-
man, both intentional and not, and in which the intentional or the human is 
always somewhat overrun by the unintended.”9
It is easy enough to recognize, with Rousseau, that there is no “disaster” sep-
arate from the human context it aects. As Mitchell notes, however, it is more 
dicult to acknowledge that there is no human actor who is separate from the 
environment.10 In examining the history of disasters, one might ask: which 
is agent, and which is environment? Do the humans act, and environmental 
events constrain these choices? Or does the disaster strike, and have an impact 
on the human environment in which it acts? Using the rich variety of available 
sources, the historian might tell a story in which the humans (their empires, 
their revolutions, their hierarchies) are the environment, and the central agent is 
the earthquake, ood, or poisonous compound which acts impulsively (though 
not omnipotently, its eects being channeled by the human environment). Or 
one might tell a story of human agents, occasionally jostled and challenged by 
unexpected events in the physical, non-human environment, but exerting power 
over each other and over the environment. Both of these possible narratives are 
based on a dichotomy between the human and the environmental which is 
highly problematic but dicult to avoid. Some historical sources, however, pro-
vide a glimpse of what it is like to experience the world without this dichotomy.
The “experts” who appear in this book tended to imagine themselves as free 
and rational agents acting upon a knowable and pliable, if occasionally recal-
citrant, physical environment, an approach which was consistent with the co-
lonial desire to master both the environment and the colonized subject. En-
gineers, seismologists, and urban planners were condent in their ability to 
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respond eectively and to prepare for future environmental events by building 
a brave new world in a ruined landscape. They arrived on the scene in the wake 
of the disaster, when the motion of the inanimate had ceased or diminished. 
Among the experts discussed here, only the epidemiologists engaged with the 
inanimate as it still moved with the speed of agency, playing real-time defense 
against a still-advancing chemical toxin. The focus of this book, however, has 
been non-experts, for all of those living in disaster-stricken areas experienced the 
inanimate in motion. The poison in Morocco moved at a modest pace and was 
initially unknown to its victims until a	er the fact, but oodwaters and seismic 
waves moved with lightning speed through the human and human-built envi-
ronment, felling buildings and bodies. This experience led to works of memory 
and representation—by Henri Kréa, Christian Hughes, Ali Bouzar, Mohamed 
Khaïr-Eddine, and others—that mark no great divide between the human and 
the environmental, and in particular no great divide between the environmental 
disaster and the other great transformation at hand, decolonization.
This book has demonstrated that the integration of environmental disasters 
and narratives of decolonization found in memoirs and later representations is 
also visible in the archival record produced in the 1950s and early 1960s. This 
early documentary evidence reveals that, from the moment disaster struck, the 
inanimate-in-motion shaped the human process of decolonization through 
multiple avenues of causality, as reactions to these disasters impacted reactions 
to decolonization. At the same time, humans interpreted the meaning of these 
environmental events in terms of the political and social events of decoloniza-
tion. Chemical toxins impaired a superpower’s pursuit of its Cold War objectives 
while enabling the opposition party in a newly independent state to mount new 
critiques of the national government. Floodwaters permitted the local reasser-
tion of boundaries between colonizer and colonized in the provincial metropole, 
in contravention of new state policies. Tectonic movements revealed and exac-
erbated the inequities of colonialism, undermined the crumbling legitimacy of 
colonial rule, and inamed the resentment of the colonized. Seismic waves also 
created opportunities for diplomacy and the extension of new forms of foreign 
inuence, and destroyed precolonial urban architecture and ways of life. This 
destruction catalyzed the expansion of domestic state power and created new 
lines of cultural contestation in the post-colony a	er independence. In both the 
immediate and long a	ermaths of these events, survivors, witnesses and oppor-
tunists produced representations of disasters that merged the environmental 
with the social and political.
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